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Chile (1970 - 1974) In the beginning of 70 s the most tragic event in the history of Chile took place. In the countrys capital Santiago machine gunfire opened and the rebellion had begun. In the United States such events were supported by Nixon's administration, since it was a positive outcome of operations of intelligence services. Declassified U. S. government records shed light on corners of the story that previously had been suspected, but not proven.
The documents describe how an angry Nixon demanded a coup, if necessary, to block the inauguration of Marxist Salvador Allende following his victory in the 1970 Chilean elections. The documents reveal that the assassination of pro-constitutional Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, who was gunned down by military plotters on October 22, 1970, was part of an early coup plan known as Track II. The new declassified documentary record contradicts former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's announcement that Track II was shut down a week before Schneider's murder. After Allende's inauguration, Nixon did not give up. The documents detail what his administration did to make the Chilean economy scream, how the CIA spread black propaganda, and how Washington finally goaded the Chilean army into the coup of 1973.
Yet, at the start of the Chilean tragedy three decades ago, the U. S. government was not even sure that Chile was important to American national interests. Except for some multi-national corporations, which had mining and other business interests, Chiles cooper was barely known to most Americans. However, the CIA began alerting Washington to the rise of Allende's leftist Popular Unity coalition in 1968. By 1970, the CIA warned that Allende was set to win the largest bloc of votes in the national elections.
The coup leader, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, held power for the next 17 years, giving up his rule in 1989, only after arranging immunity for himself and his top generals. Until Oct. 16, 1998, Pinochet had escaped all punishment for his actions, which left 3. 000 people dead and Chile a bitterly divided nation. At the time, the Vietnam War was President Nixon's biggest headache. Chile was more of an itch, although Nixon feared Allende's victory might degrade the image of U. S.
strength over communism. On March 25, June 27 and August 7, 1970, national security advisor Kissinger led meetings of the 40 Committee, a high-level inter-agency group. The committee ordered covert operations to denigrate Allende and his Popular Unity coalition, according to one CIA summary. Nevertheless, the State Department questioned the paranoid fears. The State Department reported to the White House we identify no vital U. S.
national interests within Chile. (CIA, Official Summary, 1970) In a 23 -page report, on August 18, 1970, that The State Department said that Allende's election did not even present a unique set of problems. In examining the potential threat posed by Allende, it is important to bear in mind that some of the problems foreseen for the United States in the event of his election are likely to arise no matter who becomes Chiles next president. (CIA, Official Summary, 1970) Nevertheless, the U. S. ambassador to Chile and other senior Nixon officials saw a regional crisis, a blow to Washington's international prestige, if a Marxist won a fair presidential election in South America.
Ambassador Edward Korry began sending frantic, minute-by-minute commentaries about the last days of Chiles 1970 campaign. Korry's cables became known inside the State Department as Korrygrams because of their vulgar language and undiplomatic opinions. On election day, Korry sent no less than 18 updates. He reported that he could hear the mounting roar of Allendistas acclaiming their victory from the streets. The next three weeks, Korry flooded Washington with intense reports alleging a communist takeover.
In one message, he announced, there is a graveyard smell to Chile, the fumes of a democracy in decomposition. They stank in my nostrils in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and they are no less sickening here today. (Department of State, 1970) Allende's victory also sent Nixon into a rage and started the presidents men plotting how to stop Allende's inauguration. Cables focused on a stop the formal ceremony of Allende's victory by Chiles congress on October 24, 1970. According to one idea, the congress would defy the electorate and pick the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, who would renounce the presidency and thus provoke new elections in which outgoing president Eduardo Frei would run. (Department of State, 1970) On September 12, Korry and Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson met secretly with Frei at the presidential palace. While much of the conversation remains classified, Korry reported that Frei saw only a one in 20 chance to stop Allende, but added that he could not afford to be anything but the president of all Chileans at this time. Despite the odds, Nixon ordered the CIA to try.
The covert mission to reverse the results of the election by political or military means was code-named, Project FUBELT. On September 16, CIA director Richard Helms informed his senior covert action staff that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States, according to one declassified CIA memo. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him, Helms said. The CIA had 48 hours to present an action plan to Kissinger. Soon, the CIA was pressuring Frei. CIA mobilized an interlocking political action and propaganda campaign designed both to goad and entice Frei into the so-called Frei re-election gambit, according to a declassified Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities.
The scheme had only one purpose, Helms told the National Security Council (NSC) to induce President Frei to prevent Allende's formal election by the congress on 24 October, and, failing to support that benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial benediction at the most military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office. The election gambit was known as Track I. In case the staged elections failed the back-up plan for a military coup was called Track II. The CIA inducements to Frei included offering substantial sums of money to his re- election campaign, bribing other Christian Democrats outright, and organizing visits and calls from respected leaders abroad. To influence Frei through his wife, the CIA instigated the wiring of telegrams to Mrs. Frei from womens groups in other Latin American nations.
Other mailings to Frei included CIA-planted news articles from around the world about Chiles peril. The articles were part of a covert black propaganda campaign, which, resulted in at least 726 stories, broadcasts and editorials against Allende's presidency. Despite these efforts, the Frei re-election gambit failed, as Frei refused to have the Christian Democrats block Allende's ratification. Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication he might even welcome one, (CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, 1970) Helms reported to Kissinger. However, Frei moved quickly away from the issue when right-wing coup plotters assassinated Gen.
Schneider on October. 22, 1970. Schneider had insisted that the military accept the will of the people and respect the Chilean constitution. The U. S.
involvement in Schneider murder has always been a touchy point for Nixon's senior administration officials. Kissinger went to great lengths to distance himself from the assassination, both in testimony to Congress and in his memoirs. Kissinger claimed that CIA coup plotting was turned off at a meeting on October 15, a week before Schneider was murdered. As part of Track II the CIA secretly conspired with top ranking Chilean military officials.
CIA deputy director of plans Thomas Karamessines carried from his October 15 meeting with me an instruction to turn off General Roberto Virus coup plot and a general mandate to preserve our assets in Chile in the clearly remote chance that some other opportunity might develop, (CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, 1970). However, a declassified top-secret memorandum of that October 15 meeting contradicted Kissinger's account. At the meeting with Karamessines and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger was quoted as demanding that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight now... and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Kissinger also demanded tight secrecy around the coup plotting.
Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the word of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept as secret as possible, the memo said. Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically that we had been doing everything possible in this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings, and every conceivable precaution. ) CIA, Cable Transmissions on Coup Plotting, 1970) The next day, a secret eyes only cable from CIA headquarters to Henry Hecksher, CIA station chief in Santiago, revealed that Kissinger's marching orders were relayed to the field.
It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup... prior to October 24, the cable read. But efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource... It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG (U. S.
government) and American hand be well hidden, the cable continued. Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to continue to press forward toward our objective. 8 While undercutting Kissinger, the records back the 1975 testimony of the Cia's Karamessines. He told a congressional investigation that Track II was never really ended and that what they were told to do was to continue their efforts, stay alert, and do what they could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. After Allende's inauguration on November 3, the CIA continued working toward a military coup. A CIA note, in which the mentality of this agency and the U.
S. government is clearly shown, states, Dr. Salvador Allende became the first democratically-elected Marxist head of state in the history of Latin America despite the opposition of the U. S. Government. As a result, U.
S. prestige and interests... are being affected materially at a time when the U. S. can ill afford problems in an...
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Research essay sample on Chile 1970 1974 Part 1
