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On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Lyndon B. Johnson is sworn in as the 36 th U. S. President.
He is the fourth President coping with the Vietnam War. President Johnson declares he will not "lose Vietnam" during a meeting in Washington. Johnson came to office convinced that the United States had to honor its commitments to South Vietnam and resist the revolution, but originally he was certain that success depended chiefly on the South Vietnamese. In his view, their government had to carry out the program of social and economic reform and development needed to gain the support of the people, and their army had to do the fighting. He felt that the United States could only encourage and assist the development of the political and military programs. In a Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964 Johnson said: I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions: America keeps her word.
Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area. This is not just a jungle war, but also a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.
Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. (Internet Source) But as time went on, these initial views changed because the political and military situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated and a Vietcong victory seemed likely. As the government viewed it, such a victory not only would give the Communists control of a significant area but also would suggest that the United States could not protect other countries against enemies employing guerrilla tactics and receiving assistance from the outside. The war in Vietnam thus became a test of U. S. resolve in fighting Communism and President Johnson's reputation was on the line. Lyndon Johnson did not make the decisions to escalate the war alone.
Many of Johnsons advisors urged military escalation, recommending bombing reprisals against the North and the dispatch of U. S. combat forces to the South (McMahon 207). He had initial public support, most Americans believed in the Cold War consensus that said the West had to stop the spread of Communism abroad.
LBJ also had support from the media and Congress. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 7, 1964. This resolution stated: the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. (McMahon 210) The Tonkin Gulf Resolution granted enormous power to President Johnson to wage an undeclared war in Vietnam from the White House. Lyndon B. Johnson then approved to send the 1 st combat troops, two marine battalions, in 1965. Johnson "Americanized" the war.
Although some of his advisors, such as George Ball and Clark Clifford, who was a close friend, had warned against escalation, most were in favor. Under Secretary of State George Ball, one of Johnsons advisors, had warned against escalation stating: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure [Johnson] that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U. S. ) troops we deploy. (McMahon 217) In response to Balls opposed view of escalation Johnson admits that: all of us felt the same concerns and anxieties that Ball had expressed, but most of these men in the Cabinet Room were more worried about the results, in our country and throughout the world, of our puling out and coming home. I felt the Under Secretary had not produced a sufficiently convincing case or a viable alternative. (McMahon 219) Critics of Johnsons have said that he just followed instructions from his advisors, not really making the decision for himself. I dont agree with this.
I feel that Johnson truly had the best intentions. He seemed sincerely troubled about what to do. Johnson didnt like sending our young men to war: I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units, but I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every state in this union working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life.
I think I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. (Internet source) In conclusion, I believe that Johnson felt we needed to be the superheroes for the world. We had yet to lose a war, and we didnt want to start. With all our military power, how could we lose? Johnson, along with most other government officials, just didnt realize what we were up against. The Viet Cong were prepared to fight for centuries. They had staying power.
For them, it was a matter of independence. Bibliography: WORKS CITED web Lyndon B. Johnson library and museum McMahon, Robert. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War. D. C.
Heath and Company. Lexington, MA: 1995.
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Research essay sample on Lyndon B Johnson War In Vietnam
