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... ut rather from his personal investments in business and real estate. He further claimed that his purpose for depositing the money in a U. S. bank was to protect himself in case of another economic or political crisis in Mexico (Fritsch and Cordoba A 18).
However, the federal jury in the case did not buy Ruiz's testimony. At the conclusion of the trial, it was determined that the money in Ruiz's Houston bank account "was mostly handsome kickbacks from Mexican drug lords" ("His Money Gone" 26). On the basis of this decision, the U. S.
government seized $ 7. 9 million of the $ 9 million that had been stashed in the Houston account ("His Money Gone" 26). Further evidence of Mario Ruiz Massieu's connection to drug traffickers also came out during the trial. Thus, a former agent of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police testified that Mario Ruiz was linked "to the disappearance of several tons of cocaine from police custody in Zacatecas in 1994 " ("His Money Gone" 26). This was a reference to an incident that occurred on August 4, 1994, in which a jet carrying eight to ten tons of Colombian cocaine was forced to land near the town of Sombrerete in the state of Zacatecas. Mexican federal police agents seized the aircraft and its cargo. However, when the confiscated cocaine was rounded up later, "only two and a half tons of the drug were recovered" (Oppenheimer 165).
When similarly marked packages of cocaine were seized at the U. S. border a few days later, it became clear that "there was little question that local or federal Mexican authorities had kept the bulk of the cargo" (Oppenheimer 165). The incident also gave rise to deeper implications regarding the corruption of Mexican officials.
Thus, a New York Times article on the Zacatecas incident noted that the evidence in the case "suggests a partnership between traffickers and the police that is so open that it could not continue without the knowledge of senior officials" (Golden "A Cocaine Trail" A 14). At the civil trial in Houston, Mario Ruiz Massieu was implicated as being one of those senior officials. Thus, the former federal police agent who testified against Massieu claimed that he "personally delivered two suitcases of cash" to the former Deputy Attorney-General shortly after the disappearance of the cocaine shipment ("His Money Gone" 26). As noted earlier in this paper, there have been various theories in the attempt to explain the connection between drug corruption and high-profile assassinations, such as those of Colosio and Jose Ruiz Massieu. In the wake of the foregoing evidence, a theory has also developed which links the death of Jose Ruiz Massieu to both Raul Salinas and Mario Ruiz Massieu. According to this perspective, it is alleged that both men had been collaborating with drug traffickers in a "lucrative real estate deal in Acapulco, Guerrero" (Rochlin 113).
However, this deal was opposed by Jose Ruiz Massieu, who was the governor of Guerrero at the time. According to Rochlin, "in this scenario, the interests of narco traffickers in collusion with PRI officials were responsible for the death of Jose Ruiz, who challenged them" (113). This message put Mexican officials in an interesting position, establish a warm fuzzy relationship with the drug lords, or die. The lack of options, rather than two options, does not only decrease the stability of the Mexican government, but it murders it. The Mexican government has been taken over by the drug lords. What Can the Mexican Government Do?
When President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon came to office in the fall of 1994, he introduced a new set of policies in which he promised "greater federalism and the rule of law, " as well as an end to the long tradition of the president's rule as "an absolute monarch" ("Centre and States" 38). Similar promises were made by previous Mexican presidents; however, there are signs that Zedillo is more strongly committed to true reform than the others. One sign of Zedillo's effort to overcome the PRI's stronghold which would free the Mexican government from corruption, can be seen in his appointment of Antonio Lozano Gracia as attorney general. This appointment was significant because Lozano is a member of the opposition party known as the National Action Party (PAN). In December 1996, however, Lozano was removed from his position, presumably because of his inability to find definitive solutions to the murders of Colosio and Ruiz Massieu ("Mexico's Great Salinas Soap" 39). Another sign of Zedillo's effort to change the traditional political situation in Mexico can be seen in how he refused to involve himself in a cover-up of the scandal surrounding the former president's brother, Raul.
