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The Cold War background to the Arrow. The threat was from across the Pole, and the swaggering post-war Royal Canadian Air Force wanted a strong deterrent. Design: The Arrow was primarily a triumph of innovative design. Here we glance at a few of the aircrafts design features.
The Arrows fall from favor is an account of political intrigue and indecision in the face of a technologically changing world. The seeds that would ultimately doom it would be sown very early in the Arrow's life. In December 1953, following the findings of the All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team that no aircraft meeting the Roads grueling specifications existed in other countries, the St. Laurent government awarded Avro a $ 27 million contract to design two prototype all-weather, two-seat, twin-engine, supersonic interceptors. Wing assembly at the Avro plant: Before 1954 the Arrow was rarely referred to in public, and led a rather underground existence. It was after the explosion of a Soviet hydrogen bomb and the introduction of new Myasishchev M- 4 Bison jet bomber which opened the possibility of a Cold War bomber gap, that the program was stepped up.
In March 1955, the contract was upgraded to a $ 260 -million contract for five Arrow Mk 1 aircraft powered by Pratt and Whitney engines, to be followed by 35 Arrow Mk 2 s with as-yet-unavailable Iroquois engines. It was also determined at this time to do away with the costly development of prototypes and launch into assembly line production with the first model. In September 1955, Avro told Cabinet that it needed an additional $ 59 million to keep the program on schedule. It was around this time that the fateful notion began to surface, not only in Canada but in the military establishments of most of the Western Alliance, that the era of the interceptor was over, and that the age of guided missiles would render them obsolete.
A model is tested in a wind tunnel: It was also in 1955 that efforts began to sell the Arrow to the Americans and British. The Arrow project received glowing praise and admiration, but no interest as an actual purchase. This could have been anticipated as American and British Air Forces almost never purchase planes from other countries. But this seems to have contributed to a growing unease in the Liberal cabinet and among the Chiefs of Staff about the cost of the program. This wasnt helped by recurring approaches from Avro for more money. In December 1955, Cabinet limited Avro to the eleven prototypes and put a spending cap on the overall program of $ 170 million over the next three years.
By this time, Avro had become the third largest corporation in Canada, and was employing some 41, 000 people. Inspecting the landing gear: In 1956, events took place that would seriously cripple the Arrows future. Conventional wisdom concerning aircraft suggested that a radical new design should be combined with off-the-shelf components like the engine and armament system to keep costs down. The Arrow project was already developing a new engine, and now the RCAF decided that the Hughes Aircraft radar fire control system didnt meet its standards.
They chose to have a new system developed in Canada at RCA-Victor, and when the chosen Sparrow II missile development was cancelled by the U. S. Navy, its development was also subsumed in Canada. Avro strenuously objected to these choices, and in hindsight, it appears that these extra burdens may have pushed the Arrow over the budgetary edge. In February 1957, Cabinet ordered the spending cap increased to $ 216 million, and squadron deployment wasnt expected until 1961 - 62. There is evidence that the Liberals were losing faith in the Arrow, but it was far from politically expedient to cancel the popular project in an election year.
To the surprise of many, in June 1957 the Liberals lost the election and a minority Conservative government under John Diefenbaker took power. The Bomarc: In August 1957, an event took place that was to have far-reaching implications on the fate of the Arrow. Diefenbaker signed onto the North American Air Defence (NORAD) agreement with the United States, committing Canada to integrating its continental air defence with the USAF. This meant that two new weapons systems would come into the calculations, the Bomarc missile and the Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE), a ground-based surveillance and weapons control system. These new weapons, combined with Arrow cost overruns, the unfavorable impression that the Avro lobby in Ottawa was making on policy makers, and the general impression that the threat from manned bombers had disappeared, were to gravely threaten the future of the Arrow project. The Arrow was rolled out to an admiring public of 12, 000 people on Oct 4 th, 1957.
As fate would have it, the USSR launched Sputnik 1 the same day, stealing headlines and providing an ominous foretaste of a technologically confusing world. But at the Avro plant in Malton, Ont, all was well with the world. Sputnik, and the launch of the space age: Defence Minister George Pearkes, who would be so instrumental in the demise of the Arrow, was on hand, as was Canadian aviation luminary John A. D.
McCurdy. If the space race and missile technology was making Pearkes change his mind about the Arrow, he wasnt about to mention it here: Much has been said of late about the coming missile age, and there have been suggestions from well-intentioned people that the era of the manned aero plane is over and that we should not be wasting our time and energy producing an aircraft of the performance, complexity and cost of the Avro Arrow. They suggest that we should put our faith in missiles and launch straight into the era of push-button war. I do not feel that missile and manned aircraft have, as yet, reached the point where they should be considered as competitive.
They will, in fact, become complementary. Each can do things which the other cannot do, and for some years to come both will be required in the inventory of any nation seeking to maintain an adequate deterrent to war. However, the aircraft has this one advantage over the missile. It can bring the judgment of a man into the battle, and closer to the target where human judgment, combined with the technology of an aircraft, will provide the most sophisticated and effective defense that human ingenuity can devise. (from the book Arrow) The irony of these comments is remarkable considering subsequent events. After a period of elaborate tests including engine ground running tests, low speed taxi trials, high speed taxi trials and many hours in the most advanced flight simulator in Canada, the aircraft was ready for its first flight. Just before 10 a.
m. on March 25 th 1958, most of the staff of Avro poured out as loudspeakers invited all non-essential workers to watch the Arrows maiden flight, with Janusz Zurakowski at the helm. Two chaser airplanes, a single-seat F- 86 Sabre flown by Jack Woodman, and a CF- 100 flown by Spud Potocki with Avro photographer Hugh Mackechnie on board, were already aloft. Things looked good at Avro: At 9: 51 a. m.
the Arrow lifted off, barely halfway down the 3, 368 meter runway. At 1525 metres Zurakowski requested the CF- 100 to close in and check on the nose wheel landing gear door because the safety light in the cockpit indicated it was open. The speed was then boosted from 200 knots to 250 knots and the Arrow moved up to 3350 m...
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Research essay sample on Cold War Control System
