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... Arabs by an average ratio of 45 to 13 percentage points. On September 14, that ratio was 55 to 7. Conventional wisdom once held that such favor ability to Israel was tied to Israel's patent usefulness to America during the Cold War, and it was often suggested that such favor ability might falter 'after the end of the Cold War. That did not happen. A strong factor in the American public's sympathy for Israel has always been the felt ties of common political and social culture.
When asked, a large majority of Americans have said that Israelis are "more like us, " as compared with Arabs. The positive interaction of Jews with other Americans during the past half-century has clearly played a role. (1). On the other hand, the measure of "sympathy" may be a weak reed on which to rest the predictability of the American public's support of Israel in a crunch; it does not take into account the question of how much Americans are willing to "sacrifice" for that sympathy. In the last four Gallup polls on the subject, between May of 1998 and July, 2000, 2 out of 10 Americans have consistently held that in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the United States should take Israel's side, but 7 out of 10 have said that the United States "should not take either side. " According to a Newsweek poll in October 2001, about 6 out of 10 said that America's relationship with Israel was a big reason for the terrorist attack, although at the time, the same proportion of Americans shrewdly agreed that if America moved away from Israel, it would not stop the terrorism. (1).
The evidence is that American public opinion on support of Israel, while highly favorable, is not as deep as it might be, and in a crunch for America, both that opinion and the war against terrorism could be vulnerable to this theme expressed by the semi-apologists. This Israeli-connected theme is strengthened by certain tendencies of opinion expressed by many influential's who do not qualify as semi-apologists. One such tendency is exemplified by those media and public officials who -- presumably in an attempt to be "fair" and "diplomatic" -- over-exercise the principle of equivalence. This often happens in company with a failure to acknowledge the legitimate role of self-defense in the arena of violence, as defined by the United Nations Charter. Thus, whenever there is an exchange between Palestinian terrorism and Israeli response, an abundance of media editorials will give them equal weight and call for equal subsidence. It is fair game for observers to criticize Israel when they think it overreacts or otherwise behaves unreasonably.
But the automatic application of equivalence feeds the cause of those semi-apologists who are using Ladenist terrorism as a means of furthering their anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian ideology. (Mistone 48). An exaggerated distinction between Palestinian and Ladenist terrorism serves the same purpose. Some Palestinian terrorists may have a more limited purpose than that of Al Qaeda, which is one of the reasons that bin Laden has not had it at the top of his agenda. On the other hand, Ha " are recently reported that of the first one hundred Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel, 66 belonged to Hamas, 34 to the Islamic Jihad. Both of these terrorist groups had core training in Al Qaeda camps, and are part of the radical Islamist network. There is no reason to believe that they would lay down their bombs or dismantle their and-American hostility if this country were to withdraw its support of Israel.
There is more reason to believe that if terrorist pressure were to cause America to withdraw its support - to the detriment of Israel, orthodox radical Islamism would even more thoroughly rule in the Palestinian state - to the detriment of Palestinian Arabs, and with little profit to America's image. (3). Perhaps the semi-apologists are most reprehensible in introducing any discussion at all of the "root causes" of a terrorism which is in itself inexcusable by any civilized and moral standards. They are largely impelled by the kind of philosophy simply expressed by the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, that "everything that allows the triumph of the revolution is moral, " voiced before him and after him by a number of nihilists, including those of radical Islamism. The tragic irony is that any serious effect the semi-apologists might have would directly contravene the "compassionate" goals in whose name they speak -- whether for the condition of the depressed Islamic or Palestinian people, or the lessening of hostility and warfare in the world. But whatever the consequences, the acts of serial terrorism will not stop until the Ladenist movement -- beyond bin Laden himself -- is destroyed. If this war is as extended and difficult as promised, at its core will be a struggle for the minds of Americans.
Under burdensome circumstances, the resolve of the American people could be weakened if they don't understand the full import of this terrorism. And that American resolve could be undermined by the specious semi-apologist suggestion that the Ladenist's would refrain from terrorism if we would behave more nobly, notably by withdrawing our support from Israel. (3). Washington tells you something about Israel's politics that last week's "landslide victory" of Ariel Sharon's Likud party amounted to winning 37 seats. It is very impressive until you consider that the Knesset contains 120 members. This does not mean that Likud, outnumbered three to one, will be incapable of governing. The Israelis, like the Germans, are dependent on coalitions to rule their fractious democracy.
