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Mills Theory of Liberty In outlining his theory on liberty, Mill separates his discussion into two clearly defined areas. The first, of the liberty of thought and discussion, deals with the freedom to articulate ones opinions, the freedom to participate in intellectual, political, religious and general debates and arguments, and the cognate freedom of the press. The second, of the liberty of action, attempts to demarcate the area in which an individual is free to act upon his will, opinions and thoughts. In both, there is a consistent attempt by Mill to impress upon his readers the manifest benefits that would attend an atmosphere of liberty. To Mill, one can never be certain about the veracity or mendacity of ascertain opinion or viewpoint. Any assumption of complete certainty of the truth or falsity of an opinion is an allusion to the infallibility of man.
In addition, those who assume this, and consequently stifle an opinion, exclude all others from hearing that opinion, thereby imposing their own version of certainty (as opposed to absolute certainty) on them. Thus, Mill writes We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still. One obvious benefit from allowing an opinion to be expressed would been that opinion turns out to be true. Then, the intrinsic value of that truth is the reward of the person who allowed his own opinion to be challenged. But, more importantly, the gain is not confined to the individuals involved in the debate; society as a whole benefits from the exposure of a fallacy, and the elucidation of a truth.
Less palpable are the benefits that can be obtained even if the opinion is false. Firstly, Mill believed, even erroneous opinions contain a portion of truth in them. Since the dominant opinion rarely contains the whole truth, Mill believed that such a collision of hostile opinions would bring forth the rest, or at least more of the truth. However, in rare cases, the prevailing opinion might be wholly true. But, even in such cases, Mill believed, any challenges are not rendered totally useless.
As such, even in the locus of completely true viewpoints (with the exception of mathematical truths where all argument is on outside), any attempt to differ should not be crushed and should be entertained. Although such an argument would naturally follow Mills insistence on Mans ultimate fallibility, he bases his conviction on other benefits he believed could be derived from a contest between a whole truth and a differing opinion. Firstly, he believed that all truths, even the most certain ones, would degenerate from being living truths to dead dogmas after period in which the opinion is not challenged. He believed it the fatal tendency of mankind to stop any intelligent thought about a thing as soon it is no longer doubtful. This is especially evident in the average human, as opposed to the intellectual, who relies on authorities to provide them with truths. The owners of these received opinions tend to sink into the deep slumber of a decided opinion.
It is only when such dead dogmas are challenged, are these people awakened from their slumber to defend their truths; if these are not based on true conviction, even the most blatantly obvious truth will give way. A challenge to a whole truth, however foolish it might seem, would thus serve to strengthen the foundation upon which it is built upon; being cognizant of false opinions pertaining to ones truths also aids in fortifying ones justification on relying on ones judgement and tried opinions. An atmosphere of intellectual freedom, according to Mill, would also benefit the general mental well-being of Mankind. It would serve to nurture probing intellectuals to venture unimpeded into bold, ingenious lines of thought, enable normal humans to develop to full potential their mental capabilities including judgement.
By reducing the deadening effects of received opinions, a society where intellectual debate prevails would also serve to strengthen its members reasoning faculties. Even onthe disinterested bystander, a collision of opinion would reveal to him truths and falsehoods he had never considered. The benefits that Mill attributes to a society that allows freedom oration within a certain sphere (which I will elaborate on later) are similar. These are derived from Mills assumption of the intrinsic good of individuality, as opposed to the evils of conformity, such as Ralph Owenssocially manufactured men. Mill believed that an individual (and indeed all mankind) will have his human capabilities withered away if he blindly follows custom, and conforms his nature to a mechanistic model, which it is not.
This is because no two persons are identical, and what is suited to one might be anathema to another. Most importantly, if individuality is stifled by an atmosphere of conformity, the exercise of choice by an individual is also stifled. It is this exercise of choice, the liberty to choose, that Mill is primarily concerned with in his essay. According to Mill, it is only through a regular exercise of choice that aman can benefit from developing his faculties of perception, reason, discriminate feeling, and even moral preference. Without this, man is notre than an automaton, devoid of his own desires, wishes, opinions andersen feelings. Mill further extends the benefits of individuality to the entire society.
