NOTE: Free essay sample provided on this page should be used for references or sample purposes only. The sample essay is available to anyone, so any direct quoting without mentioning the source will be considered plagiarism by schools, colleges and universities that use plagiarism detection software. To get a completely brand-new, plagiarism-free essay, please use our essay writing service.
One click instant price quote
... om scale. In the case of the yellow box, the introspective knowledge that I have (the knowledge that I am having a certain experience) is not explained by my perception of the internal workings of my mind, rather it is explained by my (sensuous) perception of another o! best, the yellow box.
A certain problem presents itself at this juncture however. In the bathroom scale example, the displaced knowledge is informed not only by the sensuous perception of the bathroom scale, but also by connecting beliefs (the belief that the scale has the function of indicating weight, that it is functioning properly etc... ) and inferences. However, in the case of introspective knowledge, Dretske wants to deny that something like the inference that the person on the bathroom scale makes is going on. "It may seem as though this account of introspective knowledge - as a species of displaced perception - makes it into a form of inferential, and thus indirect, knowledge... If, on a representational theory, introspective knowledge is more like the latter [inferential knowledge] than the former [direct perception], then the representational account fails to give self-knowledge the immediacy we know it to have. " (p. 60) In order to counter this objection, Dretske highlights two differences between introspective knowledge and 'other forms' of displaced perception. The first is that "In the case of self knowledge...
my sensory representation of the intermediate fact need not be veridical for it to carry information about me, about how I am representing things. " (p. 61). In the bathroom example the intermediate fact would be something like the perception of the scale as pointing to 150. If the person on the scale misperceives the scale (say, she perceives the scale as pointing to 150 when in fact it is pointing at 250) then that person does not have a displaced perception about herself (her weight). Perceiving object x (the scale) does not provide information about object y (the person on the scale) because the person misperceives the scale (the intermediate fact) and in fact does not weigh 150 pounds but 250. Dretske claims that in the case of introspective knowledge misperception of the objec!
t in question would not serve to show that displaced perception had not taken place (that information about the mind was not gathered by misperceiving the object in question). That is, if I am misperceiving a box as yellow (say its really green), I still garner information about my mind (that it is perceiving a box as yellow). This distinction between introspective knowledge and 'other forms' of displaced perception is meant to show that introspective knowledge is non-inferential and thereby to avoid the problem elucidated above. "If this is inferential knowledge, it is a strange case of inference: the premises do not have to be true to establish the conclusion. " (p. 61). The second distinction between introspective knowledge and 'other forms' of displaced perception is that the inference from the perception (say of a box as yellow) to the introspective knowledge (say, that I am perceiving a box as yellow) cannot possibly be false. Again, this distinction is supposed to show that introspective knowledge is non-inferential. .".. if this is inferential knowledge, it is a very unusual form of inference.
The premises need not be true and the inference cannot fail... This, I submit, is the source of the 'directness' and 'immediacy' of introspective knowledge. " (pp. 61 - 62) Both of these distinctions seem to be correct. However, it seems that in making them, Dretske has unsuspectingly provided a basis for rejecting his attempt at explaining introspective knowledge without recourse to an 'inner sense'. If, in the case of introspective knowledge, one is to assume that there is no inference from the perception of one thing to knowledge about another, it seems that one must conclude that introspective knowledge is not a form of displaced perception after all.
Dretske argues that one can garner knowledge about a certain thing y not from perceiving that thing but from perceiving a different thing x. This he terms displaced perception. However, at least in non-introspective cases, he does not leave it at that. Indeed, to do so would simply posit a mystery.
What is wanting is not the idea that one can garner knowledge about one object by perceiving another, but an explanation of how this occurs. Dretske explains that this occurs because of a pro! cess of inference from beliefs (that the scale is working properly and has the function of indicating weight) along with the perception of the object (the bathroom scale) to knowledge about the non-perceived object (the person on the scale). However, in the case of introspection, he wants to jettison this explanatory framework.
He claims that introspective knowledge is non-inferential. Therefore, we are left with the following argument; introspective knowledge (knowledge about internal states or perceptions) is garnered by the perception of other objects. But by stating that this form of knowledge is non-inferential, Dretske has given up the only explanation of how this occurs that he has recourse to. Indeed, displaced perception is defined as inferential knowledge (in the form previously described). Therefore, to state that introspective knowledge is non-inferential is to state that introspective knowledge is not displaced perception.
One should remember that the task that Dretske sets for himself is .".. to explain how we come by such knowledge [introspective knowledge] and what gives us this first-person authority. " (p. 40) By claiming that introspective knowledge is a form of displaced perception, he seems to do just that. Displaced perception occurs when an inference is made from a set of beliefs along with a perception of some object x to information about some other object y. However, by making the claim that introspective knowledge is non-inferential, Dretske undercuts the explanatory power of the concept of displaced perception. Indeed, by removing the inferential aspect of the concept of introspective knowledge one is only left with an explanation that must sound something like this; we come by introspective knowledge by perceiving objects. This is certainly no better than an 'inner sense' in terms of its explanatory adequacy.
Certainly, the fact that Dretske's attempt to explain introspective! knowledge as displaced perception fails is no reason on its own to accept an 'inner sense' view. However, Dretske clearly fails to provide a satisfying alternative and thereby fails to head off the objection to externalism that the 'inner sense' view raises.
Free research essays on topics related to: p 61, perception, displaced, knowledge one, introspective
Research essay sample on Introspective Knowledge And Displaced Perception
