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When examined closely, the Dieppe raid can be seen for what it truly was- a politically motivated disaster which, due to poor planning and over zealous British leadership, sacrificed needlessly the lives of Canadians for no practical reason at all. In reality, the Canadians who died at Dieppe had no real chance at victory and the British high command knew it, but preferred to martyr the men, rather than look bad in the eyes of their Russian and American allies. As such, Dieppe should not be seen as a dress rehearsal for D-Day, but rather as a tragic comedy of errors which led to the annihilation of over 900 Canadian soldiers. The raid itself was primarily a British venture. In 1942 things were still going poorly for the allies.
The British were retreating in Africa and Burma, and the Americans were trying to stop the advance of the Japanese in the Pacific. At this time, the Germans were also pushing the Russians back to Moscow and Stalingrad (Steubing, 2). As such, the high commands of the Russians and Americans believed that something needed to be done, and soon. Molotov, the Russian foreign minister had visited Britain before the original planning for the Dieppe raid, and had suggested that if a second front were not opened, Russia may be forced to surrender. This would have been a disaster for the British, as it would have freed up the entire German, Romanian, Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian armies to fight in Africa and even the Middle East and India, and would have allowed the Germans to put more attention into an invasion of Britain (Steubing, 3).
There was also pressure from the Americans to make the raid. The Americans had originally planned for a second front to be created by the British, which would then be supported by newly created American divisions. The British knew that with their army fighting in Africa and Burma they had nowhere near the strength to create a new front, but wanted to satisfy their new ally, so they agreed to the raid (Whitaker, 33). The last British factor for launching the raid was Lord Louis Mountbatten, who created the original plans. His ambition in the raid was to create a name for himself, and earn the respect of the high command (Steubing, 33). The reasons for the Canadians wanting to participate in the raid were not as complex.
The three major reasons the Canadians were eager to go along with any plan were: The bulk of the Canadian army had been in Britain since the beginning of the war without having seen action and were getting restless; Canadian leaders wanted the Canadians to see action before the Americans did, and Canadian General Roberts wanted to earn the respect of his British superiors (Canada: The War Years 1939 - 1945, 1). In the end, the final two factors would ensure that, even as the plan deteriorated before them, the Canadians would remain in favour of the attack, even if it meant total destruction. When the events leading up to the raid, and the deterioration of the plan are reviewed, it becomes quite evident that the plan should never have been allowed to go ahead. The original battle plan contained 6 safeguards to ensure success. These were that Heavy bombers would devastate the town and demoralize the defenders; there would be support fire from Naval guns, especially on the main beach; tanks would shepherd in the assault troops on the main beach; British commandos would have taken out the heavy coastal gun positions before the landings occurred; the assault would take the Germans by surprise, and that the German defenses at Dieppe were weak. On June 5 th, the aerial bombing which was to take place was scrapped for mainly political reasons.
Churchill did not want to bomb any French towns out of fear of losing French support, but the official reason was that the bombings would have been too weak to have any effect, which is simply not true (Whitaker, 40). The 150 planned sorties would have done incredible damage to the coastal defenses, as well as forced the German defenders to take cover, making them unable to man their defenses (Botting, 23). Shortly afterwards the naval support for the main beach was cancelled, as High command believed that it would put the battleships and destroyers in danger (Whitaker, 45). The 8 Hunt class destroyers left to provide support were weak at best, and had official orders that they? may? have to provide naval support (Whitaker, 45).
Most members of the Royal navy were surprised that the canceling of the bombings did not increase the Naval support. According to Admiral Baillie-Grohman, ? The decision to cancel the bombing did not lead to a demand to increase correspondingly the naval support gunfire. ? The main problem with the canceling of the bombings and the lack of naval support was that without them, German defenses would be allowed to remain intact and ready for the attack (Whitaker, 50). The canceling of the bombings also made surprise absolutely vital to the plan. Despite the dire need for surprise, high command knew that none could be achieved.
A combined Operation internal memo read, ? we must expect all points on the [French] coast to be alert, particularly after dawn. Tactical surprise will be most difficult to achieve? (Whitaker, 155). The British high command realized that because of the good landing and weather conditions the German defenses would be put on high alert, just as theirs had been when the threat of a German invasion had been at its highest. The Canadians about to attack Dieppe, such as Lieutenant J. S.
Edmondson of the South Saskatchewan regiment, also realized that surprise would be hard to achieve. ? When the tide was right and the moonlight was right, we doubled the sentries, we doubled the alert, we doubled everything. The Germans are just as smart as we are. If the tide is right and the moon is right and everything is right for us to go, they?
re going to double theirs. Now how do you think we can gain surprise? ? (Whitaker, 161). John Campbell also identified the slim chance of surprise being achieved at Dieppe. ? If the good soldier Haase (Commander of the German forces at Dieppe), guarding a sensitive stretch of the channel not long after the commando raid on St. Na zaire wasn? t thinking in terms of an imminent British landing then he surely should have been? (Whitaker, 155).
