Example research essay topic: Forced Labor Distributive Justice - 4,124 words

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I thought Id take this time to reply to the critics of my little essay on distributive justice. For Paul Hsieh: Im not quite sure how to take your comments. Some of the time, you seem to be agreeing with me, because you say things lithe forced labor is cleverly concealed which makes it sound like you agree that even in your counter-example the surgeon is still doing forced labor. But at other points, you appear to be arguing that a different injustice than forced labor is achieving the same effect. Namely: the government first imposes what may be called forced leisure on everyone in a certain field, and then allows exceptions for those that agree to its terms. Indeed, we could imagine this system under other circumstances.

Imagine that after slavery was declared illegal in the United States, Alabama passed a law that barred blacks from every occupation. Then, it offered licenses to work to those that met its terms. And what would the terms be? They could return to work for their previous masters, and receive minimal food and shelter. Im not sure whether we should call the blacks new conditions lavery or whether we should just say that it is just as bad as slavery, since it has exactly the same effect.

But it is hard those why this round-about means of achieving the same end should make a moral difference. Rather, it appears to just be a means of (as you say) concealing the fact that one thing is just as bada's the other. Since you agree with my conclusion anyway, this should be pretty clear to you; but I venture to affirm that almost anyone would have difficulty arguing that this round-about manner extracting forced labor is morally less objectionable than slavery. (Unless they are confused by the round-about ness itself, which asylum suggest is probably just a way of disguising what would otherwise be a patent injustice. ) For Alan Eaton: Im having a little trouble understanding your reply. Are you saying that educators will charge high prices, and that the poor will come them to get hand-outs? Even supposing that e. g.

medical schools could charge exorbitant prices, why would they automatically give their extraordinarily large profits to the medically needy? You do correctly describe how a monopolist would price (namely, inthe value of the education he offered were very great, he could extract a very high price for it), although normally we would expect competition to drive price down to average cost (which in hypothetical economy is just the cost of getting someone target out of bed and do some teaching). Im also puzzled by your remark that morality in such a society might change its emphasis. Are you talking about morality inthe anthropological sense of what people in X think is right? Or are you talking about morality in the objective sense of whatis actually right? Obviously morality in the latter sense cannot change its emphasis.

But maybe what you mean is that confronted with this hypothetical, you begin to think that you were wrong about forced labor, and it is actually perfectly just in some cases. If that is what you think, then my thought experiment has utterly failed for you. All I could ask you to do it reflect further andrew if you are actually convinced of the propriety of forced labor, or if you have been too hasty in changing your initial intuition. For Steve Blatt: You make a lot of points here, so Im only going to try with therein ones. 1. Getting a Clearer Picture of the Pure Service Economy. I admit that it is a little hard to visualize at first.

Lets put it this way: for all of the goods that there are, there superabundance. Plenty of food growing everywhere, pleasant climate, natural shelter in caves, etc. And lets add further that none of the services involve transforming naturally occuring goods into new goods; rather, they are things like surgery, maid-service, offering lessons, and so on. The world is a little bare, but surely it is conceivable without the silliness of toasters growing on trees. 2. Relevance What is the relevance of my hypothetical?

I do indeed try to extended to the real world; but I think that it is interesting in itself to see how far the redistribution ist is willing to go. It is interesting to see if this hypothetical will make him start drawing lines and admitting that justice constrains his pursuit of equality and the like. Even if you dont buy my extension, I still think the example is instructive if it merely points to the limits of redistribution, since so many advocates thereof seem to take ita's an overriding good. 3. Examining Origins of Property Holdings Well, I suppose that there are two senses in which one could bea redistribution ist.

The first (and normal sense) is that of anderson who believes that the even the results of a free market in which initial holdings were not taken from anyone by force ought to be modified, by force if necessary. The second (andidiocyncratic) sense is that of a person who believes that some current holdings are unjust and must be rectified by forced transfer from the unjust holders to the just holders. As far as I can tell, my argument only supports redistribution inthe second sense. And if someone tried to use my argument to justify massive transfers from e. g. the current rich to the current poor, I would challenge their empirical, not their moral argument.

I agree that stolen holdings ought to be returned their true owners; I just think that most current holding are held by their just owners. Even on a very strict interpretation of property rights, according to which the transfer must be voluntary at each and every nexus, it is easy to avoid the conclusion that most current holdings are unjust. Most obviously, if we also hold strictly to the principles individual guilt and individual restitution, it would be necessary for a complainant to show that a certain individual unjustly held his own property. If NO individual can show this, then even inthe chain of just transfers were broken some point in the past, why shouldnt current property be considered unowned or abandoned property which was re-homesteaded by the current possessor? Or consider the case where a criminal grabs your bag of gold distant blows it to the wind. This dust is going to land on thailand of a mass of individuals, and it will be completely impossible for you to recover it from them.

