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Example research essay topic: Arab Israeli Conflict Saudi Arabia - 4,449 words

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... If Arafat turns a blind eye to terrorism, Israel responds by punishing the PA. -- But if Arafat arrests those responsible for attacks or planning them, his domestic popularity is reduced. However Arafat's feels about indigenous terrorism, Arab state-sponsored terrorism strengthens his enemies, undermines his strategy, and escalates violence out of his control. 4. USE OF LEVERAGE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE The PA wants Arab states to urge the United States and Europe to press Israel for concessions. As a U. S.

aid recipient, the PA must avoid seeming to organize an anti-American campaign in the Arab world. Moreover, despite his differences with Washington, Arafat knows the United States provides his best hope for effective pressure on Israel. (17) Moderate Arab states were wary of jeopardizing relations with the United States even before 1993 for the Palestinians's ake. Now they need U. S. protection and their economies are more intertwined with those of the West. Egypt will not risk $ 2 billion annual U.

S. aid; Saudi Arabia or Kuwait will not jeopardize their investments and markets. Statements urging U. S. and European support for the Palestinians yield no result. Even if Arab states were more eager to help, they have less leverage than in past campaigns failed to make the West accede to the PLO, despite threats to join the Soviet camp if their demands were rejected.

The PA is certain to be disappointed, and Israel left unaffected, by Arab state policy in each of these four areas. E. DIFFERENT CAMPS AMONG THE ARAB STATES In developing a typology of Arab states regarding Israel and the PA, three groups are clearly apparent: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (18), Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon [if not for Syrian control], Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Yemen. (19) -- The Arab-Israeli conflict to go away so they are not dragged into crises or must spend resources fighting it. -- To avoid attacks or sanctions from radical forces and states that accuse them of being too soft toward Israel. -- To ensure their citizens think them pious, patriotic, nationalist and in no way Western or Zionist puppets. -- Avoid a return to the old era of all-out conflict and war. They all (though Jordan is less enthusiastic) support an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem. But they are indifferent (except for Jordan) about other details of an agreement.

Whatever the Palestinians accept is good enough for them. Breathing a sigh of relief, they could then get on with other concerns, problems, and interests. What is especially interesting about the peace camp is that, except for Egypt, they are the region's weaker countries. Of course, Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, was the first to make peace with Israel partly because that pioneer had to be strong enough to defy and survive powerful pressures brought against it.

But weak countries are readiest for peace with Israel because: -- Lacking ambitions for regional hegemony, unlike the radical states or Egypt, they do not feel threatened by Israel becoming a factor in the regional power equation. -- In fact, Israel might be useful to deter stronger, radical Arab or Islamic regimes that menace them. Having relations with Israel also strengthens links with their main defender, the United States and may provide commercial benefits. It must be remembered that one-fourth of the Arab League's members moved toward relations with Israel despite Syrian -- and, at times, Palestinian, Egyptian, and Saudi -- pleas to wait until there was a comprehensive peace agreement. These states find it easier to abandon a conflict in which they have played only a marginal role.

Egypt and Jordan (Lebanon could be added here) learned that deep involvement in the conflict damaged their stability and prosperity. Even now, the moderates continue to restrain the Arab world as a whole from returning to the old, high-priority, war-oriented approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their own fragility and preoccupation with other issues, including Maghreb and Persian Gulf problems, makes them resist militancy and realize their need for U. S. protection. There is great, genuine sympathy in these countries for the Palestinians and real distrust of Israel.

But the most important factor making smaller states slow normalization is fear of the internal (including Islamic) and inter-Arab reaction. Israel's problem is that it can offer them nothing significant enough to counteract those factors. Its protective ability is still an abstraction. Commercial and technological cooperation are promising but not worth the high risk of confronting the powerful Arab states.

Egypt wants to see a successful peace process, but its view of Israel as competitor and drive to be the Arab world's leader makes its stand more ambiguous. Egypt is the PA's patron and the only Arab state both willing and able to help it. But Egypt can only do so much, especially on an economic level. Arafat frequently appeals for Egyptian intervention in the process. For example, in August 1996, he asked Mubarak to mediate with Netanyahu to halt Jewish settlements. "I'm sure that your excellency will not spare any effort to get the peace process back to its correct track, " he said. (20) During tough negotiations over Hebron, Israel repeatedly charged that Egypt was telling the Palestinians to go slow and make more demands. But in June 1997, the United States and Israel accepted Egypt as intermediary in trying to restart talks.

