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Political Science Democracy and universal suffrage are nowadays identified with the words liberty and basic rights. Not necessarily so argues Fareed Zakaria suggesting that it is not democracy itself that brings about liberty and rights, but that the creation and protection of those inalienable rights - along with economic progress and a rise in living standards - that ultimately make for legitimate democracy. To criticize democracy is sometimes seen as like criticizing the idea of human rights; how can anybody deny the people their right to choose their own destiny? As The Future of Freedom points out, greater voter representation in government can lead to intolerance of other people's liberty and rights; if dictatorship is minority rule then democracy can be "majority overrule" (117).
Conversely, democratization can also lead to minorities such as interest groups having disproportionately high influence in government, to the detriment of society. Fareed Zakaria is an important and usually critical observer of the current Administration's foreign policy. As editor of Newsweek International and former editor of the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs, he has a privileged vantage point on the writings of journalists and scholars. In The Future of Freedom, Zakaria provides a whirlwind and world-wide tour of political history and theory (Yale Law Journal).
His broad sweep reaches back to the classical Greeks and Romans and examines current politics in Russia, China, and the Arab world; it even extends to California polities, which he cites as a US case of democracy being too much of a good thing (Cerami 152). Zakaria's central claim in The Future of Freedom is simple: "that there can be such a thing as too much democracy" (146). Excessively populist politics can undermine the "bundle of freedoms" important to any liberal constitutional order - pluralism, open political discourse, property fights, religion, and the rule of law. Though it does not offer an abundance of fresh insights, the book is still an important contribution - as much for its timing as for its message (Pastor 252). Zakaria contends that liberty in the United States has been endangered by an excess of democracy. The political process has been so subverted by polls, campaign money, and special interests that politics is now under the thumb of a "hidden elite, unaccountable, unresponsive, and often unconcerned with any larger public interest" (179).
This intuition has merit, but the conclusion tends to the hyperbolic. The remainder of the book, however, is much more nuanced, as Zakaria systematically demonstrates how foolish it is to believe that the mere accoutrements of democracy can be guarantors of fundamental civil and political fights (Kaufmann 625). Holding elections in the 1990 s did not, for example, prevent Russia from slowly "slipping toward... autocracy" (81) And, in the most important chapter, he argues that something similar would happen if elections were held today in much of the Middle East. Zakaria points out that many despots came to power through democratic means, often with large majorities.
Democratically elected Salvador Allende came to power in Chile with only 36 % of the vote - and enacted some illiberal policies. In contrast, Zakaria observes that there are countries that do not hold elections, but have been run as "liberal autocracies" that have created the conditions for sound economies and robust civil institutions (Pastor 255). Countries like Singapore or Tunisia are not democratic, but have thrived as a result liberal economies and strong institutions and as a result have increasingly free societies. Following the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization led not to liberal democracy, but tribalism (Kaufmann 624). Zakaria recounts how in 1996 a French politician made a visit to Belgrade to lend his moral support to students demonstrating against Slobodan Milosevic - only to be kicked out of their office and declared an enemy of the Serbs, because the students were angry at Milosevic for having lost the war in Bosnia. Though Zakaria doesn't mention it, Slobodan Milosevic was equally popular in Kosovo where the Serb community, not so long ago in the majority in the province, saw him as the defender of their rights and land against the ever expanding Albanians nationalism (Cerami 152).
In the case of Africa, elections have sometimes furthered tribalism, entrenched despots and produced corruption. Extreme poverty means that people in developing countries feel that their region or tribe has been "underdeveloped" and other regions or tribes favored economically. Regions or tribes are desperate to get their man in power (however unsavory he may be) in order to get roads, schools, hospitals, etc (Yale Law Journal). In Nigeria for example, the Delta region, Biafra region, the Islamic north all feel they have been neglected, when in reality there is no evidence for this. Following democratic elections, there has been an upsurge in regional, religious and ethnic chauvinism (despite attempts at creating a liberal constitution). In Uganda (like Nigeria, not an example used by Zakaria), the attempt to impose multiparty democracy by western nations and donors, has been resisted and Uganda has taken the path for the moment of a "no-party democracy. " Uganda is a country that has been wracked by ethnic rivalry in the past and has seen the problems of ethnic rivalry in democratic and undemocratic neighboring countries.
