NOTE: Free essay sample provided on this page should be used for references or sample purposes only. The sample essay is available to anyone, so any direct quoting without mentioning the source will be considered plagiarism by schools, colleges and universities that use plagiarism detection software. To get a completely brand-new, plagiarism-free essay, please use our essay writing service.
One click instant price quote
David Hume's Natural History of Religion Warburton, disquieted by Hume's project, asked, "Would not the Moral History of Meteors be full as sensible as the Natural History of Religion?" (Livingston, 1976). Although he did not, presumably, expect an answer, we may nonetheless formulate one. Discounting revelation, Hume reasonably deduces religion's origins from two "natural" scenarios man in nature, and nature in man. The former, as we shall see, is man dramatically situated in a pre civilized setting, a rude and unpredictable "state of nature. " The latter nature inside of mani's the gale of passion. Within the scope of this research, we will elaborate on Humes famous work Natural History of Religion; it would be helpful to start by outlining the structure of the book at issue.
I. That polytheism is the original religion of mankind, (a) because of the overwhelming evidence of ancient authorities and the evidence of more recent geographical explorations, and (b) because it is implausible to suppose that very primitive man first arrived at the sophisticated notion of a single God and then lost it as civilization and understanding progressed. II. Contemplation of the structure of nature suggests a single governing power. The vicissitudes of human life suggest many and diverse powers influencing human weal and woe.
III. The 'unknown causes' of human fortune and misfortune appear as malevolent or benevolent or capricious agents, and are thus given human characteristics. Moreover, people who are weakest and most vulnerable to capricious fortune are most superstitious. IV. Elves and fairies and pagan gods have much in common. All are products of the natural world, not creators of it.
As such their powers are much greater than those of human beings but of the same kind. V. That polytheism draws its extreme anthropomorphism from, among other things, allegory and the worship of human beings as heroes. VI. That monotheism evolved from polytheism, not by reasoning, but by comparison with the development of human societies where one leader tends to predominate and become ever more powerful. Once this process has started, the leading god receives greater and greater attention until the rest become relatively insignificant.
But the vulgar conception of the leading god remains anthropomorphic. VII. The absurd results of the conjunction of sublime powers and gross, anthropomorphism are exemplified in ancient, Roman Catholic and Mahometan practices. I.
The first conception of gods as powerful but limited beings, who are themselves subject to destiny and are parts of nature, gives way by fear and flattery of the supposed chief of these beings to a conception of deity as 'unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality'. (Hume, 1977) But these conceptions in turn prove too remote for ordinary human nature, and demi-gods or other intermediaries are introduced until they again become too much the objects of worship. So there is a flux and reflux of polytheism and monotheism. II. That polytheism, claiming no single truth about a unique god, is more tolerant than monotheism. 'It naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity. ' (Hume, 1977) This is verified by historical and contemporary observations and is evident in the history of Christianity. III. That polytheism, because of the nearness of gods to human heroes, engenders courage and upstanding character; monotheism engenders abasement and 'monkish virtues'.
IV. Polytheism is easily supportable and 'natural', but it is ill adapted to defense by argument and philosophy. Monotheism readily attracts philosophical defense but in turn makes philosophy its bondsman, all natural possibilities which differ from the approved religion being branded heretical. V. Actual religions (ancient and modem) contain many beliefs which appear absurd to anyone not committed to the religion. But modem religion, being scriptural, is more determined in its articles of faith than former traditional religions where no one was expected to believe or know all the inconsistent stories. (This long section is much illustrated from Hume's very extensive reading of classical sources. ) VI.
That both theism and polytheism have conceptions of deity which combine what is admirable with what is malicious. Thus great (or even infinite) power is attributed to entities of mixed moral character. The result is the moral confusion which concedes that 'the gods have maxims of justice peculiar to themselves'. (Hume, 1977) VII. That religious devotion tends less to enhance morality than to engender superstitious observances, dogmatic zeal and the embracing of absurd beliefs. This may well be because morality is natural 'and what many would have performed, were there no god in the universe', whereas austerities and acts of special devotion can only relate to god since they manifestly have no other use or reason to be. I.
