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Prologue Long before Harry S. Truman made the commitment to contain communism, long before the country had come to know the name Joseph McCarthy, the concept of the Red Scare was already a reality in Washington state. Communists were a more powerful presence in Washington than in most other states. In fact, the Populist and Progressive movements received a great deal of support from the state s large Socialist Party, and as a result were very strong during the turn of the century. Because of the state s long history in dealing with communism, Washington often served as a model for other states to follow. The state s reaction to the perceived communist threat established a national pattern of persecuting communists all over the country.
Political activity of a radical nature was not old news in Washington. Unorthodox philosophies such as socialism, the Single Tax Doctrine, Townsenism... and, of course, communism (Jones, p. 12) were embraced by a lot of people in the Pacific Northwest. Common acts included the denouncing of American entry into World War I, draft dodging, and advocating that the US recognize Russia s Bolshevik government. Many efforts were made to put an end to such conduct, but the radicals remained a powerful force in Washington until the failed Seattle General Strike of 1919, the first general strike the country had ever seen. This action was one of the triggers of the nation s first Red Scare, as many conservatives became convinced that the United States was on the brink of revolution.
Shortly after the strike, US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer ordered J. Edgar Hoover to round up non-citizens who were communists, socialists, or wobblies. Several prominent state radicals were captured in what was to be called the Palmer raids and deported to the Soviet Union. For the rest of the 1920 s, Republicans controlled the governorship and about 90 % of the state legislature. Washington s Communist Party now consisted of only a few dozen members, and the socialists and wobblies were all but gone.
When the Great Depression hit in the 1930 s, a new wave of radicalism surfaced. The Communist Party was now back on its feet, but its refusal to cooperate with other leftist groups, and its denunciation of popular President Franklin Roosevelt (Reese) stunted their growth. It wasn t until reform failed to end the Depression that the Party became appealing again as they cried out for fundamental economic change. They were no longer as extreme and were now willing to reach a wider audience. Among other things, people were not required to proclaim faith in Marxist theory and disavow religion to join. This was done in conjunction with the Soviet Union s response to the growing fascism in Europe.
The USSR was no longer introverted in its foreign policy and was willing to open its doors to capitalist democracies. Communist Party affiliation skyrocketed in Washington during this time, with its deep radical history providing for an attractive communist recruiting ground. In 1939, the American Communist Party suffered a major setback when Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The USSR, once the most vocal anti-fascist nation in Eurasia, was now openly aiding Hitler. The Party had to reverse many of its popular positions, denouncing among other things President Roosevelt s preparations to go to war. Communist membership fell by more than half as many members could not accept the new tolerance of Hitler and the Party s line being dictated by Moscow s actions.
Many people who left during this period were so embittered that they would later testify against the Communist Party during the late 1940 s and 1950 s and welcomed the persecution of communists (Reese). There were many differences between the first and second Red Scares. The first Red Scare focused primarily on immigrants and caused a lot of violent vigilantism, while the second one targeted US citizens and functioned through national and state agencies. What the anti-radicals learned the first time around they were ready to apply for round two. Branding policies and ideas as being Red was an easy and successful way to win support in the political arena, and labor leaders found that opposing radicals made their unions more acceptable to the corporate world.
Accusing the Democrats of selling out to the communists, state Republicans made anti-communism the theme of their 1946 campaign and focused their attacks on Hugh De Lacy, a US Representative from Seattle who was in favor of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The Republicans asserted that De Lacy was secretly a member of the Communist Party, which he in fact was. These charges against the Democrats, along with a minor post-war recession, aided the Republicans to an easy sweep of the elections, and for the first time in sixteen years, they were once again in control of the state legislature. The Canwell Committee One of the many Republicans elected in the landslide was Albert Canwell. A former deputy sheriff, he had also previously worked undercover to monitor Communist Party activities for Washington Water Power and Boeing. During the 1947 legislature, the first-term representative introduced a resolution which would create a committee with the power to investigate, ascertain, collate and appraise all facts concerning individuals, groups or organizations whose activities are such as to indicate a purpose to foment internal strife, discord and dissension; infiltrate and undermine the stability of our American institutions; confuse and mislead the people; and impede the normal progress of our state and nation either in a war time or a peace time economy (1).