In this way, Zedillo indicated that he was serious about his promise "to turn Mexico into a country of laws and end the impunity that corrupt members of his party had enjoyed for decades" (Oppenheimer 203). Regarding this, the New York Times reported that the arrest of Raul Salinas "shattered an immunity that has long been taken for granted by the families of former leaders of the political system that... the PRI has dominated for almost 66 years" (Golden "Salinas's Brother" A 1). Despite Zedillo's emphasis on reform, scandals relating to drug corruption have continued to exist in Mexico's political system. For example, in February 1997, the head of the country's National Institute to Combat Drugs, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, was arrested "on charges that he protected and received benefits from a powerful cocaine baron, Amado Carrillo Fuentes" ("Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief" A 3).
Despite the scandal associated with this arrest, a positive outcome of the situation occurred with the subsequent appointment of Mariano F. Herran as the new anti-drug leader. After being named to the position, Herran promised that he would bring an end to the corruption that "has arrived at the highest levels of the institutions charged with combating" drugs (Solis A 18). In addition, Herran was the "first high-level counter-narcotics official to be appointed under a new screening regimen ordered by President Ernesto Zedillo" ("Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief" A 3).
Specifically, Herran was required to pass not only a drug-screening test, but also a psychological test and a lie-detector test. According to officials within the organization, future employees of the National Institute to Combat Drugs will also have to pass a series of tests ("Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief" A 3). The implementation of this policy marks a step forward in dealing directly with the drug corruption problem in Mexico's government. Another important effort, which came into effect in January 1998, is a new law that is designed to stop the practices of money laundering in Mexico. Among other things, this law requires banks and other financial institutions to notify authorities of any "suspicious transactions" (Solis A 18).
This law barely came into effect when it was announced that the U. S. Customs Service had just completed a three-year sting operation against Mexican drug money-launderers. On the basis of the evidence gathered in "Operation Casablanca, " a federal grand jury in Los Angeles declared in May 1998 that it was charging three Mexican banks and numerous Mexican bankers with taking part in drug money laundering schemes (Van Natta A 6). During the three-year investigation, the U. S.
agents told the bankers that they needed to launder money that they had obtained through drug profits. Despite being told this, most of the bankers were "eager" to help launder the money in return for a 1 percent commission (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A 28). The final phase of the sting operation occurred when the U. S. agents lured the Mexican bankers to "American soil for a weekend of fun, " and the bankers found themselves being arrested instead ("Yankee Drug-Busters" 31). The U.
S. Customs investigation is an important step in fighting Mexico's drug trafficking problem, because it "represents the first time Mexican banks and bank officials have been directly linked to laundering profits for the cartels" (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A 28). As noted in a report in The Economist, the significance of the case lies in the fact that "the American government - or parts of it, anyway - has dealt its first serious blow to Mexican traffickers" ("Yankee Drug-Busters" 31). At the conclusion of the operation, U.
S. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin claimed that it marked an important step in the fight against drug trafficking because it enabled U. S. agents "to crack the elaborate financial schemes" used by the traffickers (Van Natta A 6).
The U. S. Attorney General Janet Reno announced that, although the sting operation did not crush the Mexican drug cartels, "the arrests and seizures disrupted a major money laundering operation that had served as an engine of the international drug trafficking trade" (Van Natta A 6). Thus, there have been recent signs of positive change in Mexico's drug corruption problem. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the problem will be completely solved at any time in the near future. One of the main reasons for this is because the problem has been going on for so long it has become entrenched in the social and political systems of the nation.
An example of this entrenchment can be seen in the fact that some of the Mexican drug lords have systematic "pay scales" for determining the amount of each bribe. In this regard, a "fee schedule" obtained as a result of the capture of the trafficker Juan Garcia Abrego indicated that the national leader of the Mexican federal judicial police was entitled to a $ 1 million payment, whereas the federal police commander for the city of Matamoros was entitled to only $ 100, 000 (Andreas 163). Another example showing how deeply rooted the problem is can be seen in the fact that Mexican police agents often compete for the best posts, where the bribes are expected to be higher. Eduardo Valle, a former personal advisor to the Mexican attorney general, claimed that, "while he was in office, the top Mexican drug enforcement posts were auctioned off to the highest bidder" (Andreas 162).
