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Example research essay topic: Washington D C Dominican Republic - 2,067 words

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In 1966, following the U. S. intervention of 1965, a former collaborator of Trujillo, Joaquin Balaguer, was ushered into the presidency. Balaguer ruled the country in a neo patrimonial, albeit less brutal, fashion. The paper discusses what effect Balaguer's reign had on Dominican Republic, where hopes that the end of the Trujillo era in 1961 would lead to political democracy, which did not happen. Outline Introduction Facts Internal politics under Balaguer Effects on economics Effects on military Balaguer's policies Effects on Dominican society Conclusion Joaquin Balaguer, and the Effect His Reign Had on the Dominican Republic In the Dominican Republic, neo patrimonial rule has been common, and political democracy has been scarce.

The countrys tragic history of foreign occupation, economic ruin, and civil wars during the nineteenth century helps explain why neo patrimonial rulers emerged in the Dominican Republic. The most notorious of these was Rafael Trujillo. He ruled the country from 1930 to 1961, taking many of the best agricultural lands and most productive industries as his own. Trujillo also made the Guinness Book of World Records: at the time of his overthrow by assassination in 1961, he had more statues of himself in public places than any other world leader. Free elections in 1962 were won by Juan Bosch.

However, the democratic regime that he led survived only seven months before it was overthrown. Following Trujillo's assassination in May 1961, Balaguer clung to power in the face of international skepticism and growing internal opposition. OAS sanctions were retained on the grounds that the extent of change represented by the new Balaguer regime was uncertain. The United States added pressure by keeping its informal boycott of Dominican sugar, but other actions were ambivalent.

Both President Balaguer and Trujillo's son Ramfis, commander of the armed forces, began to implement democratization measures, exiling some of the most visible symbols of repression and promising free elections for May 1962. Events gradually drove the United States to adopt a more forceful policy. As part of the liberalization strategy, Balaguer was encouraged to incorporate the opposition groups into a coalition government, but they continued to resist Balaguer's overtures. Nevertheless, following the exit of Trujillo's hated brothers, the Wicked Uncles, in late October, the United States called for a partial lifting of OAS sanctions against the country. Balaguer, opting to break with the Trujillo's and side with the United States, dramatically refused to step aside. In the face of a threatened U.

S. military intervention if they tried to reimpose themselves and of serious opposition from Balaguer and within the Dominican armed forces, Hector and Jose Arismendi Trujillo and a number of their close collaborators fled into exile four days after they returned. Balaguer, puppet president of Trujillo at the time of his assassination and briefly afterward, was the dominant figure in the Dominican Republic in the period from 1966 to 1978. Given the authoritarian and neo patrimonial style of his twelve years in office and his direct link to the Trujillo period, there were obviously some elements of continuity. However, Balaguer's treatment of economic, military, and political issues varied in significant ways from that of Trujillo, and the dynamics of electoral cycles and the consequences of some of the countrys socioeconomic changes in this period were quite significant for eventual democratization in 1978. Balaguer was an astute politician, physically unimposing but a master orator, patient, and with a keen sense of timing.

He was above all a political pragmatist -- willing to be ruthless if necessary, but not eager to employ repression and violence unnecessarily. His rhetoric focused on the values of order and stability, and he continued to link Dominican nationalism to what he viewed as its Hispanic, Catholic essence and to anti-Haitian themes. He was both a realist about power politics and a conservative nationalist, recognizing the overwhelming reality of the U. S.

presence, but retaining a certain disdain of that country and its leaders. For many years, Balaguer also exercised direct personal control over state resources to an extraordinary degree. One key mechanism was the public works budget. State funds earmarked for roads and urban construction came predominantly from the central government, and most of these flowed directly out of the presidents office, rather than from the public-works, health, or other appropriate ministry. In his relations with the business sector, Balaguer also operated in a neo patrimonial fashion, with a semi corporatist veneer. Balaguer inherited the massive state apparatus that had been built upon Trujillo's nationalized holdings.

Although he did not actively shrink the size of the state, he pursued a policy of what might be termed "passive privatization" by stimulating private sector growth alongside a continued important state role, especially in sugar and construction. Balaguer's economic record was strong in general, macroeconomic terms. From 1966 to 1978 the country experienced high economic growth, averaging 7. 6 percent increase in real GDP over the whole period and 11 percent in the years from 1968 to 1974, among the highest worldwide in that period (World Bank 1978 b). Growth was based upon increased export earnings, import-substitution in consumer goods, and public investment projects (especially roads, dams, and urban construction projects), and it was facilitated by the U.

S. sugar quota and generous U. S. economic assistance. Balaguer's innate conservatism was evident in his management of the public sector: his policies were dramatically different from those of populist authoritarians on the South American continent. A very tight check was kept on public-sector employment levels and wages: the number of government employees grew from around 98, 000 in 1966 to only around 119, 000 in 1976, while real wages in the public sector fell by 35 percent from 1969 to 1977.

