Example research essay topic: Nuclear Holocaust Nuclear Weapons - 1,473 words

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Deterrence is a theory of International relations based in Realism. Essentially, it tries to explain the situation of when two or more states threaten retaliation if attacked, in order to deter the attack. It is therefore possible to very simply state deterrence as "You hit me, I hit you. " For this essay, two main questions have to be addressed, Has it worked? and Does it make sense?

To answer these questions, I will firstly define what deterrence is, I will then examine some of the main arguments for and against it, in theory and in reality; finally, I will show some of the consequences of states following such a policy. Deterrence, as already stated, can concern itself with any form of threatened counter-attack, however, for this essay, I shall be concentrating on Nuclear deterrence, using examples from the cold war, therefore, when the word deterrence is used, it should be taken as nuclear deterrence. Hedley Bull describes deterrence as follows: "To say that country A deters country B from doing something is to imply the following: (i) That Country A conveys to Country B a threat to inflict punishment or deprivation of values if it embarks on a certain course of action; (ii) That Country B might otherwise embark on that course of action; (iii) That Country B believes that Country A has the capacity and the will to carry out the threat, and decides for this reason that the course of action is not worthwhile. " Therefore, for deterrence to occur, a state must convey a message to another state, usually "these will be the public an authoritative utterances of government officials. " Secondly, to use Hedley Bulls language, country B would consider following a course of action which Country A does not wish and does not because of the threat - not because it has no interest to. Thirdly, Country A must be able to convince Country B that it is capable of carrying out its deterrence threat and is prepared to use it. Mutual deterrence is where two or more states deter each other from following a set of actions - effectively a stand off or a stalemate between the actors.

The concept of deterrence can be seen easily in public statements, for example, Churchill told Parliament on Britains hydrogen bomb was, "the deterrent upon the Soviet union by putting her... on an equality or near equality of vulnerability, " a soviet attack "would bring down upon them at once a crushing weight of nuclear retaliation" and a nuclear war "would result in mutual annihilation. " Similarly, the United States issued a formal deterrent warning in January 1954 announcing an intention of "more reliance on deterrent power and... a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing. " This was qualified a little while later, "a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression. " These statements ended the era of the implicit threat which had been evident to the world since Hiroshima, and fulfils Hedley Bulls first criteria for deterrence. There are a number of consequences to the threat of deterrence.

In relation to the cold war, some argue that it escalated the arms race and the threat of a nuclear war was increased; conversely, some argue it brought peace. An interesting phenomena was the war by proxy, where the superpowers would both indirectly support opposing states or factions within states to curtail each others sphere of influence. Third world states with tendencies towards one of the superpowers were supported by that power and became client-states. The superpowers aim were to gain influence and power in that particular region, thereby maximising power for some future use, for example, using it as a knock on effect to gain other states or to control the region through the client state. Any third world state which was a client of the superpowers could expect any internal opposition to be supported by the other superpower, similarly, any opposing state would also receive support. With the exceptions of Korea (1950 - 54), Vietnam (1965 - 74) and Afghanistan (1979 - 86) where one side was drawn into direct conflict, both sides avoided direct intervention, preferring to indirectly support groups or states already involved.

If one superpower did get involved directly, the inevitable end would be a large scale war - as what happened in the above three exceptions. If both were directly involved, the almost inevitable end would be an escalation to nuclear weapons. The result was firstly the increase in costs for the superpowers overall strategy. The main outcome was by using these third world countries as pawns for their war, they increased the level of technology used by each side to fight each other, resulting in much more severe conflicts. There are many examples of indirect intervention, the most well known on a regional basis are: Israel and the Arab states (1948 - 90) and the Horn of Africa (1970 - 90).

Internal conflicts include Cuba (1959 - 90), Iraq (1958 - 78) and Libya (1969 - 80). Michael Walzer argues from a consequential ist point if view that deterrence is right. His theory maintains that, since human well-being is the basis of judging an action, moral judgements will be based on the prospect of bringing about a greater good or lesser evil. Whilst Walzer does not deny that the threat of destroying millions of people - inevitably innocents and civilians in a nuclear war - violates common morality, he argues that under the conditions of the cold war which he describes as a "supreme emergency", the west is justified in issuing such a threat. For Walzer, the Soviet threat constitutes imminent danger which threatens society's ultimate values.

A threat on innocents and attacks on them can be justified when the feared outcome of not issuing the threat is unbearable and cannot be tolerated. Walzer further argues that the preservation of freedom and a society's right to hand it down to their descendants is of overriding importance. Self-defence is impossible against an enemy prepared to use nuclear weapons, the only safety is "a balance of terror. " The mutual fear created by deterrence, Walzer states is a restraint on a nuclear exchange occurring, hopefully meaning that it could never occur. "We threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible. " Walzer continues, that deterrence does not actually involve doing anything to other people. the strategy has so far been bloodless and most believe that the threat will never become reality, preventing any form of nuclear holocaust, foreign domination (by the Soviets) or nuclear blackmail.

This defence of deterrence has a number of problems. Firstly, it assumes that the destruction of millions of individuals, including those on both sides is more preferable than to live under a foreign rule or being able to pass the right to be free to descendants, this appears to be a case of "better dead than red." A situation where Walzer feels that it is better to be killed in a nuclear holocaust than not have basic human rights perceived not to be allowed in the soviet Union. The defence has a definite western bias to it, portraying the Soviets as the evil expansionists and would attack if countries such as the United States did not issue such threats. Whilst it cannot be said that the United States was not under any threat, it is difficult to say whether the perceived threat from the Soviets was as a consequence of issues such as deterrence, which can be seen to have led to the build up of arms and escalations in wars in the third world, or if deterrence indeed managed to prevent the Soviets from attacking and the other related issues were not connected or led to deterrence. The criticisms of deterrence are quite widespread, they fall in to two broad overlapping categories, theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the concept has internal contradictions which in order to understand, have to be considered in the broader context of realism.

Realism is based on the assumption that states act rationally and that two states in a similar situation will act in a similar way, regardless of internal (i. e. cultural) differences. This is the so called billiard ball approach of realism: where each state is a billiard ball on the world system table. an interaction by two or more balls on the table is governed by the laws of physics, similarly, an interaction between two or more states is governed by "the same cool and clearheaded ends-means calculation based on perfect information and a careful weighing of all possible alternative courses of...

Research essay sample on Nuclear Holocaust Nuclear Weapons