It passed by a wide margin because many Democrats, now knowing the liability of their soft stance on communism, also voted in favor of it. To do otherwise would be political career suicide, but because of their actions, the state s communists abandoned the Democrats and joined forces with the Progressive Party, whose leader was former vice president Henry Wallace. That would be the end of all ties between the Democrats and communists in Washington. As the chairman of the Joint Legislative Fact-finding Committee on Un-American Activities, Canwell was intent on flushing out the state s communist population. Public hearings were planned to convince the citizens of the state that the Washington Pension Union and several Congress of Industrial Organization unions were communist fronts that were being controlled directly from Moscow. With the passing of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which required every leader of a union to disavow membership in the Communist Party before the National Labor Relations Board could recognize the union (Reese).
Canwell barely had to lift a finger, as many union leaders were quick to respond to the Act by removing all known communists from positions of power. He could now focus the entire efforts of the first hearing on the Washington Pension Union. From the very start of the proceedings, it was clear that the Canwell Committee was not going to be an impartial assembly. The rules of the game did not allow the accused to question their accusers nor could they speak on their own behalf. Only hand-picked witnesses and investigators were allowed to speak at the hearings. The State Patrol also had the power to remove anyone from the audience who tried to disrupt the hearings.
The Canwell Committee opened their hearings by taking testimonies from several former members of the Communist Party who were now professional anti-communist witnesses, meaning they were paid by the Committee for testifying to the subservient nature of the American Communist Party to Moscow. They testified that communist participation in reformist or front groups was merely a way to get to specific liberals the Party wanted to convert, and that the overthrowing of the US government was the ultimate goal. Next up were ex-communists from the local area who swore to the fact that they saw Washington Pension Union officials at meetings meant only for high ranking Communist Party members. These officials allegedly supported Soviet foreign policies.
Despite everything presented in the hearings, the Committee did not come close to proving that the Washington Pension Union either received instructions from Moscow or were a front with no concern for helping the elderly. Though membership in the Union did fall after the hearings, they were not seriously harmed and were able to place on the 1948 ballot a measure to provide free health care to impoverished Washingtonians (Reese). University of Washington Witch Hunt The second set of Canwell Committee hearings focused in on communist activities at both the University of Washington and the Seattle Repertory Playhouse. Organizations for higher learning were, of course, prime targets for communist infiltration, where young minds could be easily swayed and be the driving force in changing the future face of the nation. One of Canwell s committee members made the statement about UW thatcher isn t a student who has attended this university who has not been taught subversive activities... I have reports that show definitely that five professors teach subversive activities at the school and other reports that the number is as high as thirty (Schrecker, p. 94).
At the Committee s initial set of hearings, witnesses identified several professors as being communist. The Board of Regents responded by welcoming an investigation in hopes that it would clear up years of adverse rumors. At the time, UW had a new president. Raymond B.
Allen, former medical school dean from Illinois, understood what Canwell was trying to accomplish. Allen himself had pointed out in his inaugural speech the need formal (ing) in a scholarly way with controversial questions... that if there were any Communists... they ought to get off the faculty... before they were smoked out (Schrecker, p. 95).
Allen not only convinced the members of the school s AAUP chapter (American Association of University Professors) to cooperate with Canwell, but to also refrain from criticizing him. Once again these hearings denied the cross-examination of the witnesses the Committee put on the stand. A total of eleven professors were summoned. Six of them admitted to being former communists. Among them were Maud Beal, Melville Jacobs, Garland Ethel, and Harold Eby, who despite fessing up to their former associations, refused to name names.
English professor Sophus Winther, however, did name his associates, and the sixth professor claimed not to be able to recall the names of those he came in contact with. Melvin Rader and Joseph Cohen denied ever having been communists and fought hard to clear their names and reputations, claiming that the witnesses were lying. Three other professors, Herbert Phillips, Joseph Butterworth, and Ralph Gundlach, were uncooperative and refused to answer any questions, as did Burton and Florence James, directors of the Seattle Repertory Playhouse. Witnesses had charged the Seattle Repertory Playhouse with showcasing communist plays and being a recruiting station for the Communist Party. The accusations, however, had little to no supporting evidence.
All that was proven was the fact that some Playhouse members had on occasion provided entertainment at Communist Party fundraisers. However, despite the lack of evidence, the Playhouse was never able to recover from the negative publicity the hearings brought about. Attendance fell sharply after the hearings and the Playhouse was forced to file for bankruptcy in 1950. UW s Call to Arms University of Washington administrators sought to clear their school s reputations by attempting to dismiss six of the professors: Ethel, Gundlach, Phillips, Eby, Butterworth, and Jacobs. School tenure code required the Faculty Senate to create a Tenure Committee which could try the administrations charges against these professors. It was up to this Tenure Committee to find the six professors guilty of incompetency, neglect of duty, incapacity, dishonesty, or immorality (Reese) before they could be fired.