He believed that individuality brought about by liberty of action, and the freedom to differ, would contribute to a more diverse, rich and livelier world. This, he believed, makes the (human) race infinitely better worth belonging to. By developing his own individual prowess, an individual thus not only becomes more valuable to himself, but also to others. Mill also thought that it is only in an atmosphere of individual freedom can genius flourish; and geniuses, that special breed of humans, are integral to the development of society, as well as the leadership of it. Ordinary humans, allowed to be original, also become independent centres for creativity, innovation, and originality. Thus, society has as many potential centres for improvement as there are individuals.
If everyone was forced to be the same, made to learn the same things and think these way, mankind will degenerate into what Mill termed as collective mediocrity. This mediocrity not only affects individuals, but also stunts societal growth and leads to mediocre government. It is only the cultivation of individuality, he wrote, which produces, or can produce, well developed human beings. Imitation, Mill wrote, is but an ape-like faculty.
Thus, Man benefits from a liberal society by the fortification and development of his human nature. Thus, to Mill, it is only in an atmosphere where people are free to carryout experiments of living, where men can be different and act differently without fear, and where they can be free to choose unhindered, can individuality flourish. And, for Mill, Individuality and Progress were synonymous. He was of the opinion that it is only when people are palpably different can it be seen which are superior modes of living, values and behaviour. His belief that diversity aids progress reminds me ofDarwins theory of evolution, where the strongest traits are carried on, while weaker, vulnerable characteristics die off. In a nutshell, Mill was convinced that the singularly most important benefit of liberty is the progress of humankind.
Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether some of the benefits Millattributes to liberty would materialise, and whether a liberal society is a necessary pre-condition for these benefits. Firstly, Mill assumes that in the absence of impediments, people would naturally aspire to individuality. He forgets that some people would rather remain in the safety of conformism, try to be as ordinary as possible, rather than risk being made to look foolish. However, Mill does believe that people can be educated up to individuality by way of example and exhortation by practising individualists. Secondly, evidence of history has shown that love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined societies, like puritan Calvinist ones, or under military discipline; if this is so, then Mills assertion that liberty is a necessary condition for the growth of genius does not hold water.
What then does Mill consider a legitimate constraint upon liberty? That, under what circumstances can there be a warranted interference in aman's freedom? At least to Mill, the answer can be easily found in his one very simple principle. That the only legitimate reason for constraint upon a mans liberty is for self protection and to prevent harm to others. To clarify things further, Mill distinguishes between two types of actions: One, actions which concern only the agent (self-regarding actions). Two, actions that concern others besides the agent.
As soon as any part of an individuals conduct affects adversely the interests of others, society has a legitimate right to intervene. Whether to intervene or not will depend on whether general welfare will be promoted. In each persons own concern, he is free to do as he pleases, as he alone will bear the consequences. Taken on the surface, this attempt to clearly demarcate a sphere in which an individual can safely operate without fear of societal interference is very clear-cut and satisfactory. Outside this sphere, society can only warn, advice and basically try to convince the individual when it sees its lifestyle or actions as deviant and harmful to himself. But, it has no legitimate right to actively constrain him, hinder him or impede his freedom to do as he likes in that sphere.
Neither does it have the right to punish him, either by law or by moral disapprobation. This would then beat Mill termed as tyranny of the law and tyranny of opinion. Where there are problems arising from ambiguity, Mill resolved them himself. He acknowledged the fact that some self-regarding actions would inevitably affect others, no man being an island. To resolve this complexity, Mill brought in the concept of duty and obligation. As long ashi's conduct does not violate a distinct obligation to another, such as a many his wife and children, he would not be morally castigated, or legally punished by society.
If he is so punished, it is for his breach of duty andnot for the original self-regarding action. An example given by Mill is the difference between a soldier on duty getting drunk and ordinary man inthe same inebriated state; the latter will be left alone as his action is self-regarding but the former, would be punished not for the self-regarding original action of drinking, but for neglecting his public duty. This qualification, on the first reading, is again a satisfactory one. Mill also quoted the extraordinary case of selling oneself to slavery. Based his principle, the man has the right to do so, as long as he does not violate any defined duty, because this is a self-regarding action. However, Mill sees ground for legitimate interference because he sees it illogical these ones liberty to sell away that liberty.
The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. On the side of the buyer, Mill sees it that no man has the right to act for another. Thus, in short, Mills attempt to explain legitimate constraints on libertrests upon a clearly defined sphere where a man can freely do as he pleases when what he does affects only himself and not others, anderen he does not violate any social or private obligation. The problems arise when one realises that despite all his qualifications, Mills attempt to clearly distinguish between two different kinds of actions is at most tenuous.
