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"Dretske remarks that there are 'two important differences between introspective knowledge and other forms of displaced perception' (p. 60). What are these differences? Are they enough to call into question his view of introspective knowledge as displaced perception?" The second chapter of Naturalizing the Mind is in the main an attempt to provide an account of introspective knowledge consistent with the Representational Thesis. Dretske takes introspective knowledge to be a given and proceeds by trying to explain how such knowledge is possible without appealing to an 'inner sense', an idea that seems to conflict with the Thesis's commitment to externalism about the content of mental states.
To this end, he proposes that introspection is a species of displaced perception. However, he highlights two important differences between introspective knowledge and other forms of displaced perception that seem to suggest that introspective knowledge cannot in any relevant sense be viewed as an instance of displaced perception. As a result, Dretske fails to explain how introspective knowledge is possible and therefore fails to provide a compelling alternative to the 'inner sense' account of introspective knowledge. Introspective knowledge is "knowledge the mind has of itself" (p. 39). For example, knowing, when I perceive a yellow box, that I am having a certain experience (namely an experience of a yellow box) is, for Dretske, an instance of introspective knowledge. This knowledge is not about the box's being yellow or indeed about the box at all, it is knowledge about myself, knowledge that I am having a certain experience (on Dretske's view, knowledge that I am representing a, perceived, box as yellow).
Introspective knowledge seems to have some strange properties. "Natsoulas defines one form of consciousness - reflective consciousness - as a privileged ability to be non-inferentially aware of (all or some of) one's current mental occurrences. We seem to have this ability. In telling you what I believe I do not have to figure this out (as you might have to) from what I say or do. There is nothing from which I infer that A looks longer than B.
It just does. " (p. 39) Dretske take! s the notion that humans have introspective knowledge as a given. His interest in the matter arises when one attempts to "explain how we come by such knowledge and what gives us this first-person authority" (p. 40) Dretske wants to reject one possible explanation, namely the idea that introspective knowledge is garnered by the mind perceiving its own workings. Dretske wants to provide an account of introspective knowledge that does not rely on some sort of 'inner sense' because of his commitment to an externals theory of the mind.
If introspective knowledge can be attained by the mind's perceiving its own internal workings, then it seems that mental facts must be constituted by the intrinsic character of the events occurring in the mind (otherwise, it would be impossible from merely 'looking inward' at the mind to have knowledge of those mental facts), a conclusion that the Representational Thesis rejects. If Dretske succeeds in explaining how introspective knowledge is possible in some manner that does not rely on an 'inner sense', he has shown that externalism about the mind cannot be rejected on the grounds that introspective knowledge (something that is taken as a given) exists. The line that Dretske chooses to pursue is the following; introspective knowledge is a species of displaced perception, the displaced perception model of introspective knowledge shows that introspection can occur without an 'inner sense', therefore, the fact that introspective knowledge exists does not constitute a reason to reject externalism about the mind. It seems that the second step in this paraphrase of Dretske's argument is correct; if introspective knowledge is really is a species of displaced perception, then introspection can occur without an 'inner sense'. However, given certain distinctions that Dretske makes between introspective knowledge and 'other forms' of displaced perception, it seems that introspective knowledge cannot rightly be seen as a form of displaced perception. If this is correct, then Dretske has failed to provide an alternative to the 'inner sense' explanation of introspective knowledge and has subsequently failed to defend externalism from t!
he problems that this explanation poses. Displaced perception occurs when a system perceives facts about an object not by sensuously perceiving that object but by perceiving a different object. The example that Dretske gives is of the perception of one's weight by looking at a bathroom scale. In this case, the person perceives sensuously only the scale (she sees a certain object that has different patches of color in different shapes etc. ) and may perceive that the scale is pointing to 150. Facts that this person perceives about the scale are not instances of displaced perception. Leaving aside the notion that she must interpret the different patches of color as a scale who's pointer is at 150, she perceives that the scale is pointing to 150.
She also perceives that she weighs 150 pounds. This latter fact is not a fact about the scale (like the fact that its pointer is at 150), it is a fact about the perceiver, the person standing on the scale. It is clear, however, that the person in question is not perceiving! herself, she is only perceiving the scale. Of course, this perception requires certain beliefs on the part of the perceiver; that the object that she is perceiving is a device that represents the weight of the object standing on it, that the perceiver is indeed standing on it, that the device is functioning properly etc... This, then, is an instance of displaced perception.
The person in question perceives facts about an object, herself, not by perceiving herself (her body) but by perceiving another object, the bathroom scale. It should be clear here that if introspective knowledge is a form of displaced perception then Dretske has succeeded in explaining "how we come by such knowledge" (p. 40) without appealing to an 'inner sense'. That is, an instance of introspective knowledge, for example the knowledge that I have that I am having a certain experience when I perceive a yellow box, can be explained on the displaced perception model by stating that I garnered knowledge about a certain thing, the contents of my mind, by perceiving (sensuously) another thing, the yellow box just in the same way that the person on the bathroom scale garnered knowledge about a certain thing, her body, by perceiving (sensuously) another thing, the bath...
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Research essay sample on Introspective Knowledge And Displaced Perception