Though each professor offered up a different defense, all six of them were able to supply ample evidence that both their students and their colleagues had found them to be objective competent in their profession; their teachings were not biased toward communism. However, instead of countering the testimony, the administration deemed it irrelevant, that regardless of how qualified they may have been as professors, their membership in the Communist Party, past or present, rendered them unfit because it meant that they had surrendered their intellectual autonomy to Stalin (Schrecker, p. 100). Their was one catch, though. Nothing in the Administrative Code stated that Communist Party membership was ground for dismissal, so the case became focused toward what the defendants had done when Allen first questioned them, which was to either lie or refuse to answer. The administration felt that this type of deception was an inherent characteristic of membership in the Party and was... a type of behavior that the academic would could not condone (Schrecker, p. 100).
Professors therefore had an obligation to reveal their political beliefs and affiliations to their superiors. During the course of the hearings, it was discovered that Butterworth and Phillips were and had been members of the Communist Party for thirteen years (Lewis, p. 162). That now made five of the six professors up for dismissal either former or current members, but the one that had maintained his innocence the entire time, Gundlach, was the only one the Tenure Committee voted to dismiss. Three members wanted to fire Butterworth and Phillips on the spot, but ultimately the belief that they didn t have the power to can them won out. Because of the dilemma surrounding these two, five of the members contended that the UW should amend the tenure code to ban communists from teaching in the future (Reese).
As for Ether, Jacobs, and Eby, the three were unanimously retained because the Committee felt their competence and free will was shown by their walking away from the Communist Party. Allen s suggestions regarding Gundlach s dismissal was that, even though communist ties could not be made to him, he has at the very least been one of that special group of Party Members who deliberately do not become Party members so that they may better serve the Purposes of the Party. Entirely aside from whether he pays dues and carries a card, Gundlach has done more for the Party than any other respondent (Schrecker, p. 103). The Committee voted to dismiss Gundlach on the basis that he had been dishonest to the dean, which they felt was a small piece of a larger picture. Among other things, Gundlach had repeatedly clashed with several administrators, sponsored many controversial speakers, and leaked data from UW-sponsored public opinion surveys to Hugh Delacy's campaign in 1946 (Reese). The Committee s reports were then sent to the Board of Regents along with the dean s own recommendations.
Allen disagreed with the retaining of Phillips and Butterworth, and advocated their firing to the Regents. He pointed out that because the Regents were not technically bound by the Administrative Code, they could do what they felt was necessary. As a result, Phillips and Butterworth were thrown out on the street along with Gundlach. The Regents were unanimous in the view that the tenure and employment of (Jacobs, Eby, and Ethel) should not be disturbed by reason of the charges filed and the facts proved in the cases against them (Lewis, p. 162). The three put on two year probation's and required to sign an affidavit that they were no longer in the Communist Party (Schrecker, p. 103). The Domino Effect Because the UW was the first school to handle such an issue, the dismissals set a national precedent.
The AAUP protested the school s actions but lost, and colleges across the nation began their own communist investigations, using Allen s claim that communists were unfit to teach as their war cry. During the course of the 1950 s, approximately 200 professors were dismissed from American universities for being either communist or subversive. Fearful of losing their jobs, academics who were liberal or ex-communists toned down their lectures, concealed political views, and cuts ties to left-wing groups. It was too late, however, for Gundlach, Butterworth, and Phillips, as they were now blacklisted, unable to find work in higher education.
The Seattle Smith Act Trial In 1940, Congress came up with the Alien Registration Act in an attempt to curb communist influence and fear. This Act was relatively harmless in and of itself, but a rider was attached to this bill by Virginia Congressman Howard W. Smith. This soon came to be known as the Smith Act, and anyone found guilty of violating its rules was subject to a maximum fine of $ 20, 000 and / or a maximum twenty year prison sentence, in addition to becoming ineligible for employment by the United States Government (Jones, p. 3). The Act made in unlawful for people knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence (Jones, p. 2). This included the printing, publishing, issuing, circulating, etc.
of written or printed material which advocated the above matter, as well as organization with or affiliation to such groups. The Act did not mention the Communist Party by name because such specific legislative addressing of groups and individuals was unconstitutional, but the Party was clearly its target. On July 20, 1948, twelve members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States (Jones, p. 4) were indicted by the Department of Justice for conspiracy in violation of Section 3 of the Smith Act. This event came to be known as the Foley Square trial. The twelve were found guilty in 1949 and heir convictions sustained by the Supreme Court in 1953. In finding the Smith Act constitutional by upholding the Foley Square trial decision, the Supreme Court opened a can of worms.
