NOTE: Free essay sample provided on this page should be used for references or sample purposes only. The sample essay is available to anyone, so any direct quoting without mentioning the source will be considered plagiarism by schools, colleges and universities that use plagiarism detection software. To get a completely brand-new, plagiarism-free essay, please use our essay writing service.
One click instant price quote
how original was Napoleon as a military commander? No soldier will die for his country. A soldier will die for a bright ribbon Napoleon, commenting on the role of non-monetary motivation for soldiers in wars. Mr. Napoleon Bonaparte is considered to be one of the greatest and most original military leaders of France and Europe.
Under his rule only, the French empire stretched across whole Europe from Spain to Russia. Military commander Napoleon did not only revolutionized the military operations and warfare, but also was known to have been the creator of the favorable political fore-settings prior to the military attack on the given territory. Napoleon still was not seen as proposing any drastic changes in war tactics or weaponry invention as a new method of waging war across Europe, yet still Napoleon was believed to have excelled at the tactical handling of the armies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the following essay I am going to speak about the Napoleon as Military commander, his originality and superiority to other commanders.
Various educated findings together with my personal opinion will be presented. Napoleon first started to be called a great leader of after the siege of Toulon and triumphant victories in Italy in 1795 - 1797. As a Military commander Napoleon drastically improved discipline talents were refined and reached their height during the battles of Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena in the period of 1805 - 1806 (Bertaud, 112). It was not till the end of the French Empire that the strengths of Napoleon as a military commander started to be discussed or questioned. His insistence on the micro management of the army and the awarding of Marshal batons to those who excelled under his leadership, but who possessed no great talent for individual command, worked to his determent. The future Napoleons strategic failures of the decisions to invade Spain and Russia and the inability to keep the other major European powers divided proved disastrous to the French Empire (Bertaud, 112).
The growing size and motionless nature of armies and the increasingly murderous nature of warfare during the latter part of the Empire revealed Napoleon's in ability to adapt to the changing shape of war. I believe that it is in the light of his triumphs and later failures that Napoleon's traditional reputation as a great military leader must be judged and commented on with respect to his abilities. Napoleon Bonaparte has been both loved and abhorred with respect to his commander abilities. For example in his epic work The Campaigns of Napoleon David Chandler accurately portrays how the "wheel has turned full cycle several times" as to the impressions of Napoleon's military leadership abilities (Chandler, 1965, 13).
Napoleon had been regarded from at best a "talented thug", to an unprecedented military genius equal to Alexander the Great. Another example is General James Marshal-Cornwall, a contemporary of previously mentioned David Chandler, who speaks of Napoleons military abilities as .".. a master of the conduct of war; he was the supreme craftsman of his trade, who new how to make to most effective, though not the most economical use of the tools and techniques which he found ready to his hand (Chandler, 1994, 65). Marshal-Cornwall, just like Chandler views Napoleon's military genius as stemming from his use of the 'tools at hand' but, he is also aware of Napoleon's weaknesses as a military commander and does not hesitate to point it out (Butler, 56; Marshall-Cornwall, 84).
Here I would like to present another person in support of Napoleons great abilities, Owen Connelly, who argues that, Napoleon, was "probably the greatest commander of all time" in his Blundering to Glory, as well as noted that Napoleonic genius should have been used in peaceful purposes (Connelly, 70). Another historian, Geoffrey Ellis, believes that Napoleon as a military leader is gifted and talented in his The Napoleonic Empire (Ellis, 22). Napoleon Bonaparte has been viewed as a very gifted commander capable to learn on his mistakes of the past and on the mistakes of the former commanders. For example Robert Epstein states that there were two distinct eras in Napoleonic warfare. The first, consisted of the period of 1805 - 1807.
It was during this time period that Napoleon had enough political autonomy to enforce his military plans and the full-scale adoption of the army corps system. Epstein regards that the army corps and the Napoleonic command and control structure allowed for the decisive battles of annihilation that accrued between 1805 - 1807 (Ellis, 229). The second period, that of 1809 - 1815, is marked by the modernization of the armies of Napoleon's advisories aimed at increased efficiency, ability and strength. The result was that from the time of the 1809 campaign against Austria and the battle of Aspen-Essling, were Napoleon suffered his first defeat on the battle field, the key factor in warfare became firepower through the increasing scale of men and in particular artillery. As a result the scale of warfare increased and Napoleon did not keep pace.