Even as the PA's patron, though, Mubarak backs the PA position only up to a point. His main concern is asserting leadership over the Arab world, preserving good relations with the West, and avoiding a major confrontation with Israel. In contrast to the past, Egypt's bid for regional leadership is largely cost-free. In this context, he faces a paradox. (21) On one hand, Mubarak would like to see a rapidly progressing peace process. After all, Egypt has a strong interest in preserving regional peace and stability and is threatened by radical regimes (Libya, Sudan, Iran, and perhaps Iraq), as well as Islamic revolutionaries responsible for bloody terrorism within its own borders. It is the main Arab ally of the United States.

On the other hand, though, Egypt often criticizes Israel and prefers a cooler peace between Israel and Arab states. It sees Israel's integration into the area as building up a strategic and economic rival which would at least challenge Egypt's leadership and at worst might dominate it. Egypt reads this concern reads into Israel's close links with Turkey and Jordan, its diplomatic breakthroughs in smaller Arab states, and any development in Arab-Israeli economic links. Egypt also wants to have its own leadership accepted by those taking a tougher line. And as Syria's sponsor in its negotiations, Mubarak also wants to keep Asad happy by discouraging normalization with Israel until a Syria-Israel agreement is completed. This strategy did not fully succeed: Syria rejected Israel's offer to return the Golan Heights.

Arab states like Jordan, Morocco, and Oman made deals with Israel despite the absence of an Israel-Syria agreement. The idea that Israel can challenge Egypt as a regional leader seems strange. Aside from the two countries having several common interests, continued hostility by several Arab powers and popular opinion severely limits Israel's ability to play such a role. Nonetheless, this belief plays an important role in setting Egyptian policy, just as many Arabs want to limit cooperation with Israel because they think it will lead to its economic domination. (22) Mubarak also knows that attacking Israel makes him popular at home despite Egypt's many domestic problems. While somewhat disingenuous, Mubarak's claim that he cannot improve relations with Israel lest Egypt's people tell him to "go to Hell" or that the peace process's collapse would bring terror " 10 times worse than anything we " ve seen before, " reflect real concerns, too. (23) Mubarak presses Israel for concessions and preserves Arab unity while being determined to avoid war, crisis, or a break with Washington.

But while Egypt sees peace with Israel as being in its own interest, it has mixed feelings about other Arab states normalizing relations with Israel. Jordan has a stronger national interest in allying with Israel than any other Arab state. It gains a counterweight to Iraq, Iran, and Syria; the two states have some common interests on the Palestinian issue; and the Jordan-Israel relationship strengthens U. S. -Jordan links. (24) Amman works in Arab circles to limit hostility toward Israel. While public opinion in Jordan is largely against a warm peace with Israel, this has not deterred the government. (25) Jordan-Palestinian relations have been very complex: -- For many years Jordan tried to regain control of the West Bank.

In May 1988, King Hussein renounced this claim, however, and seems unlikely to reinstate it. -- But Jordan remains concerned about the fate of the lands west of the Jordan river. It cannot afford to let this place be under the rule of radical forces aligned with Amman's Arab enemies and internal revolutionaries. Thus, Jordan has mixed feelings about an independent Palestinian state but feels no ambiguity about its need to maintain influence regarding the West Bank. -- Jordan's role as guardian of the east Jerusalem Muslim holy places was guaranteed in the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, conflicting with PA claims. In October 1996, PA supporters seized the office administering the Temple Mount mosques. Jordan appealed for Israeli help to retain control (But the Netanyahu government dealt with the PA-approved group. ) -- The PA fears Jordan's ambitions over the West Bank and cooperation with Israel. The PA considers Jordan as neither a desirable nor reliable patron for the PA.

As for Israel, the same threats pushing Jordan to stay in the Arab consensus also motivate it preserving toward good relations with that neighbor in self-defense. These states oppose and seek to subvert the Israel-Palestinian process regardless of how much the PA or Syria might obtain from a negotiated settlement. Any slowdown in diplomatic progress is only a pretext for them to pursue this policy, though it may make their calls for a tougher anti-Israel stands more credible among Arabs. (Non-Arab Iran also fits into this category. ) The radical states are ruled by militant dictatorships advocating ideologies that reject Israel's existence. Similarly, the existence of a Western-oriented Palestinian state under some mixture of Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi patronage does not benefit their interests.

There are three other key factors here: a. The radicals believe they have nothing to lose by a hardline policy. Four radical regimes, distant from Israel, can demand its destruction at little risk. They need no talks since they have no bilateral issues to resolve with Israel.