Indictments broke out all over the country, aimed mainly at high ranking Communist Party officials, and resulted in a total of 15 prosecutions involving 121 defendants. On Wednesday, September 17, 1952, with the Canwell Committee hearings as its overture, the epidemic of Smith Act indictments hit Seattle. William Pennock, Terry Pets, Party Larsen, John Daschbach, Paul Bowen, Barbara Handle, and Henry Huff were arrested by the FBI for unlawfully, willfully knowingly (to) conspire with each other... to commit offenses against the United States prohibited by Section 2 of the Smith Act, by...
advocating and teaching the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit and by... organizing and helping to organize, as the Communist Party of the United States a society, group, and assembly of persons to teach, and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the government by force and violence (2). They were viewed as being a clear and present danger, and both the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the Seattle Times were quick to splash the front page of their newspapers with headlines of top state communists being arrested and communist conspiracies being brought to light. This would become one of the longest and most controversial trials in the history of Washington. On April 15, 1953, the trial began. The prosecution, led by Tracy Griffin, argued in terms of black and white: the American capitalist democracy is good; Marxism, socialism, and communism is bad.
Griffin s case focused on the accused s Communist propaganda and literature. The defendants, he claimed, uncritically accepted and propagated every literal line of Marxist literature (Jones, p. 98). Marxism was bad, so therefore these seven were bad too. Griffin s angle was basically that if guilt could not be proved by evidence against an individual, then it would be proved by association and common membership (Jones, p. 99). He then proceeded to portray them of being evil henchmen, ready and waiting to strike when called upon to do so. Then he more or less threatened the jury, citing that a not guilty plea would stamp them as being disloyal to their nation and fellow citizens.
The defense, headed by Irvin Goodman and John Caughlan, tried unsuccessfully to offer several motions for dismissing the entire trial. Their case then focused on the fact that the prosecution had no case. There was no evidence to prove that their clients were guilty of attempting to overthrow the government, and the state was simply trying to get their convictions based on the passion and prejudice of the people. Communism was not on trial. The jury then voted to convict six of the seven charged. The only not guilty verdict the nation s first Smith Act acquittal was given to Larsen.
Final Thoughts The fear of the unknown in this case, Communism and the call to arms by the likes of Albert Canwell and Joseph McCarthy were a lethal mixture. Though on paper it may have appeared to have the nation s best interests in hand, enforced it ultimately proved to be an ugly and destructive tool. The emotion of fear is purposed toward survival and self-preservation, but panic and haste can easily turn this attribute into a detriment. Fear can also lead history to repeat itself, sometimes quite frequently. In the 1940 s Republicans accused Democrats of being soft on communism, and as a result won a majority of the elections.
In the 1950 s McCarthy went on an accusal spree, claiming the Democratic administration harbored communists in the government and label (ed) the administrations of Roosevelt and Truman as twenty years of treason (Jones, p. 11). The American people bought into his accusations, which in turn resulted in the Democrats jumping into the communist purging binge, making an already frantic and poorly thought out measure even worse. It is even possible that McCarthyism was based on the actions Canwell took in his communist hunting efforts. Both men took rumor and speculation as if hard facts, considered criticism and noncooperation to be a sign of guilt, and destroyed a lot of lives, especially of those who weren t communists. Because the state of Washington had one of the American Communist Party s largest membership bases, it often dealt with Red Scare issues first and as a result became the standard which the other states followed. No example is clearer than the Canwell Committee s investigation into communist activity by University of Washington professors.
Bibliography Jones, John Kenneth; McCarthyism in the Northwest: The Example of Huff et. al. vs. United States (1953), The Seattle Smith Act Trial; University of Washington student thesis; 1968. Lewis, Lionel S. ; Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control; Transaction Books; 1988. Reese, Michael; The Cold War and Red Scare in Washington State, web Schrecker, Ellen W. ; No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities; Oxford University Press; 1986. 1) House Concurrent Resolution No. 10; State of Washington, Thirtieth Regular Session; first read February 26, 1947. 2) Indictment issued by United States District Court, Western District of Washington, Northern Division, No. 48563; September 24, 1952.
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