The plan itself practically guaranteed that the forces on the main beach would not have any chance of achieving surprise as well. The plan called for the flanks to attack first and knock out the German artillery and coastal guns. However, by having the flanks attack first, the Germans defending the main beach would have had lots of time to prepare for the attack, and since there was no bombardment or naval support previous to the landing, the Germans on the main beach had all the time in the world to dig in and prepare (Whitaker, 140). Not all of the British leaders were blind to this fact however, including Admiral Roskill of the Royal Navy. ? Even if the flank attacks catch the enemy unprepared, the town?
s defenders were bound to be fully alerted before the main assault was launched? (Whitaker, 140). While the British were remaining oblivious to the fact that surprise could never be achieved, military observers from other countries, including American commander, lieutenant Colonel Charles Shreiner Jr. had identified the problems. ? Why, after the bombing was cancelled, was the timing of the landings never changed to ensure surprise for the main assault? It was scheduled to take place 30 minutes after the initial commando attack- plenty of time for the Germans to come to full alert? (Whitaker, 141). To make matters worse in respect to surprise, German commander Haase had put his troops on a special state of readiness during the period between June 25 th and July 10 (Whitaker, 150).
All evidence seemed to point to the fact that Haase was ready for an attack. Admiral Roskill added more compelling evidence to support this claim when he said, ? On the 25 th/ 26 th of June the artillery in the Dieppe area remained limbered up all night The Germans had put 2 and 2 together? (Whitaker, 155). As a result of all these problems, surprise was simply not possible, and while high command was well aware of it, they chose to push on anyway.
The next safeguard to fall was the hopes that the German defenses at Dieppe were weak. In reality, the defenses at Dieppe were 4 times stronger than High command believed (Disaster at Dieppe, 1). To make matters worse, High Command was aware of the presence of newly arrived reinforcements and a panzer division from Russia only 40 Km? s outside of Dieppe (Whitaker, 161). All this meant that the Canadians were going to attack a force of similar size, backed by artillery and well dug in. This meant certain disaster, but High Command still pushed on.
The last safeguard, the knowledge that the troops on the main beach would have tank support, was not as secure as High Command believed. Due to a lack of planning, high command didn? t realize that the beach at Dieppe consisted of a unique pebble sand known as? chert? .
Chert was created by particles of lime which had worn off of the overhanging cliffs on the beach, and was unstable at best. With conditions such as these, the tanks were almost guaranteed to sink into the sand (Whitaker, 151). High Command had based the beaches compatibility to handle tanks on postcards and rough photographs, and beach conditions found on the Isle of Wight in the English Channel (Whitaker, 152). In fact, the only available means to judge the slope of the beach for pre landing preparations was a photo of a family picnicking at the breakwater (Whitaker, 152). The few tanks which made it up the beach were doomed for failure. The main mission of the tanks was to knock out the German airfield, which required them to pass under a narrow archway, and through streets which would have been too narrow for a Churchill tank to navigate easily (Whitaker, 153).
This meant that any tanks which made it into the town would either have been trapped in the streets, or trapped once the archway was destroyed (Whitaker, 153). Even the odds that the tanks could have ever gotten into Dieppe were slim at best. A German anti-tank sea wall stood in the way of the tanks. The original plan called for Sappers to either blow breaches in the wall or build timber staircases over it so that the tanks could pass (Whitaker, 153). However, this required the men to carry over 60 pounds of explosives as well as 6 X 6 planks of timber across the open beach (Whitaker, 153). Without the aerial bombardment or supporting fire, the Germans were able to make short work of these weighted down men, and the tanks were trapped (Whitaker, 153).
In either case, the tanks were destined to never see England again, just as so many men were. Geronwy Rees perhaps best summed up the desperate situation now facing the Canadians, ? I believe that the operation would have proceeded even if the troops had been asked to land with no better weapons than their bare hands? (Whitaker 26). On top of the raid being poorly planned, the leadership displayed by the main planners was abhorred. Lord Mountbatten, who devised the plan, was not respected by his fellow officers, and had only gotten his position because he was related to royalty (Whitaker, 25). Mountbatten was known for a lack of foresight, and an egotistical brashness, which came out in the plans he devised before the Dieppe plan (Whitaker, 25).
Mountbatten? s arrogance, mixed with Churchill? s thirst for battle and desire to appease his allies spelled disaster. General Jacobs expressed the concerns that he, along with other British commanders had in regards to Churchill?
s eagerness to engage in battle. ? Winston wanted action everywhere at all times. He felt that the right thing to do was to take a thousand or ten thousand men, make an awful mess and come away. As if it were easy? (Whitaker, 27) Since Churchill so desired battle, he would often allow for impractical elements of Mountbatten? s plans to go ahead.
In General Jacobs words, ? Dickies (Mountbatten) visits (to cheques, a getaway for high ranking military officials) were always dangerous moments and there was no knowing what discussions he (Churchill) might be led into or what he might let us in for? (Whitaker, 26). Due to the friendly relationship that Mountbatten had with Churchill, Churchill would often foolishly go along with many of the changes Mountbatten wished to implement in the raid, without consulting with other high ranking officials beforehand. The lack of leadership unfortunately was not just limited to the British.
