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Example research essay topic: Post Cold War Second World War - 2,205 words

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... latin was to launch the infamous Kamikaze anti shipping campaign. Though Japanese Army Air Force pilots occasionally flew on such one-way suicide missions, the overwhelming majority of Kamikazes were Japanese naval attackers. The threat of the Kamikaze was the greatest aerial anti shipping threat faced by Allied warfare forces in the war. Approximately 2, 800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4, 900 sailors, and wounded over 4, 800. The Kamikaze anticipated the post- 1960 s anti shipping missile, and forced planners to take extraordinary measures to confront what was basically a straightforward threat, but also a threat that could profoundly influence events out of proportion to its strength.

The Kamikaze experiences, while dreadful, and could not bring victory, only delay. The Second World War was the last Great War at sea. During the Cold War, both Soviet Union and Western blocs produced large numbers of maritime patrol aircraft derived from long-range bombers, airliners, and specially designed planes. As the threat of the new generations of sophisticated submarines carrying advanced weapons including homing torpedoes and missiles gradually emerged, more and more of these systems were designed for the antisubmarine role as opposed to attack of surface ships.

The clear danger submarines posed to aircraft carriers spurred the creation of specialized ship-based antisubmarine aircraft. The size of American aircraft carriers dramatically rose after the early 1950 s, reflecting the demands of the jet age. Three significant innovations transformed American naval aviation and dramatically improved efficiency and safety. One was the introduction of the angled flight deck, two was the installation of the mirror landing system, and three was the introduction of the steam catapult. Ironically, as these changes improved efficiencies and safety, and as the size of aircraft carriers and their crews dramatically increased, the actual size of deployed carrier forces aboard ship declined.

These dropped from about one hundred in WW II, to about 75 airplanes by the time of the Gulf War, the majority of which were support or purely fleet air defense airplanes. With size limitations on naval aircraft, naval carrier forces were increasingly dependent on long-range land-based air forces in order to fulfill missions. Long-range precision weapon revolutions were rendering land-based aircraft, submarines, and missile-armed small combatants increasingly dominant and effective in the maritime warfare role. Carrier battle groups were forced to operate further and further from away from the shore, degrading their traditional value as a means of projecting global presence. However, maritime air warfare has continued to play a significant role in the Korean, Southeast Asian, Falklands, and Gulf conflicts.

Maritime air warfare played a significant role in ensuring the success of the blockade the Kennedy administration placed around Castro's Cuba, and played a small part in land strikes in Vietnam. Maritime air operations did play prominently in any of the Arab-Israeli wars, or in the India-Pakistani ones, although there were some attention grabbing attacks. The Falklands war of 1982 was a notable exception to the general postwar pattern of indecisive naval combat. Here, maritime airpower had a profound effect upon surface vessels operations. Land-based Argentinean strike aircraft sank six ships (two destroyers, two frigates, a container ship functioning as an aircraft carrier, and a fleet auxiliary) and damaged a further thirteen (four destroyer, six frigates, and three fleet auxiliaries); British carrier ship-based aircraft and helicopters sank or forced the abandonment of six vessels (a submarine, two patrol boats, a trawler, and two freighters), and damaged another patrol boat. British maritime superiority enabled all other British naval and amphibious operations to occur.

The Falkland campaign was notable for dramatically highlighting the value of anti shipping missiles such as the Exocet and the Sea Skua, shipboard surface-to-air missiles, and the leverage offered by the British Aerospace Sea Harrier armed with advanced air-to-air missiles. Also shown again was the vulnerability of large capital ships to submarine attack. In particular, this war also illuminated the increasing threat to ships by maritime air attack and, especially, to the vulnerabilities of many newer vessels (less armored than their predecessors of WW II, in part because of their having heavier topsides for carrying extensive electronic equipment) to even unsophisticated and, indeed, obsolescent attackers dropping conventional non-precision iron bombs. Newer ships were heavily damaged or even sunk, even when weapons did not explode. In fact, what is often missed is that the British victory owed as much to the operational inexperience's of Argentinean airmen and bomb fusing problems as it did to the skill and technological advantages of its own force, and the tremendous logistical accomplishment of equipping and moving such a force so far in a relatively brief period of time.

Of 22 bombs that struck British ships, 12 failed to detonate, and one detonated late. Thus fully 55 % of Argentinean bombs failed to explode, even though they hit their targets. Had they done so, it is likely that the British task force would have been so weakened that they would not have been able to operate in the waters around the islands. That, of course, was a precondition for taking them, and would have spelt disaster for the entire expedition. The effects such a defeat would have had on the subsequent history of the 1980 s, especially the European governments, is profound. While I only speculate, it is likely that a defeat in the Falklands would have seen the Thatcher government falling, perhaps fatally weakening the strong alliance of the U.

S. and Great Britain that did much to bolster European resistance as NATO faced the Soviet Union in the latter and more serious years of the Cold War. Thanks to a few more bombs exploding, the loss of a sea war thousands of miles from Europe might have had a dramatically different ending, and vastly affected the balance of power in Europe. The lessons learnt in the Falklands war were not lost on the worlds navies, particularly as the conflict demonstrated the leverage that newer weapons could offer even a small opponent confronting a naval power.

Accordingly, naval planners increasingly emphasized reliance upon a diverse means of defensive measures, including the application of stealthy low observable technologies in shaping and materials to reduce the radar signature return of surface vessels; long range early warning coupled with long-range engagement of air and missile threats; and finally, close-in gun and rapidly blooming chaff deployment to defeat aircraft and missiles in terminal end-game engagements. Despite such efforts, encounters in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and finally, the Gulf War of 1991, have reaffirmed the continued vulnerability of surfaces forces precision air and missile attack. Ships offer little protection against the sophisticated aerial attacker armed with precision ammunition. In single day in 1988, U. S. naval aviation and surface forces sank over half the Iranian navy, thanks to the leverage offered by naval aviation forces armed with laser-guided bombs and anti shipping missiles.

