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Example research essay topic: U S Foreign Policy Second World War - 2,904 words

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U. S. Foreign Policy and Aid to Nepal in the Cold War Period: Implications for Future Direction U. S. Foreign Policy and Aid to Nepal in the Cold War Period: Implications for Future Direction Table of Contents Introduction The U. S.

Interest in Nepal The Motivations for Aid The U. S. Aid and its Foreign Policy Objectives U. S. Aid and the Politico-Economic Objectives An Evaluation of The Aid Impact The Future Direction of the U.

S. Aid Conclusion Bibliography Introduction Foreign aid is basically a diplomatic instrument. The United States was the first country to employ aid systematically in order to achieve its major foreign policy goals in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Of the several less developed countries that have received U. S. aid since the 1950 s, Nepal was one of the first.

Nepal and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1947 and four years later signed the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation on 23 January 1951. The external factors, i. e. the strategic location of South Asia and the potential risk this region was exposed to from communist powers, motivated the U. S. to provide aid to countries like Nepal.

Similarly, the internal factors, such as the weak and un institutionalized governments, general poverty and the growing popularity of national communist parties in South Asia, were equally important motivations for the U. S. to supply aid to countries of South Asia. Nepal was definitely one of the poorest to receive aid yet strategically vital because of its physical proximity to the Tibetan autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. Even more far-reaching was the assumption that any communist influence on Nepal could spill over to the South Asian region and beyond to the vulnerable Far East.

The underlying assumption of this research is that U. S. Foreign policy and aid to Nepal are based mainly on geopolitical location of this country, which situated between two major strategic powers such as China and India. All this influence has clear and evident roots which originate in Cold War Period and has certain aims which are directed into the future of U. S. foreign policy globally and particularly in Asia.

This paper has three main objectives: (a) to examine the fundamental aid objectives of the United States in Nepal during the cold war period, (b) to assess the major accomplishments of the U. S. aid, and (c) to draw conclusions about the directions of U. S. aid in the post-cold war period and explain the implications for Nepal. The paper begins with a brief history of the relations between the two countries.

The major part of the paper discusses the United States aid policy in Nepal in the context of its foreign policy objectives and the success of aid in achieving them. The last section draws conclusions about U. S. aid to Nepal and examines possible implications of aid in the post-cold war period.

The U. S. Interest in Nepal When Nepal and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1947, Nepal had been ruled for one hundred years by the autocratic Rana family - a system of government based on hereditary premiership. This system of rule was overthrown by the anti-Rana movement led by the Nepali Congress in 1951. The period from 1951 to 1959 was a period of political instability as King Tribhuvan (the grandfather of the present King Birendra) and his son Mahendra postponed general elections but changed prime ministers quite frequently. In 1959, general elections were held for the first time in Nepal's history and the Nepali Congress, led by B.

P. Koirala, formed the government. This government was then dissolved abruptly in December 1960 by King Mahendra, who began to rule absolutely through a system of government called the party less panchayat system. Not until the Spring of 1990 did a popular movement for the restoration of democracy finally force King Birendra to replace absolute rule with a constitutional monarchy.

Since 1990, Nepal has been experimenting with multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Viewing the U. S. 's interest in aiding Nepal from U. S. and Nepal perspectives will be useful for understanding whether the interests of the two countries were compatible. The U.

S. based its foreign policy objectives in Nepal on two main premises: (a) The people of Nepal, similar to those in other poor countries, wanted desperately to experience change in their living conditions, a fact made evident to the U. S. by the overthrow of the Rana system of government in 1951.

And (b), the United States believed that it could use aid to prevent Nepal from becoming a hot spot of rivalry between India and China, and the people from turning towards radical ideology as a way of addressing the fundamental problems. It was also the opinion of the United States that Nepal, with such a diverse group in terms of language and religion, could better promote national unity through faster economic development. For Nepal, U. S. influence could be used to counter undue outside influence on the parts of India and China. The United States did not have any direct security concerns in South Asia, let alone in Nepal.

While the United States's tragic interests remained vital throughout the cold war period, they were pursued with varying degrees of intensity in the countries of South Asia. As pointed out by Thomas Thornton, "developing a security policy toward South Asia-or even making an assessment of security interests there-is not on the conceptual maps of Americans. American leaders, since at least the time of Eisenhower, have sought to include South Asia into either Southeast or Southwest Asia rather than handle the region as an entity on its own. " However, due to massive poverty and potentially explosive inequalities between the poor and the rich in the countries of the region, the United States viewed South Asian nations as vulnerable to communism. As such, Nepal's geopolitical location was the major factor influencing the U. S. interest.