According to Andreas, corruption is inevitable whenever illegal drug activities take on the role of a "big business. " Regarding this, Andreas says there is a "logic" to drug corruption, in which bribes are viewed as a means to "purchase an essential service monopolized by government officials: the non-enforcement of the law" (161). Andreas also uses the analogy of describing bribery as a "tax" on the business operations of drug traffickers (162). The deep-rooted ness of the drug corruption problem can further be seen in the perspective of the average Mexican citizen regarding the link between drug traffickers and the government. On this point, De Witt says that "the hidden but all-pervasive influence of drug lords has induced a vast collective cynicism among the Mexican man and woman in the street" (8). De Witt continues by noting: "If a big dealer is busted, the general belief is that the arrest came through collusion between a rival trafficker and an ambitious PRI politico - who can then masquerade as an anti-drug crusader" (8). Obviously, the drug related corruption is a problem for economic growth and political stability in Mexico.
They decrease the stability of the government by weeding out those who are virtuous. The problem is very deep, because not only Mexican officials but also American officials are corruptible. Regarding this, it was reported in 1997 that there was growing evidence that local sheriffs and judges in Texas border towns were "accepting money from Mexican drug lords to turn a blind eye to their activities" ("Neighbours" 25). Furthermore, many experts argue that the policies for dealing with Mexico's drug trafficking problem have been wrongly focused.
Some say, for example, that the United States has been too lax on Mexico. This laxity has been blamed on the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the eagerness of the Clinton Administration to see Mexico attain its annual "certification" as a co-operator in the international war on drugs. In this regard, Rochlin says that during the NAFTA negotiations of the late 1980 s and early 1990 s, "it was very conspicuous that Washington was much harder on the Andean region than on Mexico in the crusade against narcotrafficking" (Rochlin 110). Other commentators say that the United States has placed too much emphasis on trying to cut off drug supplies through programs for such things as the interdiction of traffickers or the eradication of crops. By contrast, it has been claimed that too little time and effort has been spent on trying to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States and other places.
It has been argued that cutting off supply routes is often ineffective because of "the so-called balloon effect, whereby applying pressure in one region simply pushes the trade elsewhere" (Rochlin 107). This effect can be seen, for example, in the rise of Mexico to prominence as a gateway for drugs into the United States during the 1980 s. During that time, successful U. S. interdiction efforts in Florida resulted in the Colombian cocaine cartels developing new routes through Mexico ("Neighbours" 26). More fundamentally, it is argued that efforts to curb drug supplies are bound to be ineffective, because full success in that area can never be attained as long as a demand for the drugs persists.
On this point, Rochlin says: "If there were no demand in the United States and elsewhere for illicit drugs, there would be nothing to interdict or eradicate" (117). Similarly, Peter Brimelow has written in Forbes that many Mexican officials have been corrupted by the drug trade, "but it's our money that is doing the corrupting" (46). Despite these claims, the U. S.
government currently spends about 70 percent of its budget for fighting drugs on interdiction and eradication efforts, and "only 30 percent on programs designed to curtail the apparently insatiable American appetite for illicit narcotics" (Rochlin 111). As noted by a writer for The Economist, "there is little evidence that this achieves much" ("Neighbours" 26). According to Matter Falco of the U. S. Council on Foreign Relations, the emphasis on cutting off drug supplies rather than dealing with the domestic demand is a sign of the United States' "long tradition of blaming other countries for its drugs problems" ("Neighbours" 26). A think-tank study conducted by Falco concluded that the U.
S. effort to control international drug supplies has failed, and argued that it would be more cost effective to try to reduce drug usage through programs for reducing consumer demand ("Neighbours" 26). In their study on the problem of illegal prescription drugs and "drug tourism" along the U. S. -Mexico border, Valdez and Sifaneck likewise concluded that it is difficult to stop the flow of drugs across the border when a demand for the drugs already exists in the United States (894). In a recent article in the journal Current History, Peter Andreas notes that there are signs that the Mexican drug trade and its resultant corruption may diminish somewhat in upcoming years. According to Andreas, there are two forms of corruption: "crisis corruption, " which is disruptive, unstable and violent, and "normal corruption, " which is more subtle and stable.