Aphoristic and rhetorically expressed conclusions. These contrast the apparent reasons for belief in a single designer intelligence, and what that belief would lead us to expect of religion and to do, with the actual practices and real results of religion. The final result of our investigations is that 'the whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery' leading to 'doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment'. (Hume, 1977) Hume poses two questions in the " Introduction " to the Natural History of Religion: "As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. " (Livingston, 1976) The "subject of our present inquiry, " (i. e. , investigation into religious belief) he writes in the Natural History, is the principles "which give rise to the original belief" and the "accidents and causes... which direct its operation. " (Hume, 1977) In The Natural History (published in 1757) that Hume uses to identify the foundation (in terms of what it is that compels one to believe) for the belief in an intelligent designer, given a recognition of order and design in nature. The first stage, seeking the origin of religious belief in human nature, is addressed in the Natural History and the second, seeking its foundation in reason, is found in the Dialogues.
Hume did not question what religious belief consisted of; he consistently held to the claim that order and design in nature 'bespeak' an intelligent author. Hume ends the Natural History on an inconclusive note. When the origin of religious belief is sought in human nature, the following is the result: The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy. (Hume, 1977) The purpose of the Natural History is to investigate the origin of religion in human nature.
It results only in a suspense of judgment because the answer is not to be found there. The scientific investigation, the accurate scrutiny, fails. In the "General Corollary, " the concluding section of the Natural History, Hume again reiterates his position that: "A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author. " (Hume, 1977) But we do not arrive at this conviction as a result of some aspect of human nature. From the religious principles that have prevailed in the world one finds only "sick men's dreams" or "play some whimsies of movies in human shape. " (Hume, 1977) We must look for this conviction elsewhere. We leave those who embrace superstition and enthusiasm to quarrel among themselves; we will turn to human reason to seek the foundations. We cannot help but search for a resolution to the questions -- human reason and the imagination demand it.
That the impasse cannot be maintained is acknowledged by Hume at the end of the Natural History. Human reason can only provide a weakly probable answer, but the force of the imagination will break the suspense of judgment: ... such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld... (Hume, 1977) In his Natural History of Religion Hume has dwelt at considerable length on the very different relations in which, as he holds, religion and philosophy stand to one another in the ancient as compared with the modern world. History, it is important to note, had not yet, in Hume's time, been divided in the threefold manner, ancient, medieval, and modern; the current distinction was between ancients and the moderns. For three hundred years men had lived a double life. Ancient history was history in the absolute sense, and the ages that followed were a shadowy and unreal world which could only be rationalized by being related in some way to the past. (Livingston, 1976) This was the tradition to which Hume became heir, and to which he adhered.
The Christian centuries preceding the Renaissance were still for him 'the Dark Ages'-ages during which religion and reason did violence to one another, to their mutual detriment, in ways that, happily-so Hume likes to believe -- have no parallels in the ancient world. Religion, Hume teaches, originates independently of reason. (Hume, 1977) Man is at first a barbarous, necessitous, un leisured animal, so pressed by numerous wants and passions that he starts no questions and engages in no inquiries. The traditional stories answer, in a manner suited to his intelligence, the only questions to which he is, of himself, inclined. The 'Divinities' in which he believes are not really 'Gods' in the genuine sense of the term. They are beings but little superior to human creatures; and there was no thought of ascribing to them the origin and fabric of the universe.
These were questions first raised by philosophers. It is precisely to this 'atheistic' character of the first Gods that Hume would trace the origins of theism. The Gods being conceived as being influenced, like men, by gifts and flattery, each generation, under pressure of its fears and distresses, has outdone its predecessors, inventing new and more magnificent strains of adulation. "Thus they proceed: till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no further progress. " (Hume, 1977) And thus 'by chance, ' in the notion of a perfect omnipotent Being, the Creator of the world, religion comes to coincide with the principles of true philosophy. They are guided to that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition. Thus the deity, who, from love, converted himself into a bull, in order to carry off Europa; and who, from ambition, dethroned his father, Saturn, became the Optimus Maximus of the heathens.
Thus the deity, whom the vulgar Jews conceived only as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, became their Jehovah and Creator...
Free research essays on topics related to: religious belief, natural history, human beings, human reason, human nature
Research essay sample on David Hume Natural History Of Part 1