Most of his critics agree that it is quite impossible frank action to have no repercussions on the concern of others, despite his qualification with the violation of duty concept, which incidentally only deals with indirect repercussions. This is especially so because the concept does nothing to clarify his frequent mention of harm to others and injurious to others. It is also vague and open to interpretation, as whether there is a duty or obligation involved is quite subjective. To take a modern day example, would a man have any duty or obligation towards artist-tube baby borne not of his genes? Because of the frequency in which the phrases harm to others and injurious to others are used, I worldsex them as central to his Principle of Liberty, and would be an extension what he meant by affecting the concerns of others. Thus I would seethes as superseding Mills weak attempt to bring violation of duty into play.
That Mill never defined what he considered harm and what he deemed injurious seriously undermines the coherence of his attempt to qualify what he meant by a legitimate constraint on liberty. How are we to knowhow far a man is to be left free when we do not know what constitutes harm? Is the hurt of feelings injurious; can we consider, for example, action to be injurious only when physical pain is involved, or also whitmore abstract, and less extreme harm like inconveniences are involved? The point is that because Mill never defines the scope in which action can be said to harm or affect others, a situation arises where therefore too few cases, if any at all, when an action is purely self-regarding, and too many where one can argue that some person in some way is affected. Thus, if we are unable to distinguish to clearly demarcated areas in which some actions are purely self-regarding and some are not, Millsdoctrine becomes entirely untenable.
However, it has been argued that this traditional interpretation of Million very simple principal glosses over the fact that Mill uses two different types of phrases to describe actions. On the one hand we have the use of phrases like conduct which affect only himself, conduct affecting others; on the other, we see phrases like affects the interests of one but himself and affect the interests of others. J. C Rees, unlike traditional critics who see no difference between the two, believes thatcher mean two entirely different things. He believes that an interests haste specific meaning of something that is founded on social recognition as interests, supported by reasons and thus, more tangible than the generality of the unqualified word, affects. For example, a personal affront, which undoubtedly can be called an effect of an action, and thus rendering that action non-self-regarding in that sense, can hardly count as interest, because societal standards of evaluation will not count it assume.
Indeed, non-human entities such as plants and animals, whom Milldefinitely does not include under his Principle of Liberty, can also be thus affected; any attempt to talk of their interests would be ludicrous. Rees further supports this distinction by pointing out the close relation Millcreates between rights and interests when he speaks of certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered rights. By so narrowing the definition down to rights, Mill can be seen to be clarifying that what hemant was not a general effect on others, but a violation of interests and rights. Thus, if we take this reading of Mill, and recognize that interests are not synonymous to general effects, than it is still possible to demarcate an area non-interference where only an individuals interests and rights are concerned. However, I find this distinction hard to accept. Firstly, Mill uses these phrases so interchangeably and freely that it is logical to think that hemant them to be the same.
Secondly, the ambiguity of the word concerns cuts both ways: It might conceal a coherent theory based on interests rather than effects but it might also allude to two completely incompatible principles, one based on interests, and the other on effects. Is, this contradiction renders Mills attempt to explain legitimate interference incoherent and impossible to apply. Also, even if the theory of interests is accepted, it has its own built-in complexities of interpretation. How widely are we to interpret interests? Do we include actions that affect public interests and not any individuals interest in particular? And even if we do only concern ourselves with individual interests, under what standards of evaluation do we consider something an interest?
True, any fanciful whim cannot be considered an interest, but must all interests be tangible and material then? Are psychological interests any less important than monetary or legal ones? Rees attempted to define interests as the condition in which a persons claim to, or title to, or share in something is recognized as valid by others, or at least is regarded as worthy if consideration. Obviously, this aids little in narrowing down the things that can be considered as interests, andersen Rees himself admitted that his attempt was not definitive. Even if we confine our discussion to rights, Mills one very simple principle is still obfuscated. Where constituted, legal rights are concerned, we only have to refer to the law; but in the area of un constituted rights, where Mill advocated punishment by opinion if an infringement should occur, there is again a wide scope for argument as to what counts asunconstituted rights.
The bottom line is that a theory based on interests or rights might been harder to apply than one based on general effects; at least effects can empirically observed. Perhaps if Mill, as C. L Ten suggests, had confined his sphere of legitimate constraints to essential rights resting onthe rules of justice which are common to different societies, he might have managed a more satisfactory attempt at defining legal constraints. The question of public interests that I mentioned above leads to another major problem I encountered when trying to understand Mills Principle of Liberty.