The United States believed that Nepal's independence and territorial integrity were of importance to the security of South Asia as a whole. By the mid 1940 s, it had become quite apparent that the colonial rule of the British in India would come to an end. It was almost certain that Britain would withdraw from India after the end of the Second World War with far-reaching consequences for the political map of the Indian subcontinent. The end of British rule in India would cause direct and serious effects on the despotic Rana rule in Nepal. Being wary of this the Rana's began to turn towards America in early 1945.

The need for establishing direct links between the United States and Nepal was felt by both countries for distinctly different reasons. As stated above, the Rana rulers of Nepal (1846 - 1951) needed the support of countries like the United States. The British government was both financially and militarily weakening by the mid 1940 s as was evidenced in its failure to support the governments of Greece and Turkey against guerrilla-leftist forces. The Soviet Union was deeply engaged in Europe and was expanding its influence toward Asia, which exerted pressure on the United States to shift the focus its foreign policy objectives to Asia.

As stated by George Guess, "with an emerging 'bipolar' view (Sino-Soviet bloc) of the world as decision premise, the U. S. stepped up military and economic aid to receptive leaders and regimes in this region in order to 'leverage' its world view. " India and China were politically weak and vulnerable in the early second half of the 1940 s and could not have withstood the potential threats from the Soviet Union. Nepal's geographical proximity to China was the main factor determining the U.

S. interest in Nepal. The United States also anticipated a build-up of strong Soviet influence that could penetrate south of the Himalayas through weak states like Nepal. For the Rana prime minister, the power vacuum left by the British in India could to some extent be bridged by the United States, which might be favorable to the regime. It was only in the fall of 1950 that the United States was prompted to react in favor of the Rana regime, when two distinct events with considerable destabilizing consequences occurred: 1) Nepal's King Tribhuvan's move, in the midst of an insurgency led by the Nepali Congress against the Rana regime, to seek political asylum in early November 1950 at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu and 2) the Chinese occupation of Tibet in late October 1950.

The King's action further intensified the insurgency. Meanwhile, the British government was employing an ambiguous diplomacy because on the one hand, it had recognized the infant grandson of the King, who was proclaimed "king" by the Rana prime minister, but on the other hand, it had stated that it "would like, if possible, to keep in line with Indian policy. " The United States considered the king's move to be potentially the most destabilizing factor in Nepal. However, the U. S. government stated that "it might not be in the interests of stability in the present international situation to do anything to weaken the Rana regime in Nepal. " This was the kind of policy dividend the Rana's had expected from their prior contact with the United States. Tibet has been strategically important for China, India and the Soviet Union.

From the U. S. perspective, if India was not prepared to make an issue of the Tibetan question, it was not going to take the situation seriously. The United States did not want to go against India's line since India controlled Tibet's access to the West. Any direct contact between the U. S.

and Tibet was regarded by the U. S. administration as giving China a cause for concern and the Soviet Union a reason for infiltration into Tibet. The immediate concern for the United States was to prevent a communist intrusion across the Himalayas.

One strong justification for the increased "tempo of U. S. -Nepalese political and economic relations" was the "increased Russian and Chinese Communist interest in the Himalayan periphery of Nepal, and events in Tibet and Sinkiang Province and their impact on Nepal. " Moreover, the U. S. saw that " a permanent post at Nepal's capital would also provide a channel of information regarding Tibet. " The U. S. realized, however, that Tibet could not provide a military, ideological or economic base for its policy toward Central or South Asia.

Tibet's geographical remoteness and unsuitability for any military operations against the U. S. S. R. were other factors in the U. S.

decision not to support the Tibetan movements for independence. U. S. -India relations were not very warm in the early 1950 s. India's independence leaders did not appreciate the U.

S. support of the European Allies in the Second World War as they believed that such support would have given an indirect boost to the imperialist rule of Britain and France. India also opposed the U. S. Asia policy, particularly in Korea and Japan. To the dismay of the Americans, India vehemently supported the admission of China to the United Nations.