Syria's proximity to Israel forces it into a more nuanced but still uncompromising stance. b. Extremely dissatisfied with the status quo, they want to wreck the peace process and stop other Arab states from normalizing relations with Israel. They see an Arab world's return to past militancy as a way to escape isolation and seize leadership. The radical states' relative regional and international isolation, lack of cooperation or a superpower backer, an unfavorable power balance, and shattered ideological taboos make them weaker in the area than at any other time during the last 40 years. All except Syria face U.

S. sanctions; Iraq and Libya are under UN-mandated sanctions. c. These regimes have a material interest in blocking the peace process. If Israel were to be accepted as a normal part of the region it would be better able to oppose their attempts to bully neighbors, promote revolutions or become the dominant regional power. A Palestinian state which did not side with their ambitions, but whose existence might even reduce regional tensions, is also a negative development from their standpoint.

A successful peace process will also reinforce U. S. influence, further weakening radical forces. Given this impressive array of factors, radical states are unlikely to support peace with Israel even if it signs a peace treaty with the Palestinians.

PA relations with the radical Arab states are paradoxical. They say they back its cause but also criticize and subvert the PA. Arafat could win their approval only by totally changing his strategy. But if he were to do so, they lack the political influence or military force to change the situation in his favor. Why did Damascus reject the offer of Israel's Labor government to return the Golan Heights in exchange for full peace and adequate security guarantees, preferring to suspend talks rather than conclude an agreement with Israel? Similarly, why has Syria been so cold in its relations with the PA, instead backing groups trying to subvert both Arafat and the peace process itself.

The reason is based on Syria's view that peace with Israel and the PA's emergence -- even if it became the ruler of a Palestinian state -- would severely hurt its interests: -- An Israel-Syria accord would open the door for most Arab states to have relations with Israel and to work with it on matters of common interest. But Israel would remain equally determined -- and far better able -- to oppose Syria's ambitions for sway over Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. -- A comprehensive agreement would strengthen U. S. power in the region, also blocking Syrian goals. -- An Israel-Lebanon agreement would follow any Israel-Syria accord, reducing Damascus's leverage in Lebanon and producing international pressure for a Syrian withdrawal. -- An agreement with Israel is unlikely to bring Syria much Western aid or investment. -- Syria would lose prestige, aid, and deferral to its interests, advantages that being a militant confrontation state have brought it in the Arab world. -- There could be domestic opposition to the regime's dramatic policy reversal. Peace would create a situation in which freer access for foreigners and more open commerce and communications might weaken the dictatorship's hold over its own people.

weakening the minority government's hold over the country. In short, Syria would be reduced to a secondary power in the region. Consequently, its interests are against making peace. Syria's willingness to talk was motivated not by a desire to reach agreement but rather an effort to avoid friction with the United States or the blame for blocking a diplomatic solution. As for Syria-PLO relations, almost since the two men first became leaders a quarter-century ago, Arafat and Asad have had cool relations.

The underlying problem was Damascus's desire to control the PLO and make it serve Syria's interest, through its own client Palestinian groups. Syrian-PLO fighting in Lebanon in the mid- 1970 s and the 1983 Syrian-provoked split in the PLO intensified the rift. Today, Syria criticizes the PA's strategy, supports anti-Arafat Palestinians in Lebanon, bars Arafat's forces from areas it controls there, and funds anti-Arafat groups. Syrian permissiveness toward Hizbollah and Iran's influence in Lebanon also hurts Arafat, since they help his rivals. Moreover, Syria and the PA compete over whose demands take precedence in shaping Arab policy toward Israel.

Arafat may want reconciliation but Syria seems uninterested. No matter how hard pressed by Israel or other problems, he cannot expect Syrian help. On the contrary, Syria will exploit opportunities to sabotage Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, hurt them both, discredit Arafat, and help his rivals. During the 1970 s and 1980 s, Iraq helped Abu Naval kill PLO officials. Baghdad also maintained its own client groups in the organization.

Arafat did, however, support Iraq against Iran in their war, despite his own earlier good relations with Tehran's Islamic revolution. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began a bid for Arab leadership in 1988, Arafat again strongly backed him and did the same in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and subsequent crisis. Despite Iraq's regional and international isolation, Arafat remains more faithful to Saddam than to any other Arab leader. Iraq insists that the critical situation requires its readmission to the Arab world and an end to sanctions. Though hostile to the peace process, Iraq never condemns Arafat, ordering client groups in the PLO to back him and even to vote for changing the Palestinian Covenant at the May 1996 Palestine National Council meeting. Saddam's 17 July 1997, National Day speech sets forth the pro-Arafat and anti-peace process elements of this strategy, as well as the need to reintegrate Iraq into the Arab world as a precondition for Arab victory: "No matter how we Arab officials assess Yasir Arafat, he is now the man in command of his people...