Should we not then treat the original thief as if he had simply destroyed your property, and hold him accountable? And if he then killed himself and had estate, why should we think that an unknowable percentage ofthe population owes you an unknowable amount of restitution? Why not think that the robber has robbed you and escaped punishment, without in anyway placing guilt on the rest of the populace? 4. Rules of Valid Argumentation Well, there are at least two rules for an argument to work.

First all, as I said in my first posting, it is necessary that the premise be more initially plausible than the conclusion. If pis the premise and q the conclusion, then P (p) >P (q). This avoids absurdities like trying to argue that the external world exists because I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the idea of God, and God would not deceive me. Second of all (as Mike Hunter pointed out to me), it is also necessary that the premise be more initially probable than the denial ofthe conclusion. This avoids absurdities like trying to argue that have no knowledge because all statements are either analytic or synthetic. The denial of the conclusion (We have knowledge) is more initially probable than the premise, so the argument doesnt work.

Matter-amicably, P (p) > 1 -P (q). For example, my argument would be a good one if P (slavery is wrong) = . 99 and P (redistribution is right) = . 7 For. 99 >. 7, and. 99 > (1 -. 7). 5. Is Having Children Wrong? , The Duty of Slaves to Commit Suicide, etc. Now Steves attempt at reductio ad absurdum dont even slightly convince me, for they make a critical conflation: With regards to having children, all that my argument says is that is wrong to oneself impose forced labor on another.

It doesnt say that it is wrong to fail to avoid it; nor does its that it is wrong to create another human being who is likely or even certain to be victimized. Similarly, my argument that slavery is wrong for the slaver to commit does not mean that itis wrong for the slave to submit to it or fail to kill himself. To put this in teleological / de ontological terms, I am saying that is wrong to enslave people. This is distinct from it being wrong to be a victim of slavery. We would only be driven to Steves conclusion if we thought of slavery as a teleological moral cost which exceeded all others. Hence, the moral cost-minimizing solution requires the production of no further children and suicide for existing slaves.

I however am saying that slavery a de ontological moral wrong; it is wrong for it to be done all, but it may despite this be teleological ly good that people exist even if they are enslaved. In Notices terms, I see slavery as a side constraint rather than a moral goal. Bryan Caplan[Moderators note: You know, Brians essay and the little controvert started might be a very interesting thing to include in the JASP. If Brian or one of his commentators would like to organize and edition all, I could very easily include it as a special feature. Larry]From: Ben Fischer B. D.

Caplan's essay means to a prove the following conditional, where A = redistribution in a pure service economy and B = forced slavery in a pure service economy: A -> BSince forced slavery is unacceptable in a just society, he argues, by modus topless redistribution is unacceptable. In this response I means show that the conditional is false, at least in any interesting way. That is to say, I mean to show that it is possible to have a situation inthe pure service economy which would be acceptable to theredistributionist, yet would not entail any interesting kind of forced slavery. We can imagine a certain group of people unhappy with the state of affairs in the society which Caplan describes. They come together to discuss what they see as a problem, that there is too much suffering in the pure service economy. They agree that none of them will conduct business (i.

e. , conduct the kind of voluntary exchanges that Caplan describes) with anyone not in their group. Furthermore, everyone in their group will be required (on pain of expulsion) to devote a certain percentage (which might differ from profession to profession) of their services to those who couldnt otherwise afford them. In return for such a donation, they receive the privilege of trading with the other members of the group, a privilege not otherwise available. The first question is whether such a voluntary association would satisfy redistributive requirements. If the organization was large enough, it surely would.

Assuming that the voluntary association is large enough, would forced slavery necessarily result? It would not for the people inthe voluntary association, for it is voluntary . Neither would those outside the voluntary association be subject to any interesting kind of forced slavery. This latter group would have two options: join the voluntary association or dont. If they do, the only question is whether they were forced to do so. Again, the voluntary nature of the organization assures that they were not.

Imagine that only one person refused to join the voluntary association, and that that person needed emergency surgery. Without joining, that person will die. Yet if we want to say that this amounts to a kind of forced slavery, that the choice between joining the voluntary association and death is no real choice all, we also have to say that the members of the voluntary association (or perhaps just the surgeons) are doing something incompatible with justice. If the voluntary association is submitting the lone holdout to forced slavery, it is not interesting forced slavery, for in a system of voluntary exchanges like Caplan describes, we surely want to keep the right not to exchange.