Andreas compares the current drug trafficking situation in Mexico to the oil boom that occurred in the nation in the late 1970 s. At that time, a dramatic increase in oil profits caused the "corrupt arrangements" between politicians and the oil industry to become more "flagrant and disruptive" (165). In 1982, when the oil boom ended, corruption continued, but it was no longer at a "crisis" level. Similarly, Andreas predicts that "the relationship between drug smuggling and the state may eventually settle down, resulting in a more stable, predictable, and less violent business environment" (165).
Andreas further notes that there are signs that Colombian drug lords are responding to "the high cost of moving their product through Mexico" by "redeveloping routes through the Caribbean and south Florida. " Regarding this, Andreas says that "a greater diversification of smuggling routes may help to reduce corruption in Mexico" (165). Nevertheless, Andreas agrees with the overall view held by most other writers on the subject that, although the situation may change over time, the problem will not be completely resolved as long as a demand for drugs continues to exist. Thus, Andreas concludes his article by indicating that "Mexico's close proximity to the United States market assures that the logic of narco-corruption will remain entrenched" (165). Mexico's only hope to ensure economic growth and political stability is to eliminate narco-corruption.
High profile arrests need to continue being made when political officials are swayed by corruption. If these crimes are not addressed, the political reform will fail, because credibility of the institutions you are reforming is not going to be recovered (Oppenheimer 336). The United States can help rid corruption by placing more pressure on the Mexican government to pull itself away from openly accepting the drug trade. This would turn on investors who would likely reward Mexico with a capital inflow.
Once again the atmosphere in government offices and Wall Street brokerage houses (could be) jubilant. And many Mexicans, with fresh memories of the countrys recent crises, ask themselves whether the men in power would ever learn from their mistakes Bibliography: Works Cited Andreas, Peter. "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico. " Current History 97 (April 1998), 160 - 165. Brimelow, Peter. "A Dirty Shade of Green. " Forbes 159 (April 7, 1997), 46 - 47. "Centre and States. " The Economist 336 (September 2, 1995), 38 +. De Witt, Addison. "Looking for an Alternative in Mexico. " The New Leader 81 (March 9 - 23, 1998), 6 - 8. Fritsch, Peter, and Jose De Cordoba. "Mexican Ex-Official's 'Family Fortune' Was Drug Payoffs, U. S.
Alleges at Trial. " Wall Street Journal (March 11, 1997), A 18. Golden, Tim. "A Cocaine Trail in Mexico Points to Official Corruption. " New York Times (April 19, 1995), A 1 +. Golden, Tim. "Salinas's Brother Charged In Mexican Assassination. " New York Times (March 1, 1995), A 1 +. "His Money Gone. " The Economist 342 (March 29, 1997), 26. "Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief. " New York Times (March 11, 1997), A 3. "Mexico's Great Salinas Soap. " The Economist 342 (December 7, 1996), 39. "Neighbours. " The Economist 342 (March 29, 1997), 25 - 26. Oppenheimer, Andres. Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico's Road to Prosperity.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996. Preston, Julia. "Swiss to Seize Salinas Millions, Tying the Money to Drugs. " New York Times (April 4, 1997), A 3. Rochlin, James F. Redefining Mexican 'Security': Society, State and Region Under NAFTA. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Render Publishers, 1997.
Rosenzweig, David, and Mary Beth Sheridan. "Mexican Banks Indicted in Drug Money Probe. " Los Angeles Times (May 19, 1998), A 1 +. Solis, Dianne. "Mexico Replaces Its Disgraced Drug Czar. " Wall Street Journal (March 11, 1997), A 18. Valdez, Avelardo, and Stephen J. Sifaneck. "Drug Tourists and Drug Policy on the U.
S. -Mexican Border: An Ethnographic Investigation of the Acquisition of Prescription Drugs. " Journal of Drug Issues 27 (Fall 1997), 879 - 897. Van Natta, Don, Jr. "U. S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in Laundering of Drug Profits. " New York Times (May 19, 1998), A 6. "Yankee Drug-Busters Head South. " The Economist 347 (May 23 - 29, 1998), 31.
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