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The Prospects of European Unions Global Hegemony The long-cycle Political Theory of World Leadership assumes such a state of global culture, which provides for one nation to enjoy the powers of dominance until a strong competitor who is willing to take the place emerges. However, in such a case the struggle between the opponents is rather tough. That, as during the years shortly after the Send World War, it is comply assumed that the global economic and political hegemony f the United States is destined t last free. But history debt stand still. As ther capitalist pwer's recipes their strength, they became active economic competitors and made inroads in the dominance f U.
S. industry, trade, and finance. Mrever, the recovered war-tm pwer's eventually shattered a key fact f U. S. leadership, facing the abandonment f the dollar-as-gd-as-gld provision f the Brettn Wds agreement. Business analysts have fr years posted t the United States as the engine f growth f the world economy.
With the United States accounting fr roughly 40 percent f the growth f world trade since 1995, demand in U. S. markets has proper up many ther enemies (Kagan, 2003). However, a slowdown r decline in the U. S. economy contributes t global economic difficulties and encourages the search fr ways t let economic ties with the hegemonic power.
Additionally, the U. S. drive t make war at will and the world has led sme government t at least seek a way t shake ff American leadership. With Japan in severe economic crisis fr a de years, the mst likely challenger t U. S. hegemony is the Eurpean Unit (EU).
In what files, I will fcu's n the the f global dominance and its application t the current geopolitical situation in the world. The problem f hegemony has been a may issue in U. S. -Eurpean relations since the United States emerged as a great power at the end f the 19 th century. The United States fight tw big wars in Eurpe ut f fear that if a single power (in the cases, Germany) attained hegemony in Eurpe, it would be able t mobilize the continents resources and threaten America in its wn backyard, the Western Hemisphere. The conventional wide hld's that Americas pst-World War II initiatives - the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty - were driven by similar fears f possible Sviet hegemony in Eurpe (Chase-Dunn, 1983). Until recently, Eurpean integration and its potential independence could be seen as a rapidly evening and unstoppable press.
The Eurpean Unin's member states had also completed a single market, had introduced a can currency, and were negotiating the membership f a number f eastern Eurpean countries. Mrever, a convention had been set up t wrk ut proposals fr a Eurpean constitution. Even before eastern enlargement the EU represented an economy that came case t the U. S. economy in terms f Girls Domestic Product, share in world trade, and market capitalization. This economic performance generated such a growing self-consciousness that the Eurpean government declared, at the EU summit in Lisbn, that Eurpe would become the mst competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. (Chase-Dunn, 1983) In my view, the ability f the EU t challenge the United States depends less n economic potential than n the formulation f a political project.
U. S. dominance can be replaced by a new world hegemonic re under Eurpean auspices with the EU drafting and establishing international institutions that could given the world economy. In considering what files, we must make tw reservations. First, frm its very beginning, Eurpean integration was mainly concentrated n the creating f a unified economic regin. Economic integration has been the least can denominator ever since, and this economic fcu's helped t disguise the differing political aspirations f EU member states (Goldstein, 1988).
But nw that economic integration has reached its highest stage with monetary unit, further integration in Eurpe can be deepened with political integration. The establishment f the Convention n the Future f the Eurpean Unit confirms this. As this convention concentrates mainly n technical questin's concerning the distribution f resources and responsibilities and member states and the EUs institutions, pen conflict ver different political claims could be added. However, this technorati approach leaves the convention, and the institutions and government behind it, unable t formulate a current political project. Send, a Eurpean project presupposes nt nly consensus r compromise and ruling classes, it als requires the allegiance f the subordinate classes. Political elites, the media, and even CEs free pint t an imaginary Eurpean Social Model t legitimize Eurpean integration (Modelski, 1978).
This reference brings tw advantages. n the ne hand, it speaks t the traditions f Eurpean labor movements and welfare states. Despite years f slashing welfare provisions and dismantling workers rights, bth still play an important rle in peple's daily lives. n the ther hand, the mainly identical construction f a Eurpean Social Model all Eurpean states t pint t the allegedly interior pure market economy f the United States. Paradxically, however, the very non f any srt f social model raises the expectations f rdi nary people concerning the level f employment, social security, and labor standards. These raised expectations stand in stark contrast t the EUs practice f pricing greater competition and working people as well as the unemployed in re t drive do their standards f living.
The contradiction between expectations and everyday experience has produced a crisis f legitimacy fr Eurpean integration. The recent electric successes f nationalistic right-wing parties are a visible sign f centrifugal free undermining nt nly further Eurpean integration but als even the state f integration that has been achieved up t nw (Kagan, 2003). When considering the possible parade f Eurpean Unin's global dominance we must consider whether the EU can replace the United States as the global source f consumption, and thus economic growth? In the late 1990 s, Eurpe went through a period f accelerated integration. In 1998, negotiations began n eastern enlargement f the EU, with six applicant countries; in 1999, the Eurpean Monetary Unit (EMU) began. Tw years later, Eurpe went int recession, as did the world economy.