If the holdout chooses not to join, the same argument obtains. If the voluntary association, in letting him die, is submitting him to forced slavery (or, more accurately, killing him), it int an interesting crime. We cannot claim that the voluntary association has done wrong without denying the people in it to organize on the basis outlined above, which we surely dont want to do. The likelihood of such a voluntary association ever forming is admittedly very low. However, in the pure service economy I suspect that redistribution would never be a problem because the very wealthy, the surgeons, say, would have to work so little that they would be bored and gladly perform operations for the poor.

So I dont feel compelled to based argument on what is likely, for Caplan's is not indeed, the pure service economy itself could never exist. My point is simply that Caplans argument that redistribution entails slavery in the forced service economy fails. If a large enough voluntary association could accomplish the kind of institutionalized redistribution that Rawls, say, would favor, and it seems to me that it could, no interesting form of slavery would exist and Caplan's argument fails. Ben From Wed Apr 5 18: 28: 52 1995 Received: from bottom.

magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by pony express.

princeton. edu (8. 6. 12 / 1. 7 /new PE) id SAA 21115; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 28: 48 - 0400 Received: from [ 128. 146. 24. 182 ] by bottom. magnus. acs.

ohio-state. edu (8. 6. 10 / 4. 940426) id SAA 01944; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 26: 44 - 0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 26: 44 - 0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economy Status: Rfrom: Bryan D. Caplan Well, I dont disagree with Ben Fischer argument. Why would I? He imagines voluntary institutions which pressure people into helping others; and these functions exert a redistributive function.

But, as Ben points out, no one either in or out of the institutions issuing forced, so were have voluntary redistribution. Very well. Then my argument only demonstrates the moral illegitmacyof redistributive organizations which were not formed voluntarily. Since this describes every government which ever existed (need Intention Lysander Spooners No Treason? ), my argument only shows that all of the redistribution which exists in reality is wrong. Which is all that I ever intended to show. In fact, if we slightly modify Bens example, we will see my intuition all its moral starkness.

Imagine that Bens association is formed threatening to kill people who dont join. Once 50 % of the population is enrolled, the leaders of the group only threaten to occasionally beat up non-joiners; another 40 % of the population joins. The remaining 10 % are then told that if they dont join, the 90 %remaining will boycott them. Is this acceptable? I doubt it.

But this process describes the actual formation of states far better than any contract theory ever could, so it is this hypothetical, not Bens benign one, which should inform our judgments of redistributive practices of actual governments. Bryan From Wed Apr 5 18: 29: 09 1995 Received: from bottom. magnus. acs. ohio-state.

edu by pony express. princeton. edu (8. 6. 12 / 1. 7 /new PE) id SAA 21160; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 29: 04 - 0400 Received: from [ 128. 146. 24. 182 ] by bottom. magnus. acs. ohio-state.

edu (8. 6. 10 / 4. 940426) id SAA 02019; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 27: 27 - 0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 27: 27 - 0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economy Status: Rfrom: (David Rader) Ben, Although your reply to the idea of forced slavery in a pure service economy does permit the possibility of redistribution through charity, it does not address the main point of the argument, namely: If a government forces redistribution against someones will, is that just? Admittedly, in a republic, the government is elected by presumably a majority of the populace. And therefore any rules made by the governemtnhave the effect of being made by the majority of the electorate (hey, this an idealized situation ignore politics and special interests). But, is tyranny by the majority any more excused for taxation than it is for racism, or (excuse the spelling) apart hied? If every person within society choses to willing donate part other labor for charitable causes, as you have outlined, that is fine. It issue individuals right to do so.

But, what if, as your great association was forming, another formed right along side it, and whose members pledged themselves to help each other (ie trade and perform services for one another) conditional on the an individual member donating to charity, if felt like it. If this association grew large enough to be self-supporting, then it would very easily allow any member of society to chose to donate, or chose not to donate, as her individual right. I am sure you would have no problem with this. But, would the other association?

Would the humanitarians who wish to coerce other members of society into donating some of their personal labor to charity think it was okay if some people did not? Most importantly: if (as I assume would happen) most of the segregation between associations was based upon personal donating choices (ie most of those who chose to donate would join the forced donation group, and those who did not want to donate would join tenour choice group) would the two sides fight each other in order to determine which chosen path was correct? Would they try to legislate the legality of their view, in order to force the other members of society to conform? You may scoff at the idea, but consider any of a number of national issues today, in which the choice is personal, and the effect is societal.