The end result was that the .".. one time god of battles (was) overthrown by the dynamics of warfare that he had unleashed but failed to comprehend" (Ellis, 232). Speaking about historical achievement as a great commander, one has to remember that Napoleon Bonaparte conquered instantaneously the bordering to France land. Napoleonic Armies dominated the art of warfare amongst the European powers in the period 1796 to 1815.
I believe that in order to judge Napoleon Bonaparte as a great military leader it is essential to look at the rational behind his great triumphs of the early period (1796 - 1806) and the reasons for the decline of his prominence in military affairs (1807 - 1815). One can see that Commander Napoleon was a military genius in the strategic and tactical handling of French and enemy armies and although he provided no large scale apparent reforms of French armies, or their equipment and techniques, he excelled at the refinement of an art that already existed leading them to the point of supremacy and European dominance (Marshall-Cornwall, 45). The Napoleonic military operations used similar tactics, organization and weaponry of the past. Thus, Napoleon Bonaparte inherited the army elements as well as a professional French officer corps, seasoned and trained veterans and new rules for the recruitment of rank and file from the revolutionary wars of the past.
Most of the reforms that were used to such great effect under Napoleon's generalship had actually been introduced at the end of the old regime in France (Rothenberg, 182). It was the Republican armies under the guidance of Generals Kellerman, Jourdan, Moreau and others that refined the infantry tactics of Gilbert and the artillery reforms of Gribeauval and the Du Teil brothers that dominated the Revolutionary and Napoleonic epochs. I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that Napoleon's personality, leadership and communication skills had a significant impact on his military career as a French commander. Many factors helped Napoleon rise to fame and enhance his abilities; his almost hypnotic power over his contemporaries; his intellectual capacity; the ability to work for long periods continually; his iron will and irresistible charm all helped during the early part of his career to establish himself at an early age as a very competent general (Rothenberg, 187).
The later point was especially significant when he took command of the Army of Italy in 1796 at the age of only 27. Harold Parker goes so far as to say that Napoleon's personality and its desire to please Josephine effected his performance during the Italian campaign of 1796, that his tendency at this time toward a sexual union "with a woman no doubt accentuated his drive for power and accomplishment" (Lynn, 16). Still I personally find it but another attractive theory and could have influenced Napoleons abilities as a commander in chief of the French army. Speaking about the historical settings I would like to note that Napoleon inherited an officer corps that was both militarily professional and transformed by the French revolution. During the war the Napoleonic corps was no longer restricted to the old nobility, but was established on the revolutionary principles of merit, talent and elections amongst peers for promotion (Marbot, 340). With the Napoleons rise to power the anarchist policy of election was abolished.
Napoleon excelled as a commander because of his encouragement of soldier loyalty to himself as he promoted those who performed well regardless of their social background, thereby inevitably linking the fortunes of his officers to his own continual success and maintenance of power (Weigley, 90). Another thing that must be regarded as determinant in Napoleons excellence as a military French commander was Napoleons attempt to change the French army during this period that were instrumental towards his victories. In tactical organization Napoleon widely introduced the use of the corps d'avant-garde or corps d'armee. First seen in his Italian campaign of 1796, the army corps replaced the division as the main tactical organization. In effect the corps was a miniature army comprised of infantry, artillery, and cavalry numbering anywhere from ten to thirty thousand men. This was not an original concept as General Moreau had experimented with the corps system during the revolutionary era (Marbot, 341).
Each of these self contained corps d'armee was capable of holding off greatly superior forces for several hours until help arrived. As a consequence, it allowed an army made up of various corps, to move in widely separated units (Morris, 272). This allowed greater mobility, was deceptive to the enemy, and eased the burden of logistics. As a general rule, Napoleon dispersed his corps on the march so that they were in mutually supporting positions and able to come to the aid of each other in the event of concentration for battle or to ward of superior forces. I would like to note that such Napoleonic system of army corps gave Napoleon a great advantage over his opponents during the consulate and early empire. Speaking about one of the battles where Napoleon was seen as a great commander I would like to note that during the campaign of 1796 in Italy, General Napoleon Bonaparte introduced the reorganization of his cavalry and artillery forces that he would adapt later universally throughout the French army (Weigley, 69).