The Gulf War of 1991 left memorable images of bombs flying through doors and elevator shafts, and cruise missiles literally cruising down streets. While to most observers, the war consisted of an air campaign against Iraqi leadership and military force targets; there was a strong maritime warfare component to the Gulf crises and subsequent war as well. From the onset, long-range maritime patrol aircraft worked with surface vessels to impose a tight blockade over Iraqi merchant traffic attempting to transit the Straits of Hormuz. During the war itself, there were sporadic actions by coalition attackers against Iraqi fleet elements. Naval aircraft and helicopters from the coalition navies savaged the Iraqi navy, which ultimately played no useful role in the war. Because of the twin revolution of the submarine and the airplane, it is impossible for surface naval forces to operate with the assurance and the confidence that they are masters of their own fate, as was true in previous centuries.

Contemporary post-Falklands British doctrine state that: The minimal requirement for a successful [maritime] operation is a favorable air situation. Air superiority will be a requirement for sea control where a robust challenge from the air is possible. Air supremacy is a necessary precondition of command of the sea. [Emphasis in original text] As the first millenium of the Common Era was one of predominant land power (typified by Rome), and the second one of predominant sea power (typified by Great Britain), the third millenium is increasingly one characterized by the dominance of air and space warfare. In fact, the main form of power projection for both armies and navy is the air weapon. Air power at sea has made its mark on naval warfare since the time of the First World War.

While currently the U. S. is the only truly global naval power (as it is the only truly global air power), the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons among smaller nations in unstable regions offers no confidence to those who would blithely assume that American maritime supremacy will remain unchallenged, particularly in far-flung regional contingency operations. As the Second World War clearly showed the vulnerability of surface ships to attackers armed with dumb weapons, the wars since the 1960 s have increasingly highlighted how even more valuable surface vessels are to attack by precision missile and bombs.

Concern over missiles and mines and their successors threaten to constrain both the traditional freedom of maneuver of surface naval forces and options regarding their use. Various forecaster and historian have attempted to predict the future of maritime warfare in light of the challenges posed by, older anti shipping technology and weaponry. One favorite has been submarines Historian John Keegan has stated that: It is with the submarine that the initiative and full freedom of the seas rests. The aircraft carrier, whatever realistic scenario of action is drawn that of operations in great waters or of amphibious support close to shore will be exposed to a wider range of threat than the submarine must face. In a shoreward context it risks attack not only by carrier-borne but also by land-based aircraft, land-based missile and the submarine itself The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must therefore be recognized as having begun. Other vision for the future of submarines includes anti-radar stealth technology, lasers, electromagnetic rail guns, and sophisticated unmanned air vehicles to conduct maritime reconnaissance.

It is not inconceivable that submarines might some day operate small-specialized piloted craft as well. As for arsenal ships, it is hard to imagine how an arsenal ship, however well armed, could defeat a plethora of air-launched or submarine-launched weapons. History provides examples such as the Bismarck, Yamato, Mushasi, and Shinano, all who were arsenal ships of immense proportion who were sunk by air, surface or submarine forces. The decline of the surface vessel as a predominate means of exerting naval power is undoubtedly underway. The decline may be slowed somewhat by new advances in shipboard defenses, but it is unlikely to be reversed. Historically, the partnership between sea 0 based air and submarine forces, and land-based aviation has been the most productive means of thwarting an enemies attempt to seize local control of the sea.

In fact, virtually all significant naval actions of this century have taken place within reach and with the involvement of land based aviation forces. In a post Cold War cost conscious environment, the advantages of having land-based aviation forces assume a greater role in maritime control operations is increasingly attractive to defense planners, particularly as the acquisition and operating costs of naval aviation are correspondingly increasingly expensive. A number of circumstances have led to this. Fist, the costs for carrier based aircraft normally run three to four times as much as a land-based aircraft. Then come the lag times in deploying naval aviation forces, along with their need to replenish and resupply, which makes their presence sporadic. Finally, the ratios of the large number of ships and personnel required to maintain a relatively small number of deployable strike aircraft is to high.

In conclusion, the pace and impact of aviation in the twentieth century has been extraordinary, and nowhere more so than in military affairs. Less than forty years after the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk, the airplane both land- and sea-based- had evolved from threatening to dominating the ship. That dominance has been extended even more forcefully into the modern era in spite of intensive and creative efforts to improve shipboard defenses. In todays world, the threat posed to the ship by the airplane or the aircraft-deployed missile or mine is at its greatest. If for no other reason than this, strengthening the traditional partnership of air forces and navies working together to ensure the defeat of their common enemies is no less important today than at any time earlier in this century. Bibliography: BIBLIOGRAPHY Air Force and Maritime Operations; web Britain: The Leading Industrial, Commercial and Naval Power in the West; web Christopher A.

Preble, The Cold War Navy in the Post-Cold War World; web Land Powers in Competition with Sea Power; web Frank Monoldo; Lessons from Kosovo; web kosovo. htm Peter Haydon; Seapower in a changing World; web 8. htm Sea Battles; web Sea Power; web power. html Trends in Naval Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; web


Free research essays on topics related to: second world war, soviet union, aircraft carriers, post cold war, land based

Research essay sample on Post Cold War Second World War

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