It is extremely important that we back him. " Under Arafat's leadership the Palestinians must undermine Israel with full Arab state financial and diplomatic support. "Until Palestine is liberated, the Palestinians must avoid building a material base for the state that could become a heavy burden when the Zionist entity threatens to destroy it or actually does destroy it. The so-called self-rule area must be more of a base for revolutionary struggle than of a state structure. (26) Arafat would like Iraq's reintegration into the Arab world as his ally but this will not happen soon and this policy does not endear the PA to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These states seek to remove themselves from the conflict while minimizing contact with Israel and avoiding formal peace with it. Their wealth makes them the best source of medium- to long-term aid for the PA and potential leverage in affecting states in the peace and radical camps or the West. During the 1970 s and 1980 s, Saudi Arabia was the PLO's most reliable source of aid. But aside from this financing and apart from the short-lived 1973 oil embargo, the Saudis and other Gulf Arab monarchies largely refrained from direct involvement in the conflict.

In the latter 1980 s, Saudi aid dwindled as it spent more money at home and diverted funds to help Iraq in its war against Iran. Saudi investments in the West discouraged actions against Western interests. The real crisis came when Arafat backed Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, provoking a strong, bitter Saudi response. All aid to the PLO and Palestinian institutions was cut off. Kuwait, whose many Palestinian residents had always made it so sympathetic to the PLO, went even further. After Iraqi forces retreated, Kuwait expelled most Palestinians from the country and has virtually boycotted the PLO since then.

Unwilling to alienate Iraq or fully admit his own past mistakes, Arafat has failed to rebuild relations with Saudi Arabia or defuse Kuwaiti hostility. (27) Consequently, despite rejecting normalization, these two countries will give the PA little material aid and certainly not risk their relations with the United States on its behalf. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have opposed normalization and discouraged other Gulf Arab states from doing -- even when Israel was offering big concessions to the Palestinians and Syria -- based on their perceived self-interest. This stems both from desire to maintain Saudi hegemony over the smaller monarchies and a Saudi fear and demonization of Israel, extreme even by general Arab standards. In both countries strong Islamic forces oppose making peace with Israel and could be turned against a government that did so. One can argue that these Saudi and Kuwaiti policies belay their national interest. Israel does not threaten them, they all face common militant enemies, and want strong U.

S. influence in the region. The problem is that such assessments do not convince Saudi or Kuwaiti leaders. Chart: Arab State Attitudes Toward the PA Hostile to the PA; Aid anti-Arafat Palestinians: Iran-, Lebanon, Libya-, Sudan-, Syria-? , [Radical Camp] Friendly to the PA; unable to help much: Algeria^, Bahrain^, Djibouti^, Mauritania , Morocco , Oman , Qatar , Somalia, Tunisia , UAE^, Yemen^ [Peace Camp] Friendly to the PA AND able to help: Egypt [Peace Camp but seeks to coordinate all groups] Cool to the PA; able to help but don't do so: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia [Drop-Out Group] Supports but also competes with the PA: States having some form of relations with Israel. ^ States open to normalization but stopped by the freeze. - States opposing the peace process. The peace process's course has produced a cycle in Arab policy toward Israel. Each forward step brings gains in normalization, followed by another period of deadlock as talks bog down and criticisms are renewed.

There is, of course, a potential avalanche effect, in which an anti-Israel campaign spins out of control. This is less likely than in the past but cannot be ruled out. Aware of this scenario, Mubarak and other Arab leaders will also be more careful to avoid it. On one hand, Arab states neither can nor are ready to try doing much to achieve the PA's goals. A disinclination to restart the conflict means that deadlocks in the process are unlikely to produce a real regional crisis, benefit Arafat, or force Israel to revise positions. On the contrary, doubting Arab readiness for peace will produce a less flexible Israeli policy.

On the other hand, however, Israel's failure to progress or reach a full settlement with the Palestinians bars it from achieving a more secure place in the region. An Arab lobbying campaign may persuade some Western leaders that only Israeli concessions can avoid a Middle East conflict or damage to their own commercial and strategic position there. Thus, while there is a strong link between progress in the peace process and advancing Israel's relations with Arab states, the political connections are far more complex than they seem. Yet: -- Half the Arab world's countries want more normal, mutually beneficial relations with Israel and one-quarter of them have already moved in this direction. The moderates are constrained not by their own interests but from fear of foreign Arab and domestic pressure, which they hope progress in peacemaking will dissipate. They find a temporary freeze a cheap price to pay for their bigger neighbors' approval. -- The main opponents of peace are impelled not by concern over details of negotiations or the Palestinians' fate but by their own interests.