Napoleon streamlined the existing system, distributing a cavalry division to each army corps and forming the remainder, principally the heavy cavalry, into a virtual corps of its own as a part of the army reserve (Morris, 274). This corps was held exclusively under his command for commitment at the decisive point on the day of battle. These changes greatly improved the cavalry's efficiency. One of the most famous of French cavalry officers of the period, General Marbot, regarded Napoleon as the ."..
best light cavalry officer in any European army... Both in irregular warfare and major operations he was a most remarkable officer. " Like the cavalry Napoleon also organized an artillery reserve under his personnel command for the commitment at the decisive moment on the battle field (Weigley, 92). I would like to draw the readers attention to the fact that Napoleon was also responsible for the introduction of a new corps d' elite, the Imperial Guard that contributed to Napoleons recognition as a great leader. This formation provided Napoleon with a strong reserve of elite troops always at his immediate disposal and ready to be committed at the decisive point and moment (Weigley, 99).
Although these changes were instrumental in the success of the French armies under Napoleon they were in no way revolutionary. What made Napoleon a great Military commander as well as a wonderful manager was his ability to focus on proficiency of the army and it effectiveness avoiding the red tape (Haythornthwaite, 90). In my personal opinion the most outstanding feature of the Napoleonic system of warfare was undoubtedly the military flexibility and limitless variation. The insistence on speed and mobility was the basic features of his victorious campaigns from Italy in 1796 to Waterloo in 1815 (Morris, 270). It was this Napoleons emphasis on speed and mobility that also contributed greatly to the confusion and unsettling of his opponents and thus making Napoleon a great leader. Napoleon's reforms and their adaptation to his ideas of strategy along with his personality where all instrumental in the French army, achieving dominance during this period, and it was these methods that complimented and made the Napoleonic system of warfare possible and so effective (Marbot, 349).
The creation of the Imperial Guard, the army's elite, had the detrimental effect of draining off the best soldiers from the line regiments, undoubtedly weakening their quality. The superb officer corps that existed in the army suffered increasingly higher casualties in the later years, especially after 1808, as the quality of the rank and file decreased, necessitating more sacrifices from the officers to inspire the men to great deeds or even to hold their morale together (Haythornthwaite, 94). As the years of warfare dragged on the officer corps was filled with every available means, such as promotion from the ranks or commissions granted to newly entered cadets, often with adverse effects on performance, yet still contributed to the soldier loyalty to Napoleon and his admiration. In conclusion I would like to say that Napoleon Bonaparte indeed deserves his traditional reputation as one of Frances and world greatest military commanders. Through his abilities to fuse battle with maneuver, his reorganization of the French army and his flexible and innovated strategic and tactical handling of armies he was able to dominate the European battle field throughout most of his career. It was the declining quality of French forces: his inadequate subordinates; the increasing size and murderous nature of warfare; the improvements of his enemies; the deterioration of his personality; and almost 20 years of continual warfare led to his ultimate downfall and military fiasco.
This traditional reputation must be viewed not only in regards to his victories, but also his failings as a military commander. I believe that it is in this light that judgments must made on Napoleon's military capabilities. Bibliography Bertaud, J. "Napoleon's Officers, " Past and Present, 112 (1986) Butler, A. R. (trans). The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot: Late Lieutenant in the French Army, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1897. Chandler, D.
The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillian Publishing, London, 1965. Chandler, D. On the Napoleonic Wars, Stackpole Books, London, 1994. Connelly, O. Blundering to Glory: Napoleons Military Campaigns, Scholarly Resources Inc, Delaware, 1984. Ellis, G.
The Napoleonic Empire, Macmillian Press, London, 1991. Eating, J. R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee, Macmillian, London, 1988.
Epstein, R. M. "Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth-Century Warfare", Journal of Military History, 56, (July 1992). Haythornthwaite, P. J. The Napoleonic Source Book, Arms and Armour, London, 1990. Lyons, M.
Napoleon Bonaparte And the Legacy of the French Revolution, MacMillan Press, London, 1994. Lynn, J "Towards and Army of Honour: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789 - 1815, " French Historical Studies, 16, (Spring 1989). Marbot, M. D. Memoirs du General Baron de Marbot, III, Paris, Plan, 1892. web web Marshall-Cornwall, J.
Napoleon As a Military Commander, Clowes and Son Ltd, London, 1965. Morris, W. Napoleon: Warrior and Ruler, Putnam's, London, 1896. Petre, F.
Loraine. Napoleon at Bay, Greenhill Books, London, 1994 (first published 1914). Rothenberg, G. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, University of Indiana Press, 1978. Weigley, R.
F. The Age of Battles, Pimlico, London, 1991.
Free research essays on topics related to: military genius, napoleon bonaparte, military commander, army corps, french army
Research essay sample on How Original Was Napoleon As A Military Commander