Canadian generals failed to show any leadership at all. Even as the Canadian leader, General Roberts, watched the plan get picked apart and become impractical, he failed to object to any of the changes out of fear that he would lose his job (Whitaker, 15). Even as the air support which Roberts had defined as the most important component of the attack was taken away, he failed to object. Colonel Charles Stacey reported that, ? The minutes of the meeting of 5 June make no reference to General Roberts views on the air bombardment? (Whitaker, 16). Overall, the leadership was unorganized, and everyone was, for the most part, unsure of what their role was.
General Montgomery, the supreme commander of all the British forces, was almost completely uninterested in the raid, even though he identified the glaring problems in the planning (Whitaker, 161). Geronwy Rees also noted Montgomery? s lack of interest when he wrote, ? I am surprised that the army commander should be so little perturbed about the risks of the operation.
It was, he implied, an operation which had been decided upon by the Chiefs of Staff, for reasons which he was not concerned? (Whitaker, 157). Even Mountbatten did not have complete control over the situation. Admiral Baillie-Grohman commented that, ? Mountbatten told me he had not wanted the frontal attack plan either. He said he had been keen on going in on the flanks and had fought hard for it. But the army had insisted on the frontal attack and they had had their way because, after all, it was a military matter? (Whitaker, 147).
It can be seen that the leadership was loose at best. No one was truly sure who was in charge, and no one was willing to take charge. As such, nobody was there to stand up and cancel the operation. If the planning of the operation was not bad enough, the implementation of the plan was worse. On route to Dieppe the landing craft were spotted by a German convoy, which should have made the L. c. ?
s turn around and head back to England. However, despite the warnings, the attack pressed ahead (Botting, 25). The main attacks also came late, so that the troops ended up landing in broad daylight, making them easy targets for dug in German machine guns (Botting, 26). To make matters worse for the men who landed on the main beach, the tanks which were to escort them landed 15 minutes late, which left them open to the guns (Botting, 26).
Even when the tanks landed they were caught in the sand and quickly taken out of the battle (Botting, 27). The final nail in the coffin for the men on the main beach was that the commando? s had only been able to knock out one of the coastal batteries (Botting, 27). As a result of everything that had gone wrong, the force on the main beach was quickly pinned down and defeated. After the battle, the British quickly declared the battle as having been a?
practice for the real thing? (Botting, 33). Despite this cover, almost all British officials failed to accept any blame for themselves. Mountbatten refused to believe that there had not been an element of surprise as well. This can be seen in the proceeding conversation between Captain Denis Whitaker of the Royal Hamilton light infantry and Lord Mountbatten at the Combined Operations debriefing in Montagu house. ? Right Whitaker. Now we have already established that secrecy and tactical surprise were maintained in the Dieppe raid.
The fact that the lights were on at the lighthouse, the slow entry of the luftwaffe into the battle, the success of the commandos on the right flank: These are all convincing evidence of this? Sir, I landed on the main beach. When I interrogated a German prisoner at the casino he boasted? We have been waiting for you for a week? Sit down, Captain Whitaker. I do not believe the enemy was forewarned.
I want constructive criticism- not excuses? (Whitaker, XIV prologue). Admiral Hughes-Hall also denied having ever received warnings about the German convoy, but was quickly proven wrong. After he had been proven wrong CCO quickly stated? that convoy was a different one and had nothing to do with the German vessels met at 0350 hours? (Whitaker, 18). In total only 2500 of the 6100 men returned to England, 1000 of which had never landed at all (Botting, 33). 900 Canadians gave their lives in this futile action, with an additional 1000 wounded and 2000 taken prisoner (Botting, 33). On top of all the losses, not a single target had been knocked out during the entire operation.
In retrospect, the entire Dieppe operation was doomed from the start. Poor planning, and a lack of leadership sent over 900 Canadians to an early grave. The official excuse for the operation was that it was a dress rehearsal for D-Day. But how can that be a proper justification?
All evidence points to the fact that Dieppe was merely a political move, made to appease our Russian and American allies. The High command knew the attack would not work, but went ahead with it anyway despite the carnage they knew the attack would inflict. The? lessons? learned at Dieppe were known long before that attack ever took place. As such, it is obvious to see that the?
lessons learned? theory is just an excuse to justify the worst military operation of the war. Geronwy Rees eerily summed up the situation when he stating that, ? No one drew the logical idea that Rutter was no longer feasible as a serious operation of war.
Henceforward it could only be an expensive and murderous laboratory experiment? (Whitaker, 247). Even if lessons were learned, at what price were they learned at? More than 900 Canadians died on the beaches of Dieppe, not because they believed that they being used as guinea pigs, but because they believed that their actions could start the process of bringing an end to the worst war the earth has ever seen. Due to the ineptness of the planning, those 900 men would never again see the faces of their loved ones, or enjoy the simples pleasures of life we take for granted everyday.
Perhaps that is the saddest aspect of the entire battle, for even as we debate whether or not Dieppe was a futile action, those 900 men lie in France, paying a silent tribute to the horrors of war. 349
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