In some areas, Mills attitude towards public interest and the general concern of society is clear. For example, he supports police restraint in public places because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. Also he believed that even when there are grounds for legitimate interference, whether society should actually interfere or not will depend on whether it will be beneficial to general welfare. Mill also recognizes the concept of general weal when dealing with instigators who derive personal benefit. However, Mill seems to drop his considerations of maintain public interests. One blatant example is his opposition to the prohibition on eating pork in a Muslim country.
If he were to be consistent in bringing into consideration general weal, then he would have no grounds on which to oppose the ban. Mill also neatly side-steps the issue of public interest in the area of decency. He dismisses the offences of decency to be only connected indirectly with our subject. He also fails to come to a definite conclusion with regard to the pimp and the keeper of a gambling house, merely remarking that there are arguments on both sides. I feel that by failing to clarify his stand on the public weal, Mill makes it harder even for readers to construe a coherent theory on legitimate restrains. It is often in the domain of public welfare that individual desires and wants come into conflict with.
By including public interests in some considerations, leaving them out in others, and allowing a few unresolved, Mill makes it difficult for his readers to understand without doubt what activities he thinks can be legitimately prohibited, and what should be left unrestrained. Perhaps Mills Principal of Liberty would appear more satisfactory if we accept G. W Smiths interpretation of it being a normative rule of liberty. That is, it prescribes an area of non-interference, a domain of liberty oration, rather than expounding the areas in which one can intervene. By Isaiah Berlins definition, Mill would then be a negative libertarian, concerned with the question of what the area is in which a person can benefit to do what he desires unimpeded. If this is so, then what is important not how satisfactory Mill demarcates the area for interference, but there of non-interference.
Mill does this quite well: Interfering in acts in which only the agent is involved (few though they may be) and which would only affect himself, would not count as legitimate constraint on liberty. However, this still does not resolve the complexities discussed above on what counts as a legitimate restraint. Another way in which I would judge whether Mills explanation is satisfactory is whether it is consistent with his utilitarian theories. This is because I feel that even if his explanation of legitimate constraints is cogent, I would feel it unsatisfactory if it did not also tie in with his utilitarian theories. It is hard for me to see how Mills theory of Liberty, and what he sees as legitimate constraints to liberty, can be consistent with utilitarian principles. It is clear that Mill totally discounts morality-dependent distresses a legitimate constraint on liberty.
This is clearly seen in his objection took-eating prohibition in Muslim countries. Also, an appeal to the utility of other people, whether they like an action or not, is invalid in Mills answer to the question of interference or non interference. However, Mill does use a balancing of utilities, in cases where conduct harms others, by taking into consideration whether general welfare will be promoted by interference. However, because he deals so inconsistently with general welfare, as I have shown, Mill also does not apply these utility principles uniformly. I do agree with C.
L Ten that in some ways, although Mill does not explicitly employ an aggregative standard of value, we can infer it to answer some questions in his theory of liberty. When an action conflicts with similar or overlapping rights of others, it might be overridden insider to minimize the disability from the violation of these rights, and to maximize the sum of intrinsic utility from having a want satisfied. Thus, each interest, right and concern is weighted in order to resolve which rights overridden. If explained as such, utilitarian principles, though not underpinning Mills theory of liberty, is also not incompatible, but instead supplements it by resolving some difficulties arising from the collision often individuals spheres of liberty. Another way in which I think helps in resolving the seeming incompatibility in Mills theories of Utilitarianism and Liberty is to understand that underlying both is his theory of human nature. It is because of mans hedonistic nature that causes him to strive to develop hinson individuality and satisfy his wants at the costs of others.
By trying to conform everybody according to his own idea of life, he secures his utility and protects him from the disability of conflict with a different lifestyle. Mills theory of liberty thus attempts to draw the boundaries in which aman is free to pursue his own happiness, and the areas in which his hedonistic impulses must be sacrificed in order that the sum of societal utility is maximized. All in all, Mills attempt to explain what counts as a legitimate constraint upon utility has many questionable concepts and a plethora of ambiguities. However, it would be wrong to dismiss his theory as untenable just because we are unable to clearly define some terms. On the whole, it does make a courageous attempt to answer the complex question of how much authority should society have over an individual.
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