In spite of its initial successes, Balaguer's industrial policy ultimately had two other negative consequences. Gradually, it undermined the presidents position by promoting the development of new business groups, some of which became increasingly independent from the state and resentful of Balaguer's patrimonial style and perceived favoritism toward the large Santo Domingo industrialists. Most significantly for subsequent administrations, Balaguer's policy had a corrosive effect on state finances, as the extent of tax exoneration's granted to industry expanded over time. (World Bank 1978 b) One of Balaguer's most difficult challenges was the military, which never became his personal instrument. Given the countrys history and most immediately the fates of both Bosch and Reid, Balaguer had reason to fear threats from the armed forces. In fact, several times he did confront direct challenges to his rule from military conspirators, even as relations between business and Balaguer became strained by the growing incursions of high-ranking military officers into business and into politics. But Balaguer gained the respect and, to a certain extent, the obedience of the Dominican military as a result of his ties to the Trujillo period, his anticommunism, his statesman-like caudillo figure, and his acceptance of military repressive acts and large-scale corruption.

In 1969, Balaguer asserted there were unknown, uncontrollable elements within the military and the police, but later he argued that although they were known he lacked the evidence to prosecute them. Repression remained high in 1971 when General Perez y Perez was appointed as chief of police in January and openly established a paramilitary death squad, La Banda. Following international pressure generated by the efforts of Pena Gomez of the PRD, violence declined when Balaguer briefly arrested several members of La Banda and then forced Perez y Perez and Nivar to switch positions in October 1971; Nivar had complex links with Pena Gomez and other PRD and leftist leaders. However, political violence and assassination continued throughout the rest of Balaguer's regime, although it declined further after 1975. Balaguer's relations with different social groups in the Dominican Republic were predominantly neo patrimonial in nature. With the partial exception of business, most social sectors retained low levels of organization.

At the same time, he did not govern in a neosultanistic fashion. The governing coalition was between Balaguer qua state, owner of a substantial part of the countrys leading export product and a major industrialist in its own right, and established and emerging industrialists; at the same time, Balaguer maintained a significant popular base in rural areas. Growing dissent was to be found in urban areas, especially among middle-sector and professional groups. Balaguer's policies helped provoke unhappiness within the ranks of the military, especially among frustrated individuals in the lower ranks who perceived their chance of advancement as blocked by the individuals who had been brought back from retirement and were remaining in place. Over the 1990 s, although some military might well have been willing to provide Balaguer armed support if called to do so, it appears the Dominican armed forces were becoming increasingly divided in their political loyalties. In both the 1994 and 1996 elections, the major presidential candidates and parties all possessed the support of at least some military officers.

Opposition parties did not complain of centralized military harassment against them, though there was evidence of military bias at the local level. In sum, due to important changes in the domestic arena and the international context, and to the actions of the PRD and the more cautious and cynical steps subsequently taken by Balaguer, the Dominican armed forces largely ceased to be a political threat to democracy. By the time Balaguer assumed power, the country was no longer as isolated, and societal and political actors were stronger than had been the case under Trujillo. If Balaguer had been even more like Trujillo, his regime might have had more satanistic tendencies, but given the development of social and political forces and the countrys international circumstances, it could never have approximated the features of the Trujillo regime.

Societal organizations independent of the regime were able to form and articulate demands, and business groups ultimately spoke in defense of democracy and, thus, in favor of the moderate PRD opposition. A vigorous political opposition was able to form and campaign actively, although its own increasing moderation facilitated the process -- especially in a context in which there was no active revolutionary threat. The Dominican military were neither completely beholden to the ruler nor totally autonomous. The nature of the regime and its relations with other actors meant there were moderates in both the regime (ultimately, Balaguer himself) and the opposition (the PRD). Balaguer had clear ideas about policies that would enhance his stature and favor him politically focused on centralizing expenditures through his office, especially on public works; he bowed to international constraints as necessary and proceeded with his own agenda when feasible. Less concerned with constitutional formalities than the PRD, he had more success in managing economic policy for his political purposes.

Paradoxically, this meant Balaguer combined economic mismanagement in terms of helping to provoke crisis conditions and impose a heavy burden on many Dominicans, with political shrewdness in terms of managing the tensions thus generated. In responding to the crisis conditions he helped provoke, Balaguer successfully enhanced fiscal revenues and demonstrated political adeptness at carrying out economic stabilization when required and taking advantage of initial restructuring policies. Yet, the cost of his mix of policies was increasing disorder and loss of capacity within the state; positive macroeconomic indicators in terms of growth and inflation were combined with high levels of inequality, low levels of expenditures in health and education (until near the end of his term), and continued high unemployment. Under Balaguer, over half of the government's budget flowed directly through the office of the presidency, where contracts would often be handed out at his discretion and with no effective oversight by congressional or other authorities. The struggle for democratic politics during the period from 1978 to 1996 evidenced many frustrations; this period illustrates the challenges of seeking to transform neo patrimonial political patterns and provides evidence of the difficult relationship between democracy and neopatrimonialism.

Bibliography: Joaquin Balaguer. Wikipedia. Accessed December 11, web News about Joaquin Balaguer, including commentary and archival articles published in The New York Times. Accessed December 11, 2006 at web Diamond Larry, ed. 1993.

Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Render Publishers. Ward Howard J. , and Michael J. Kryzanek. 1977. Dominican Dictatorship Revisited: The Caudillo Tradition and the Regimes of Trujillo and Balaguer. Revista/Review Interamericana 7.

World Bank. Annual. World Development Report [WDR]. Washington, D. C. 1978 b. Dominican Republic: Its Main Economic Development Problems.

Washington, D. C. : World Bank.


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Research essay sample on Washington D C Dominican Republic

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