India also believed that the aid and capital investment forthcoming from the United States was inadequate to encourage its development. India was extremely vulnerable politically in the final days of its fight for independence as the Hindus and Muslims were engaged in bitter communal riots unprecedented in India's history. India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir for one year after their independence. The partition of India and its aftermath created so much hostility, enmity and rivalry between India and Pakistan that the United States could neither pursue balanced relations with both countries nor support one at the cost of the other. Hence, Nepal was an ideal candidate both geopolitically and in view of the developments in Indo-U. S.

relations, for the U. S. to pursue its major foreign policy objective of countering any possible communist threat to both Nepal, and through it, to the Indian sub-continent. The Motivations for Aid The U. S. aid objectives in Nepal were pursued in the context of its major foreign policy objectives.

Reading some of the official documents and policy statements of the U. S. government, one can summarize its major foreign policy objectives as (a) helping Nepal maintain its independence and neutrality, (b) containing the possible threat of communism, (c) supporting Nepal's development efforts to become a modernized and developed economy, and (d) enhancing Nepal's "western orientation. " For the sake of our analysis, these objectives can be grouped into two main types, strategic and politico-economic. These objectives were not designed in a vacuum but were contingent on political developments in China and the South Asian region and the American perception of these developments.

The United States believed very strongly, at least until the 1960 s, that a security threat to Nepal's independence either from the north or the south could only heighten the possibility of a major war in Asia. The U. S. Ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker, described the importance of Nepal's independence as a "stone in the arch of world freedom and progress. " He further commented: "We, all freedom-loving countries, want to keep each stone in place, for each is as necessary and important as any other. To help Nepal make its contribution to that arch is reason enough for our assistance. " The second objective, i. e. , the containment of a possible attack by communist China, remained vital until the late 1960 s.

The U. S. perceived two types of communist threats as prevalent in Nepal: physical aggression and ideological influence from China. Nepal was both militarily and eco-technologically weak, no match for China, given the latter's demographic and military size. Moreover, with the growing influence of the former Soviet Union since the mid 1950 s, the United States perceived ideological influence from this country as well. Therefore, according to the statement of the U.

S. Ambassador designate, "Nepal as being within the U. S. defense perimeter (required) protection against communist imperialism. " The consequence of such a perception on the part of the United States culminated in the minor arms assistance offered in the mid 1960 s. The total military assistance was US $ 1. 8 million in 1965 - 66. India knew about this assistance as it was stated that the military equipment the United States supplies d were not available in India.

Apparently, this aid, which came at a time when India proved to be militarily weaker than China after its defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, was meant as a mere gesture to show the extent of foreign policy engagement the U. S. could undertake in case of a threat to Nepal from the north. Ostensibly, however, it was to aid the Khampa rebels based in eastern Tibet who were fighting the Chinese from Nepal.

Creating economic conditions that would prevent internal communist subjugation in Nepal remained one of the major foreign policy goals of U. S. aid from the time of President Truman until the collapse of communism in 1990. The United States feared communist uprising either through internal subversion or through external pressure against less developed countries freed from colonial rule after the Second World War. Although Nepal was not a colonized country, the United States perceived a similar situation after the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951. The threat of communist ideological penetration intensified with the growing rivalry between the former Soviet Union and China by the late 1950 s, as was evident by the fact that the early 1960 s saw the communist force become divided along China and Moscow factions.

Hence, preventing possible communist exploitation of Nepal's poverty and underdevelopment also became a foreign policy priority for the United States. After the dissolution of the first democratic ally elected government in December 1960 it was no surprise that the United States very strongly believed Nepal's monarchy to be a much stronger bulwark against communist uprising and de-emphasized the restoration of democracy. However, it did become one of the strongest advocates of democracy and human rights and gave moral support to the 1990 movement for the restoration of democracy in Nepal. Complementary to its objective of containing the communist menace in Nepal was the U. S.

objective of helping to modernize and develop Nepal's economy. With the end of Rana rule in 1951, Nepal broke free of its shell of isolation from rest of the world and found itself to be extremely backward socio-economically. Feudalism was strong and inequality in land holdings, the major source of livelihood and wealth, between the landed aristocracy and the marginal landowners and tenants was massive. In terms of the development of the basic infrastructures and level of education and minimum health facilities, Nepal found itself severely underdeveloped.

Hence, the appetite for external assistance for its development was enormous. For the Americans, the logic was simple: if economic development and modernization contribute to uplifting the conditions of the majority of the poor, they will not be a fertile ground for communism. The other foreign policy objective the U. S. pursued in Nepal was to orient it toward "western democracies. " This would come, the U.

S. policy makers believed, as a natural result of meeting the economic development and modernization objectives. The first three years after the signing of the


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Research essay sample on U S Foreign Policy Second World War

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