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... te goal being that of continuation as a nation and lastly a species. Tossed in with these more innate, Darwinistic survival-based national interests were the more political ones on the parts of Kennedy and his team of advisors who realized concretely the need for rational political decision making that took into account the public good and wherein a consensus of the American and European communities would agree. In this regard, Kennedy critically and carefully analyzed not just the immediate situation at hand but the true reasons behind the situation and the total present and future implications of the Crisis.
In short, Kennedy took into account all three goal ranges (short-, middle-, and long-term) in his decision making process. Yes, Kennedy knew air strikes might have done away with the most immediate threat: the missiles. However, JFK also realized that even the short term would most probably see escalating, threatening military response on the part of the Soviets who, in the middle and long ranges, would have annihilated both American land and American global reputation. Weighing heavily on Kennedy was his strong belief that the real political issue at risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis was Berlin, not Cuba. John F. Kennedy realized well that Soviet national interest was the spread of communism with the objective being the domination of other foreign lands.
At the time of the Crisis their more immediate goal to their national interest and objective was Berlin. JFK quickly surmised the additional Soviet political ploy in the shipping of missiles to Cuba. Not only was the U. S. S. R.
setting the stage for equalization of atomic capability by way of striking position, but the Soviets were setting the stage for taking Berlin. As Halford Mackinder points out in sum: the population who commands the "heartland" (that which extends from eastern Siberia to central Europe) will command the entire world population. Additionally, President Kennedy clearly remembered that the Soviets had taken successful similar action against Hungary during the Anglo War in Egypt. The President also realized that, in the event that Berlin were lost to the Soviets because of American action, the Europeans would not longer be counted among American allies. Given that American national interests were perpetuation of democratic principles with the objective of spreading those principles to foreign lands, the goal was to keep Berlin safe for the European community while preserving American security and lives. With all national interests, objectives, and goals in mind, Kennedy believed that military action against Cuba would eventually lead to the loss of Berlin and the European view that the United States was as an aggressive nation who put Europe strategically in danger.
Of course, JFK noted, therefore, that military action against was not recommended. Therefore, when air strikes were first tossed onto the dinner table, Kennedy balked. Later, when invasion was served up as a solution, Kennedy again refrained from sinking his teeth into the idea. Clearly Kennedy knew in both instances the importance of maintaining the national interests, objectives, and goals. Second only to American national security in this regard was the maintaining of our allies.
Alliances are an all-important factor in global survival and supremacy -- if the later be what is sought by a nation. Under the theory of satisfying alliance a state searches among other states for a perfect partner or partners in order to achieve or effectuate an alliance. However, under the theory of minimum winning coalition, a state will add alliance partners to its coalition until and in order to gain a distinct advantage over its enemy or opponent. In short, under the minimum winning coalition theory a state will stop adding alliances only when and if it has achieved at least 51 % of total alliance potentiality. It is this later theory which the United States, methinks, operates under now and did operate under in 1962.
Important to this theory at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the alliance of Europe and its nations with that of the United States of America. This was truly an alliance with which American was pleased -- to say the least. Thoughts of endangering this alliance -- which clearly gave America the edge over the U. S. S. R. -- in any way was unthinkable.
Alas it was this alliance difficulty and its endangerment which caused JFK and the Ex Comm to tread carefully. Of this concern, Adlai Stevenson was keenly aware, as was John F. Kennedy, his brother Robert, and Dean Rusk. All of the aforementioned members agreed that any American action could not be viewed solely on a unilateral basis.
Both Kennedy brothers, Stevenson, and Rusk saw and were concerned deeply with the larger global picture and accurately pointed out the fact that over 40 allied nations would be affected by United States action. In the view of these members, these nations and their peoples could not and should not be forgotten or sacrificed, beginning with Berlin, the true goal of the U. S. S.
R. Additionally, not only the safety of American allies were considered in the Ex Comm discussions, but so too were the impressions of these people. A variety of questions were posed with regard to not only the effects of United States actions on Cuba, but also to how the world and, most specifically, our allies would view them. In this regard, the moral dilemmas which were poised at the United States door became issues not solely of American moral judgment and perceptions, but those of a global society. Ranking high among these concerns were the perceptions of the peoples of other nations regarding the possible bombing of innocent civilians of Castro's revisionist regime. Of course, these civilian Cubans had done no wrong.
So, the question with regard to military air strikes became one of allied perception of unnecessary civilian deaths at the hands of the American military. What this perception might be and where it ultimately might lead was of great import to President Kennedy and his Ex Comm members. Alas, military movement on Cuba was viewed as holding a great potentiality for the loss of strong and necessary allies. Likewise, the impact of quarantine or blockading was another area which held possible allied considerations. If the United States imposed a blockade of Cuba and / or the Soviet Union, the response was equally sure: the Soviets would blockade Berlin. Again an allied problem inevitably would occur.
Given this scenario, Kennedy was sure that the U. S. S. R.
and its Premier would allege that the United States of America had started the whole Crisis. Soon, Kennedy believed that a reaction would grow in Europe, a reaction that Berlin was suffering because of the actions of its supposed ally, the United States. Alas and again, our European allies would be lost. The stew of the allied political world would be lost to the United States. Still yet, a decision as to a course of action had to be taken, and it had to taken quickly. Time was clearly not on the side of the Americans in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Time was, however, categorically on the side of the Russians and the Cubans. The U. S. S. R.
needed and relished the time of decision that the United States agonized through that October. The U. S. S. R.
clearly saw itself strictly as a responsive, not a reactive, element in the equation of solution. Theirs was not to propose; theirs was to respond, reject, and restrain. The United States relationship with time was quite the contrary. Working against the United States were several time factors. First, while the clock ticked, Cuba assembled more missiles.
Yes, the United States gained more recognizance information, but all of it disturbing. Clearly, as Cuba assembled more missiles, the United States was placed in more eminent danger. If a missile was launched while the United States stood poised on negotiations, what would the reaction be in America? The world community? More importantly, what would the devastation be?
Also, what would the fate of Berlin and all of free Europe be? These questions plagued JFK and his advisors. Second, as the hours passed, the Soviets gained more time to think, plan, and devise strategies against their enemy. They sent letter upon letter, pushing the reactive burden onto the shoulders and into the cauldron of the American leaders desperately attempting to conjure up a healthy elixir to what could soon be a world crisis. Oddly enough, it was time -- or actually the fudging of time which finally made the difference between deadly brew and wholesome remedy for the United States. Ignoring a final community from the Soviet Premier, Kennedy -- upon the advice of his brother -- responded and accepted the Premiers prior letter agreeing to the dismantling of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Timing had made all the difference. The world was once again a safe place -- for now. Yes, the political world is much like a stew. It is a mixture of past, present, and future. However, since the introduction of atomic warfare, this stew has taken on a whole new distasteful pungency. Blended into this veritable deadly mixture today are not just the great nations but also a growing number of second and third world nations now exceedingly more capable of annihilating one another.
One must wonder as our world approaches its second millennium if the morals of those nations, their individual and collective interests, the views of their allies, and the distinct pressures of time will ever be able to avert another nuclear threat. Obviously, only the last factor, time, will ever tell. Bibliography:
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Research essay sample on Cuban Missile Crisis U S S R