They view a successful process as dangerous, and a breakdown as a chance to pursue their ambitions, destroy an unfavorable situation, and strengthen their regional influence. -- Turning the clock back is not attractive for Arab leaders who know the dangers and costs this poses for them. They are not interested in fighting Israel and lack the resources, interests or unity to do so. Similarly, the Arab economic boycott against Western companies dealing with Israel cannot be reestablished. Ironically, Israel may be more hurt by Arab states' lack of help or active sabotage regarding the PA -- reducing its stability and ability to fulfill commitments -- than by any direct Arab state pressure on Israel. -- Israeli flexibility and compromise with the Palestinians give Arab states the rationale to reduce tensions and improve relations with Israel. -- Israel could feel more secure in making compromises with a weaker PA than with one which enjoys Arab support for its most militant claims.

These factors also show that Arab states would not give much material help to a future Palestinian state which wanted to break its peace treaty with Israel. Most Arab countries' desire and interest to end the conflict with Israel remains. It is their readiness to act immediately that has been reduced temporarily. They will continue to resist a return to a past era of conflict, seeing that as dangerous for themselves and successfully opposing it. 1. The historical record on Arab state-Palestinian relations show themes similar to those analyzed here. For the author's discussion of this pre- 1956 situation, see Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Question, (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1982).

On the pre- 1993 history of Arab state-PLO relations, see Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? , especially Chapter Six, as well as the author's article "Is the Arab-Israeli Conflict Over?" Middle East Quarterly, Fall 1996, and monograph, Assessing The New Middle East: Opportunities and Risks Bar-Ilan University BESA Center, Security and Policy Studies, 1995. Bibliography: 2. Yezid Saying, "Fatah: The First Twenty Years, " Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Summer 1984), p. 115. Walid Kazziha, Palestine in the Arab Dilemma (London, 1979), pp. 15 - 19. 3. Alain Great, The PLO: The Struggle Within (London, 1985), p. 246. See also Walid Khalidi, "The Asad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance, " Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Fall 1984), p. 265. 4.

PLO Executive Committee member Muhammad Milhim commented, "It makes no sense for a Palestinian in Lebanon to use his arms against Israel when he is being stabbed in the back. " Al-And, 19 September 1989, (FBIS, 22 September, 1989, p. 7). 5. Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order, (SUNY Press, 1997). 6. Official text of the resolution obtained at the summit. 7. Text of 22 June, 1996, speech from Egypt's Ministry of Information, State Information Service. 8. Washington Post, 27 September 1996. 9. Glenn Robinson, "The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime, " Survival, Summer 1997. 10.

Ha " are, 19 November, 1996. 11. Resolution, op. cit. 12. Associated Press, 24 June 1997. 13. Ma " are, 6 June 1997. 14. Resolution, op.

cit. 15. Text of 22 June, 1996, speech from Egypt's Ministry of Information, State Information Service. 16. Interview, Middle East News Agency, 24 January, 1989, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 25 January, 1989, p. 15. 17. For a detailed discussion on Arafat's views and relations regarding the United States, see Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? , op.

cit. 18. On the history of Israel and the North African states, see Michael Laser, "The Israel-Maghreb Connection: Past Contacts, Future Prospects, " Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, # 355, April 1, 1997. 19. In addition, a high level of Israel-Turkey cooperation is an important regional development, intimidating the radicals (especially Syria) while also discomfiting Egypt which sees this alignment as challenging its own (and Arab) regional hegemony. 20. Reuters, 20 August 1996. 21.

In fact, some argue that Arab passivity might more likely produce confrontation as Israel's demands become so extreme that the peace process collapses. As the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram put it: "If Israel thinks Arabs will not act, then the region will return to what it was before negotiations. " Quoted in The Washington Post, 27 September 1996. 22. Fatal A. George, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May-June 1995, pp. 69 - 78. 23. Interview with Jerusalem Report, 19 March 1997. 24. For an excellent, detailed discussion of bilateral relations since the peace treaty, see, Lori Plotkin, "Jordan-Israel Peace: Taking Stock, 1994 - 1997, " Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997. 25.

To cite only one example, Jordanian opposition lawyers rushed to defend a Jordanian soldier who murdered seven Israeli junior high school girls.


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