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... en Lees army was fighting to defend Richmond during the last days of the war, desperate for rations, Governor Vance of North Carolina was congratulating himself on stockpiling 92, 000 uniforms and 150, 000 lbs of bacon, to be used solely by North Carolinian troops. Doubt has also been cast over the determination of its leaders to the cause. Jefferson Davis was a reluctant secessionist, Stephens was heard to remark that Lincoln was not a bad man, and even fire-eating Robert Toombs voted against the firing on Fort Sumter. With such f-hearted secessionists, what could be expected, asked historian Arnold Whitridge. He also cites the delusion that cotton ruled the world as a major factor in the Confederacy's defeat.
Although valid, much of the criticism of the Confederate government could be equally well applied to the Union. Peace Democrats north of the border harassed Lincoln; opposition was vociferous in many quarters following the suspension of habeas corpus, and it appeared for a while that Lincoln would not win the 1864 election. On balance, however, the government of the Union was more united, and more effective. Most historians agree that Lincoln was a greater leader than Davis, although at the start of the war it appeared that the opposite was true. The more experienced Davis soon built up a sound army, commanded by excellent generals.
However, while a good military man, Davis was no politician. His ego bruised easily, and some of his decisions appeared to have been motivated more by personal like or dislike of an individual than any strategic reason. His decision to retain Bragg and leave Beauregard and Johnston in the cold is one such example of this. Whitridge argues that Davis would never have practised the arts of the politician, even if he had understood them, having, learned to obey and command; but nothing in his experience had taught him how to persuade and conciliate. Lincoln, on the other hand, was a masterful diplomat, prepared to overlook personal differences, for example with McClellan, for the good of the Union. He never once faltered in his determination to save the Union, and entertained no doubts as to the wisdom of his policy.
It must be remembered though, that Davis was by no means a weak leader, and had a great deal to contend with in terms of belligerent State governors, supply shortages, and teething troubles which would affect any new government. Also, given the tragic circumstances surrounding Lincolns death, and the worthiness of his cause, there has been a tendency to romanticism him and his achievements, which any historian must guard against. Brian Holden Reid argued that the South lost the Civil War through insufficient will to seek and secure their independence. He draws a comparison between the Confederates and the Boers, who kept the might of the British Empire at bay with a tiny fraction of their aggressors manpower, resources, or expertise.
Several historians cite the example of Paraguay, who sustained a war against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay for six years, when outnumbered in population by thirty to one. This seems a somewhat untenable argument, for three main reasons. Firstly, merely because a bloodier and more devastating war has been fought is not to say that the situation in which many Southerner found themselves was not a desperate one. Shermans raids devastated thousands of acres of land; inflation and shortages meant food was scarce and prohibitively expensive; men of working age were fighting, and therefore could not labour in the fields or factories.
Men deserted to prevent their families from starving, and returned to battle afterwards; a question of necessity, not cowardice or lack of resolve. Rather than any loss of motivation, Bruce Collins argues that the combination of civilian depredations, loss of military manpower, and loss of territory wrecked the Confederate war effort. Thirdly, as McPherson points out, the lack of morale argument is a somewhat circular one. Defeat and depredation reduce morale, which in turn promote defeat and further depredation. However, most would argue that the defeat came before the loss of will to fight, not afterwards. Furthermore, Northern morale was as fragile, if not more so.
Before Antietam, many Northerners were ready to negotiate peace. One wonders how long the Union morale would have held out had it found itself in the same predicament as the Confederacy in 1864. Reasons for Southern defeat are as numerous as they are diverse. Some argue that Lincolns masterstroke was the Emancipation Proclamation. Ultimately, it gave the North 3. 5 M potential new soldiers, removed a substantial section of the Confederate workforce, and extinguished any realistic hope of foreign help for the Confederacy. However, the policy was a divisive one, many Northern generals had misgivings about black troops, and many slaves preferred to ride out the war in familiar surroundings.
Grade McWhinney suggests that strategic defects may have played a role, arguing that the South should have attacked when it defended, and defended when it attacked. Given the numerical advantage of Union armies, defending would have evened out the odds, it is claimed. However, military theory and practice two different things, and battles can always be fought far more effectively in retrospect. The American Civil War was far from a foregone conclusion. The Norths larger population and superior resources were balanced by the geographical and strategic advantages of fighting on Southern soil. Lincolns greater ability can be negated by the Confederacy's plentiful supply of experienced and competent generals.
Before Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the war could easily have gone either way. If forced to give one reason why the South lost, it seems that the gross inadequacy of the Confederate government must be it. Attempting to go from nothing to a large institution running a full-scale war is difficult enough, and would not be helped by an overly-libertarian vice-president, belligerent and unhelpful state governors, a President who was severely lacking in diplomatic or political skill, and an underlying doctrine (States Rights) that was incompatible with full-scale warfare. Struggling with the incubus of John C Calhoun, the Confederacy effectively fought the Civil War with one hand tied behind its back, a disability that even the dashing and brave Southern troops could not overcome.
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Research essay sample on Why Did The South Lose Civil War