There is a strenuous effort to crack down on corruption and tax-evasion, and there are some innovative measures designed to make institutions more transparent (Pastor 257). In the Middle East, Zakaria mentions that undemocratic governments like Algeria are often more liberal than the electoral majority. In the Kuwaiti parliament, democratically elected fundamentalists rejected the Emir's call for votes for women. The appeal of radicalism in the Middle East has also to do with great poverty, for which the populous blames its western backed governments (Cerami 150). But as Iran has shown when Islamists come to power, they too fail to improve people's lives and so people become disillusioned. In Indonesia the imposition of democracy resulted in catastrophic power struggles that causes a crash in the economy and led to tribal pogroms (Kaufmann 626).
Zakaria laments what democratization has done to India. At Independence the country was a secular liberal democracy with functioning institutions, like courts, legislatures, civil service and relatively free press. There has been an increase in factionalism, in particular the rise of fundamentalist Hinduism and the BJP (Kaufmann 625). Where once a hint of cronyism or favoritism in the judiciary would have brought protests and resignations, today judges are appointed and rewarded by politicians (at least two popular ministers are thought to have orchestrated several murders) and local warlords rig ballots (Pastor 251).
Much the same has happened in the Pakistan - corruption and cronyism flourished under the democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (Kaufmann 624). In the USA, Zakaria decries the rise in lobbyist influence in American politics (as Congress has become less of a closed shop), and politicians slave to the opinion poll. He also sees similar decline in standards in the media, law and the financial sector, as they have become more competitive and cut-throat. But Zakaria has a rather romantic view of the hierarchy and educated "aristocracy" that used to run America until the last few decades, as well as a romantic image of the noble ideals the founding fathers and the liberal constitution; The Revolution was not entirely about democracy - "no taxation without representation" - because Americans were taxed less than Britons (in fact the tax on tea had just been reduced even further), nor was the average Briton any more represented in parliament.
Similarly while the constitution might have on paper promised to protect basic inalienable rights, for Black Americans and Native Americans, Independence was calamitous (Kaufmann 627). Often the changes in society that make it more liberal and protect the rights of minorities might have more to do with changes in the morals of society over time than simply a rise in living standards or sound constitutions. A more liberal, moral society doesn't always have to do with increasing GDP or legislation - something Zakaria might have examined (Pastor 252). For example, Professor Amy Chua has also documented similar problems with democratization in World on Fire but sees free market reforms as the problem (Kaufmann 625). However many of these problems of democratization leading to factionalism existed before such economic reforms though - which is not to say that economic liberalization hasn't lead to trouble, something else that Zakaria might like to have covered. Where there is common ground is in that free elections in themselves can lead to factionalism, the resentment and persecution of groups seen as privileged, "non-indigenous" etc (Yale Law Journal).
A decade ago such observations would probably have been called cynical or even authoritarian. Today, in the wake of numerous failures of democratization such concerns cannot be ignored particularly with the fate of countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia at stake (Cerami 153). The Future of Freedom is no dictator's charter and although the book makes it's case with clarity, Zakaria tends to interpret simply as incompetent dictatorships those states that started out with the same conditions as the successful countries he cites (liberal well-intentioned autocrats, good constitutions), but for one reason or another have failed - there are factors such as demographics, external interference, economic fluctuations and so on (Pastor 256). Nevertheless, the book is an important insight into the process of nation-building, particularly for those interested in the destinies of emerging, or declining, states. But if you are looking for formulas to solve the problem of state building, you will not find them in this book. Zakaria, while shedding light on the crisis of our times, leads us away from the question of how to make democracy work, instead asking an even more elusive question: how to build good liberal institutions.
The Anglo-American sequence of liberal institutions succeeded by wider suffrage is the stuff of history. No developing country today can or will wait for these institutions to take root. We must find ways to do both at the same time. Instead of shielding emerging leaders in failed states from making mistakes, we should find ways to help them make their own errors and then learn from them. Indeed, we would set a better example if we learned from our own mistakes before embarking on our next state-building adventure.
Works Cited Cerami, Joseph R. "The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. " Parameters 33. 4 (2003): 150. "The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. " Yale Law Journal 112. 8 (2003): 2599. Pastor, Robert A. "Building a Democratic State: Is It Possible?" Journal of International Affairs 58. 1 (2004): 251. Von Kaufmann, K. H. "The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. " Futures 36. 5 (2004): 623. Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.
New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.
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