Both sides wage huge legal and legislature battles to try to force the other side to conform. To name a few: gun control, abortion, prayer in school, farming, and environmental concerns. In each of these cases, the pro and anti sides are polarized, and very hostile towards each other. The battles have evolved from is it right to into should someone be legally allowed to And, because many people who respect an individuals choice fight to protect that choice, as opposed to fighting in favor of a specific action, it is very difficult determine which members of each association feel that an actions right. The problem, as I see it, with each of these cases, is not that individual members of society feel that one action is or is not morally right. The problem is that one side of each argument has chosen to try to force every member of society abide by that sides moral code.

Morality is most likely not a universal truth. And certainly, no moral system that has been proposed is universally accepted. Forcing your own system upon other people is wrong, according to my personal view. And, in that way, any kind of forced action, be it donations to charity, the refusal to allow abortions, the taking of guns, or the stopping of voluntary prayer sessions in schools wrong.

Sorry, Ben, but I just dont think you can escape the fact that forcing members of society to give away their possessions against their will is unjust. Certainly not by saying that in one situation there could spring up a voluntary charity organization. dave From Wed Apr 5 21: 58: 25 1995 Received: from top. magnus. acs.

ohio-state. edu by pony express. princeton. edu (8. 6. 12 / 1. 7 /new PE) id VAA 21425; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 58: 20 - 0400 Received: from [ 128. 146. 24. 95 ] by top. magnus.

acs. ohio-state. edu (8. 6. 10 / 4. 940426) id VAA 11987; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 57: 03 - 0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 57: 03 - 0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economy Status: Rfrom: Mike To David Rader: I cant resist answering this one, although Im sure Bryan could answer just as well. I agree with your central point, which is that you shouldnt force people give to charity. But the justification you offer at the end of your message renders your position incoherent.

You say the reason we shouldnt force people to give to charity (i. e. , the reason it is unjust to force people) is that morality is most likely not a universal truth and its wrong to force people to abide by ones own morality, in your personal opinion. You seem to be overlooking the fact that the view you just offered, lithe view Bryan was defending, is a moral judgement. Therefore, it is obscure how you can defend its truth by claiming that moral judgements arent really true. Furthermore, I presume you would say that it was permissible to use force to prevent people from computing random murders. Yet wouldnt this be forcing our morality on the would-be murderers?

If you say that it is categorically wrong to use force against people, then that must mean that it is also wrong to use force to prevent people from using force; and so it winds up that people should be permitted these force after all. From Fri Apr 7 01: 18: 39 1995 Received: from top. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by pony express.

princeton. edu (8. 6. 12 / 1. 7 /new PE) id BAA 13435; Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 18: 36 - 0400 Received: from [ 128. 146. 70. 55 ] by top. magnus. acs. ohio-state.

edu (8. 6. 10 / 4. 940426) id BAA 23070; Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 17: 50 - 0400 Date: Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 17: 50 - 0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: redistribution as charity Status: Rfrom: Ben Fischer Perhaps I didnt make all the implications of my argument clear. Suppose that a government decides that anyone who wants to stop paying taxes, etc. , can simply give up their citizenship and set up tiny principalities constituted of the land that they own. But the old government is surely well within its rights in denying these new principalities the right to travel on their land. Well, it is clear that the residents of this principality, presumably only a family, would starve relatively quickly, unless they owned a farm.

In that case, the government wouldnt be forcing anyone to participate in their system of redistribution (another undesirable things, I suppose), but if the redistribution that does exist is charity, its of a strange kind. Essentially the government would have presented its citizens with the choice of death or redistribution-entailing citizenship, but the conditions under which death would be imposed are perfectly reasonable. The government would just be exercising its right over the property it owns. In this way I avoid the question of whether redistribution is good public policy, but the denial of its morality entails a denial of the governments right to use its property in any way it chooses. My point is that you cannot deny the right of the government to enforce redistributive policies without also denying them the right to use their property in any way they see fit. In a way, the U.

S. goes beyond the call duty, for the choice isnt redistribution or death, but simply redistribution or jail for income-tax evasion. This is another version of Socrates contract argument. If the government gives you the opportunity to make another choice (and surely its reasonable to make allowances forage here), you are bound the strictures it sets on you, even death. I case no way that redistribution necessarily entails slavery of any kind, if there is a contract which you arent forced to sign.

Of course, the situation changes markedly in non-democratic systems. Ben

Research essay sample on Forced Labor Distributive Justice