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... rate of applicants (there is) a shortage of highly qualified ones (Pilot Turnoverp. 91). Inexperienced pilots tend to make more mistakes than their veteran counterparts, so that the labor demand growth that has taken place with deregulation coupled with a reduced number of former armed forces pilots available may well be a factor undermining airline safety. Having stated that it is, in general, safe to board U.
S. operated planes, yet another qualification must be made at this juncture. Smaller carriers, flying short routes and known as commuter airlines have much worse safety records than the major airlines. According to McConnell: In the past decade, commuter airlines have had 81 fatal accidents, Killing 384 people. In 1987 alone 35 accidents caused 58 deaths. And in the first two months of 1988, crashes killed 22.
The Commuters fatal accidents rate per 100, 000 departures has averaged Seven times that of the major airlines (Mcconnel p. 206). These smaller carriers, like their major airlines counter numbers, are subject to FAA monitoring and regulation, and the results of FAA inquiries into the safety of the commuter lines has led the Agency to suspend or revoke commuter airline operating certificates on 58 occasions since 1981 for safety violations. The heart of the problem with the commuter airlines resides in the shrinking pool of qualified pilots available to them (Ott p. 28). Generally offering lower pay than the majors, the commuter lines have experienced a drain of talent as many of their most experienced pilots have left to take positions with the majors. In 1985, major U. S.
carriers hired some 7, 600 n new pilots; the majority of them previously worked for commuter airlines (Mcconnel p. 209). At the same time, willingness of the majors to accept less qualified pilots from sources apart from the regionals has decreased the quality of regional hires yet another notch (Pilot Turnoverp. 91). The trend toward less experienced crews in this segment of the industry is undeniable. The pilots hired by U. S. regionals who had less than 2, 000 hr.
flight time rose 22. 3 % of those hired in 1985 to 36. 2 % in the first six months of 1989 (Ott p. 29). In addition to a declining level of experience in the cockpits of commuter aircraft, these pilots face demands that often exceed those placed upon pilots working for the majors. On some small carriers, pilots face several trips a day between under-equipped airfields, and in addition must plan routes, study weather, handle baggage and even fuel the plane. Fatigue can become a factor (Mcconnel p. 207). To fill spots, regionals have tried to lure flight instructors from flying schools into their ranks (Pilots Turnoverp. 91).
Unfortunately, by engaging in this practice, the regionals reduce the capacity of the nations flight schools to enlarge the pool of personnel available to all carriers. If a shortage of qualified crew members is identified as a factor that has some causal relation to a perceived decline in American air carrier safety, this effect is most acute at the level of the commuter / regional firms. The evidence regarding the effect of de-regulation upon safety for American airlines is mixed, inconclusive, but nevertheless broad enough. Common sense tells us that older planes and less experienced crews will have a negative impact upon safety, and, in the case of commuter lines, the latter has probably contributed to a performance record significantly below that of the major carriers. Given that a case can be made that identifiable variables are now eroding flight safety, the question naturally becomes: What can be done to remedy or, at least, ameliorate this situation? The FAA formed an Airworthiness Assurance Task Force shortly after the Aloha incident, and, in February, 1989, this body issued its recommendations.
These proposals generally dealt with the tandem problems of aging fleets and inexperienced crews. Regarding the former, The Task Force noted that in several recent accidents, parts that had either been inspected and passed review or parts that were thought to have an infinite working life, broke down. The Airworthiness Assurance Task Force recommended to the FAA an $ 800 million program to upgrade older aircraft. The key provision would mandate the replacement of various parts and assemblies at specified time intervals, even if inspection detected no flaws. In other words, the industry would move to a plan of preventive replacement, rather than preventive maintenance. The plan would require repairs in about one of every five jetliners currently in service (Hoffer p 115).
The FAA itself has followed up on this recommendation: this year the agency mandated replacement of rivets on older 727 s, and in the near future, the order will be extended to veteran 737 s and 747 s as well. The cost of all this promises to be high, amounting to an average of around $ 600, 000 per plane. Still, conducted on a phased basis, it does not spell financial ruin for the majors, and given FAA powers, they have no choice but to comply. The FAA has also made recommendations regarding improvement of crew performance. It has, for example, suggested that airlines should avoid pairing two pilots who may be qualified but inexperienced, either as pilot or in the particular aircraft type they would be flying (Ott p. 29). The Agency has also urged that only experienced pilots be given control over aircraft during times of severe weather conditions.
Both of these proposals have been accepted by the industry. Far more controversial, the FAA has also endorsed the idea of setting autonomous safety departments within each airline that would have absolute power to ground flights or personnel on the basis of safety. These departments would actively monitor pilot performance through retrospective examination of data contained in tapes on flight recorders (Fotos p. 31). Although the airlines see such a move as having safety-enhancing outcomes, the notion that control over scheduled flights will be ceded by line management to a safety procedures, has met with some resistance. At bottom, implementing the Faa's suggestions will carry a step price tag in both financial and management labor terms, and taken together, may contribute to a second round of shakeouts, as weaker carriers will not be able to bear these costs and continue to be competitive. Borenstein, Severin and Zimmerman, Martin B.
Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline Operations, The American Economic Review. Vol. LXXVII, No. 5 (December 1988), pp. Fotos, Christopher P. Flight Safety Advances Hinge on Pilot Management Team Work, Aviation Week & Space Technology Vol. CXXXI, No. 15 (9 October, 1989), Hoffer, William.
Horror in the Skies, Popular Mechanics. Vol. ClXVI, No. 6 (June, 1989), Mcconnel, Malcolm. How Safe Are Commuter Airlines? Readers Digest. (June, 1988) Ott, James. 10 Fatal Crashes Spark Call for New Safety Measures, Aviation Week & Space Technology. Vol.
CXXXI, No. 15 (9 October, 1989), pp. 28 - 30. Pilot Turnover Prompts Regional Airlines to Expand, Improve Training Programs, Aviation Week & Space Technology. Vol. CXXXI, No. 16 (16 October, Bibliography:
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