The inability f the Eurpean economy t river quickly frm this downturn, much less spearhead a global economic recovery, derailed the EUs ambition t take the world economic lead frm the United States, an ambition pr claimed at the EU summit in Lisbn (Bamyeh, 2000). Nevertheless, an economically integrated Eurpe des represent a potential threat t U. S. leadership in the world economy - nt because the Eurpean economy is inexorably n the rise hut because the U.
S. economy has weakened. T understand why U. S. hegemony has weakened, it is useful t have a lk int recent history.
In the 1970 s, the turn frm the dollar-based regime f fixed exchange rates t floating rates, as well as the U. S. retreat frm Vietnam, were visible signs f a crisis f U. S.
hegemony. And behind these signs were tw interwoven develpment's. ne was that Germany and Japan also caught up with U. S. levels f productivity and per capita income, thus being may economic competitors in world markets.
The ther was the transition frm a period f unprecedented property in world capitalism t a general swing do f growth that was accompanied by intensified class struggle and accelerating rates f inflation. In these new circumstances, the United States failed t deliver relative stability t world capitalism as it had dne between the end f the Send World War and the late 1960 s (Thompson, 1988). The reaction f the dominant capitalist enemies t the economic crisis f the 1970 s was three fld. First, monetary policies shifted frm the prevailing recipe f balancing unemployment and inflation t policies that were intended t squeeze inflation ut f the capitalist economy by restricting my supply and increasing interest rates, and which accepted the negative consequences these prices had n growth and employment. Send, these enemies turned, albeit t varying degrees and in different frm's, t actins against labor (Thompson, 1988). The spectrum f these actins ranged frm unit bashing in Britain under Margaret Thatcher t corporatist integration f trade unin's in programs t reduce welfare standards in mst f continental Eurpe.
The eurpe f these policies was t lower workers bargaining power at the company level as well as in several- r nation-wide negotiations n wages, wrk hur's, and working conditions. Profits were t be reserved at the expense f wages. Third, spending cuts were implemented in welfare programs. Conservatives had always claimed that the welfare state undermined the proletariat wrk ethic. The growth slowdown, as well as intensified class struggles, gave them ammunition fr this argument and served as a justification t dismantle the welfare state. These policies were successful in achieving their immediate gals f reducing the rate f inflation, redistributing incme's frm wages t profits, and reducing welfare spending.
But they failed t achieve lng-term property, as promised by their presents. Average growth in the 1980 s in the United States hardly reached the level f the crisis-ridden 1970 s, while EU member states fell behind even that level. What is mre, the 1970 s als saw a reversal f the catch-up press that Eurpe had undergone during the 1960 s. n the we, the 1980 s and 1990 s were marked by a widening growth gap between Eurpe and the United States (Modelski, 1978). Besides U.
S. military dominance, which was never questioned, this development helped t restore U. S. hegemony. When crisis hit, frm the late 1990 s until the present, practically all f the s-called emerging enemies, as well as Japans, needed a significant injection f increased demand in the world economy t stimulate growth. In economic terms, the United States was nt in a position t d this.
During the recession f 1991, the United States was able t balance its current account (experts minus imports f gds and services plus net investment income and transfers) fr a short time and t restrict further increases in foreign debt. However, this is nt the case that when growth f the U. S. current account deficit has accelerated. Frm an economic pint f view, ne thing seems clear at the men. Deflatinary tendencies in the world economy and U.
S. hegemonic prblem's have contributed t intensified competition between the trading blc's f North America and Eurpe. Whether this transforms int a full-fledged imperialist rivalry is a question f political strategies pursued within these tw blc's. This hld's especially fr the EU, since n ne can debt that the United States is willing t defend its dominance.
A lack f political integration may prevent the Eurpean Unit frm transforming itself int a superpower capable f challenging the United States in its dominant position. T see why ruling classes in Eurpe may fail t act collectively, it is necessary t understand ne peculiarity f Eurpean integration after the Send World War. The driving free behind the integration press were certain political gals f the leading pwer's within western Eurpe: t balance pwer's within western Eurpe; t create a bulwark against the Sviet Unit and its sphere f influence; and t regulate relationships between Eurpe and the United States. However, these political gals were achieved largely through economic integration (Chase-Dunn, 1973).