The difference is that, whereas German politics are dominated by three or four "major" parties, the Israeli system features innumerable participants. In the past, Sharon has had to align himself with tiny, right-wing religious parties that are largely interested in protecting the prerogatives of Israel's Orthodox Jews, and exerting as disproportionate an influence as possible. This election, however, might have altered the equation. Sharon is anxious to form a government with the center-left Labor party; but Labor's leader, Arab Mitzna, has vowed not to serve in any Sharon coalition. Of course, if Labor divested itself of Mitzna, its 19 seats could combine with the insurgent (and anti-Orthodox) Shinui party to give Sharon a narrow majority. (4). In that sense, the choice is stark, and supremely important.
If Sharon is obliged to assemble another shaky coalition of assorted religious extremists, he will not only undermine his own long-term position within the Knesset, but guarantee the status quo for Israel. That status quo involves a broader, more lethal and expensive occupation of Palestinian territory, the continued loss of civilian life in Israel proper, declining morale, a collapsing economy, and increased isolation around the world. All the rallies and fund-raising dinners sponsored by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee cannot disguise that the world is treating Israel these days like apartheid South Africa. And it is with reason. Israel has embarked on a colonial policy toward the Palestinian Arabs: Not only are the native Arabs treated as second-class citizens in their own land, but the Sharon government prosecutes a campaign designed to increase, rather than relieve, their distress.
This does not excuse Palestinian violence, but it certainly explains it. Sharon's troops have effectively confined Yasser Arafat and his corrupt Palestinian Authority to one bombed-out compound in Ramallah, while demanding that Arafat and his colleagues exercise control over several million Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon continues to construct Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, connected by roads, fortifications and checkpoints designed to harass and intimidate, and to isolate Palestinians from one another. Israel's government has embarked on a deliberate policy of destroying Palestinians' farms and small businesses, bulldozing shops, uprooting centuries-old olive groves, and dispersing flocks. Every day brings reports of two or three or a dozen Palestinians shot dead by Israeli forces. (5). The paradox here is that, while Israeli public opinion recognizes the suicidal character of such policies, Israeli voters are more comfortable with Ariel Sharon in time of conflict.
So the question is whether Sharon is in power to perpetuate himself in power, or to employ his prestige as a nationalist general to secure a durable peace for his countrymen. It is the difference between short-term tactics and long-term strategy, and, not least, Sharon's place in Israel's history. This is of interest and concern to Americans for two reasons. First, the United States is contemplating an Israeli request for a colossal $ 14 billion in assistance and loan guarantees. And second, although George W. Bush may dismiss the subject with one sentence in his State of the Union address, the uncomfortable truth is that the world and not just the Muslim or Arab world perceives the United States as Israel's sponsor in oppressing the Arabs of Palestine. (4).
The major promise of victory in Iraq (apart from the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime) is the prospect of U. S. leverage to compel Sharon to do what most Israelis know is necessary for peace: To end the self-defeating occupation of Palestinian land, to dismantle the settlements, and to draw a fair and defensible border that preserves Arab East Jerusalem for the Arabs. That, presumably, is President Bush's "vision" of a coexistent Israel and Palestine, devoid of terrorism. (4). In less than a decade, Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel and the occupied territories. A democratic Israel, dominated politically by its Arab inhabitants, would lose its Jewish identity.
An Israel that denies the vote to Arabs who have lived on the land since time out of mind would cease to be a democratic state and, presumably, would forfeit its claim to American support. (4). Words: 3, 312. Bibliography: Child, G. Washington views on Terrorism.
Washington: Vising Press, 2001. Dutch, I. 1995. Arabs in the Jewish state: Israel's control of the national minority. Haifa: Mefras, 67 - 69. Gerstein, D. 1999. The conflict and protest in the Israeli society.
Megamol: 55 - 70. Miller, C. 1997. Profile of a terrorist. Terrorism 1 (1): 34. Mistone, F. 1998. The transition to peace for Israeli society.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (January): 46 - 48. Peres, Y. 1999. Democracy and peace in the Israeli mind. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute. Vetter, A 1998. The margins of justice toward the law and the legal system among Jews and Arabs in Israel.
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 6: 35 - 40.
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