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Introduction Discussion Peru background Peru presidential elections Fujimori strategy Fujimori economic plan Citizens reaction to Fujimori rule Fujimori and army Achievements in economy Conclusion Fujimori This essay explores sociocultural aspects of the Fujimori phenomenon, particularly his significance as symbol or force that expressed popular aspirations that institutional political formulas could not fulfill in 1990 - 1992. From the electoral triumph that first swept him into the presidency in 1990, to his reelection in 1995, the government of Alberto Fujimori received the constant support of broad sectors of the population. Between 1989 and 1993 Peru was plunged into a profound and all-encompassing crisis: the economy experienced uncontrolled hyper-inflation and political authority all but collapsed as a consequence of the States retrenchment and loss of legitimacy. In addition the country experienced the demise of the party system and a generalized social crisis caused by the brutal terrorist campaign of Shining Path guerrillas in the countryside and the cities, particularly Lima. Illicit drug trafficking on the part of entrenched organized criminal groups was widespread within the military and local structures of power. Other factors also contributed to the overall vulnerability, insecurity, disorder and anxiety that typified Peruvian life during this period.
These included the countrys isolation from the international economic system and a pervasive sense of mistrust towards the law that also manifested itself in social relations in general, contributing in turn to the further erosion of already fragile institutions. Daily life became untenable; motherhood, surrounded as it was by anxiety, was threatened by the uncertainty of an unknown future. While mothers were not the only people affected by the crisis, they felt particularly threatened by the almost complete absence of effective authority. Fujimori's presidential ambitions were backed by Cambio 90, a small party that he helped create in 1989, and the Peruvian evangelicals who were key in providing organizational and mobilization skills to the campaign of the former university professor. The alliance with the Protestants cost Fujimori, a practicing Catholic, the enmity of the Catholic bishops who eventually found themselves in the embarrassing position of endorsing Vargas Llosa, a well-known agnostic (Klaiber 1990).
Fujimori portrayed himself as an independent, moderate candidate escaping the extremism of Vargas Llosa's conservative agenda as well as that of the left-wing candidates. In typical populist fashion, he was short on specifics but very apt in devising catchy slogans like, honesty, hard work, and technology. In three weeks his support jumped from 5 per cent in public opinion polls to 24 per cent of the actual vote cast in April, finishing only three percentage points behind Vargas Llosa, thus forcing a run-off election. Pitted against Vargas Llosa, Fujimori put his contender on the defensive. He out rightly rejected FREDEMOs austerity package, promising instead to adopt a gradual, supply-side approach to economic stabilization.
This meant emphasizing government investment and development projects in order to promote new jobs and economic growth. By the same token, he also pledged to resume negotiations with foreign creditors only if the latter were willing to make major concessions in the rescheduling of Peru's onerous debt. The main contenders of the 1990 presidential elections - Mario Vargas Llosa, as the novelist-turned-candidate of a new neoliberal Right, and Alberto Fujimori, as an unknown who rejected politics as usual -- signified an unraveling of hopes once placed in established Center Left parties. Fujimori surprised the electorate by winning, then surprised the populace by adopting a harsh neoliberal shock treatment that drove key commodity prices skyward and contracted the economy.
As Peru entered a period of severe neoliberalism and economic hardship accompanied by cholera outbreaks in 1991) for the impoverished majority, the insurrectionary war intensified in Lima. The insurgents declaration that they had reached the strategic equilibrium stage of the war in May 1991, the urban bombings and the assassinations of alternative political leaders that choked Lima with fear during the next fifteen months, the suspension of the Congress, judiciary, and Constitution in President Alberto Fujimori's self-coup of April 1992 all seemed to signify imminent national collapse. In August, Fujimori's economic team developed a market-oriented plan that went far beyond what Vargas Llosa had proposed. By comparison, the plan was much tougher than the ones previously adopted by Money and Color. It also represented a complete repudiation of Fujimori's electoral promises. The plan was so radical in content that it was dubbed Fujishock (Salcedo 1990).
Prices and salaries in the private sector were liberalized whereas the prices charged by PEs rose steeply to generate profits since the government was no longer attending to PE financial needs. At the same time, the government proceeded to substantially cut public employment and many subsidies. All exchange controls were eliminated as were the existing restrictions on investment, capital flows, imports, and financial markets. Sharp cuts also affected social programs. Tariffs were simplified and reduced first to three and later to only two rates. In the beginning, noticeably absent from the government agenda was any specific reference to privatization.
As in Argentina in 1989, Fujimori's about-face in economic policy brought a profound change in the ruling coalition. The Presidents party, Cambio 90 held only one-fourth of the seats in Congress, thus requiring an expansion of the support base if any legislation was to be passed. After the election, it was clear that many among Cambio 90 s small business and evangelical groups became quite displeased with Fujimori's shift to the right. Undeterred, the President appointed a cabinet of national unity, whose members came from different political backgrounds and whose primary feature was the conspicuous absence of Cambio 90 representatives, who thereafter played no meaningful role in the decision-making process. Vargas Llosa gone to his self-imposed exile in Europe after the election, it was relatively easy for Fujimori to co-opt the political right given that he was actually implementing the very policies for which conservatives had campaigned. At the same time, the President forged an iron alliance with the military (Kay 1995).
He demoted the leadership of the national police, claiming that it was corrupt, and put the armed forces in charge of the war against terrorism. This ended a long-standing dispute over which institution, the police or the military, was best fitted for that mission. To enact his reforms, Fujimori followed the same pattern already observed in Argentina and Brazil. Upon his inauguration, the President told the country that he had inherited a disaster from Alan Garcia which required immediate action.
Under pressure, the Peruvian Congress delegated to the executive the power to legislate on sensitive policy areas using constitutional articles 188 and 211 for a limited time. Under these conditions, the President was very effective in implementing his policy
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Research essay sample on Vargas Llosa Presidential Elections