Economic integration in Eurpe, although it had the side effect f creating a may trading blc, was used primarily as a means t deal with these matters f foreign policy. Ironically, the question f political integration was posted at the very beginning f integration in Eurpe. Even before the Send World War was ver, small, mostly liberal, sometimes socialist, political circles had launched the idea f a Eurpean federation. In this way, Eurpe could maintain independence frm the tw pst-war superpowers - the United States and the Sviet Unit. Mrever, such a federation could create a Third Way between state-run socialism in the East and free-market capitalism in the West (Thompson, 1988). At the beginning f the 1970 s, ruling classes in Eurpe remained convinced f their ability t maintain economic property by the paper application f Keynesian policies.
Encouraged by this conviction, they set the ambitious gal f introducing a can currency, ne that could challenge the leading position f the dollar in the world economy. The dominance f the latter became questionable when financial turmoil led the U. S. government t unilaterally abandon the Brettn Wds System in 1973. Mrever, demand management failed t keep the world economy n track and inflation under cntrl during the send half f the decade. Thus, at the end f the 1970 s, Eurpean's were happy t introduce fixed exchange rates instead f a can currency (Bamyeh, 2000).
In this way, they were able t reconstruct a certain degree f stability within Eurpe at least, while the world economy had entered a phase f financial instability. Nevertheless, it was nt the swift and successful integration in Eurpe that called U. S. hegemony int question at that time. Quite t the contrary, in the early 1980 s, the U. S.
bourgeoisie seemed ready and willing t leave the crisis-ridden 1970 s behind by adopting though policies against the perceived external and internal enemies f liberty and property: the Sviet Unit, liberation movements in the third world, trade unin's, and the welfare state. At the same time, ruling classes in Eurpe hesitated t take n any f these enemies. Complaints abut Eur-Sclerosis, a term that was meant t describe the excessive influence f trade unin's and welfare state regulations n capitals accumulation strategies, were widespread (Goldstein, 1988). This particular style f pursuing ne liberal policies gave rise t the non f a Eurpean Social Model that will be dealt with in the following sectin. What is important here is that the crisis f the 1970 s speed do Eurpean integration but did nt cause a shift frm economic t political integration. This did nt change even when the Cld War came t a sudden end in the early 1990 s.
The primacy f economic ver political r even social integration, characteristic f develpment's in Eurpe frm the 1950 s until that, may turn ut t be a dead end in the near future. Fr ne thing, because monetary unit has reached completion, any further deepening f integration will necessarily have t be abut political r social issues. Contrary t illusions abut the free market, the creating f a single market and a can currency in n way implies the absence f political interference. Frm the early days f lowering and then abolishing internal tariffs up t the introduction f the eur, economic integration in Eurpe was always accompanied by the evolution f a hybrid economic technocracy. This stands in a stark contrast t the weakness f democratic participation and legislative pwer's n the Eurpean level.
However, the main problem fr Eurpean integration and dominance projects des nt lie in the field f sluggish and unstable growth f the economy, nr with inefficient political structures, but in a failure t gain legitimacy. Attempts t legitimize Eurpean integration have been undertaken recently by left-f-centre parties which promised t deliver a new frm f equality t compensate fr the hardships imposed upn workers by ne liberal restructuring f crpratins and world markets (Kagan, 2003). ne f the characteristics f these Third Way parties has been t present themselves as an alternative t bth the welfare states f the pst-war era, and the pure market economy that seemed t have been realized in the United States. In these efforts t dissociate themselves frm the U.
S. model, the Third Way parties have embraced what has cme t be known as the Eurpean Social Model. The reasons fr the quick rise and fall f Third Way politics are t be fund in Eurpean history. After the Send World War, moderate factors f the labor movements in Western Eurpe fund themselves integrated int capitalism's institutional structure by the establishment f national welfare states. Even the labor movements mre radical factors either became sympathetic t the developing welfare systems r succumbed t heavy political pressure frm Western Eurpe's ruling classes and, ccasinally, labur's mre and mre institutionalized currents. The identical position that the economic integration f western Eurpean countries could develop together with national welfare states became very important.
While the swift development f international and especially intra-Eurpean trade during the pst-war bm was hardly recognized, the expansion f welfare provisions and rising labor standards affected the lives f the vast majority f people in Eurpean countries immediately. Thus, economic integration in Eurpe and social integration within the institutional framework f national welfare states went hand-in-hand. But it was the welfare state, nt integration f Eurpean r world markets that gained the allegiance f the people. Reference: Thompson, William R.
On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2003). Modelski, George. The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State, Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (April 1978) 214 - 35. Goldstein, Joshua. Long Cycles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Joan Sokolov sky, Interstate Systems, World-Empires and the Capitalist World Economy, International Studies Quarterly 27 (Sept. 1983): 357 - 67. Bamyeh, Mohammed. The Ends of Globalization. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.
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