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... n why knowledge and behavior sometimes conflict does not concern the knowing process but rather the conditions under which knowledge is achieved. Individuals may possess knowledge. But they also may be "asleep or mad or drunk. " These states are characterized by the presence of strong feelings, feelings not unlike "emotions" and "sexual appetites. " Such feelings, Aristotle tells us, "clearly both disturb knowledge and the body as well. " 12 It is this second state of affairs which for Aristotle best describes arabia. Like those who are asleep or mad or drunk, the incontinent is affected by strong feelings. Such persons, Aristotle asserts, "both have knowledge in a way and do not have it. " That is, people affected by strong feelings may say knowledgeable things.
They may "even recite demonstrations and verses of Empedocles. " This does not mean, however, that these persons actually understand the words they espouse. In this respect, the incontinent is like an actor who can convincingly recite verses even though he does not comprehend them, or a young learner who is able to string together words without fully grasping their meaning. 13 The central question thus comes into view: how, precisely, do appetites and strong feelings affect the reasoning process when persons knowingly act against their better judgment? Aristotle offers the following explanation: Suppose, then, that someone has (a) the universal belief, and it hinders him from tasting; he has (b) the second belief, that everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and this belief (b) is active; and he also has appetite. Hence the belief (c) tells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, since it is capable of moving each of the (bodily) parts. The result, then, is that in a way reason and belief make him act incontinently. The belief (b) is contrary to correct reason (a), but only coincidentally, not in itself.
For it is the appetite, not the belief, that is contrary (in itself to correct reason. ) Hence beasts are not incontinent, because they have no universal supposition, but (only) appearance and memory of particulars. 14 Aristotle's account here is obscure, largely because it has been preserved in the form of scanty lecture notes. In an extended footnote to his translation of the Ethics, Terence Irwin offers one interpretation of Aristotle's ideas. 15 Irwin's interpretation may be summarized as follows. The incontinent is working with three premises or beliefs. One belief (a) is universal ("Sweet things shouldn't be tasted"). A second belief (b) entails perception and contains both a universal and a particular component ("Everything sweet is pleasant; this particular thing is sweet"). A third belief (c) represents the inference that is drawn from the other two premises ("This sweet and pleasant thing shouldn't be tasted").
Besides these three beliefs, the incontinent also has appetite. Now, belief (b), "Everything sweet is pleasant; this is sweet, " acts to excite appetite. Consequently, belief (b) detaches itself from the universal belief (a) and joins instead to appetite. This does not necessarily deter inference (c) from being reached. But because (a) and (b) have become disconnected (the latter having joined with appetite), (c) is not genuinely derived from premises (a) and (b). Thus, while the incontinent may be able to correctly recite inference (c), he does not really know (c), because he has not derived it from an integrated set of premises.
In a similar vein, the incontinent both has and doesn't have belief (b). Insofar as (b) is the focus of the incontinent's attention, we can say he has this belief. But since (b) is attached to appetite, it is detached from (a). It thus does not genuinely follow in the reasoning process. Consequently, while the incontinent may "know" premise (b), he does not "really" know it. On Irwin's account, then, the key move in the phenomenon of arabia is the dissociation of particular premise (b) from universal premise (a) and its subsequent attachment to appetite.
As a consequence, appetite ("Taste this sweet thing!" ) overcomes the better syllogism ("Don't taste it!" ). The incontinent knows better, but his behavior conflicts with his knowledge. While this interpretation of Aristotle seems promising, it ultimately fails to explain how, exactly, the better syllogism is overcome. Is it because the incontinent's feelings simply are stronger than those of the continent person? This explanation is unlikely: Aristotle insists that the continent person, no less than the arabic, possesses strong feelings. 16 What role, then, do feelings play in cases of arabia? In an essay entitled, "Aristotle On Learning To Be Good, " M.
F. Burnyeat offers an illuminating angle from which to consider this question. 17 Unlike Irwin, Burnyeat does not believe that incontinence represents the triumph of feeling over reason. This would suggest that reason alone leads to virtuous conduct and that feelings hinder this outcome. Such a conclusion, Burnyeat maintains, is precisely the opposite of what Aristotle intends. Feeling for Aristotle is not an obstacle to correct behavior: on the contrary, feeling is essential if virtuous conduct is to be realized.
Framing the issue this way, incontinence becomes a striking example of what happens when feelings are ignored, repressed, or misdirected. To appreciate this line of argument, Burnyeat directs us to look beyond the immediate circumstances of the incontinent's conflicted decision and view arabia instead as a phenomenon evolves over time. As Burnyeat puts it, we must "account for (the arabic's) present conflict in terms of stages in the development of his character which he has not yet completely left behind. For on Aristotle's picture of moral development, as I have drawn it, an important fact about the better syllogism is that it represents a later and less established stage of development. " 18 Given this perspective, the crucial questions become: In what condition is the person prior to arabia? Can this original condition be nurtured or educated in such a way as to prevent arabia from developing? What kind of education fosters the disposition for continence?
When and how can moral education go wrong and open the door to conflict? Burnyeat offers the following analysis. 19 Long before reflective judgments about behavior are achieved, a wide range of desires and feelings works to shape patterns of motivation and response. Pleasure and pain constitute the poles of this "feeling range. " Physiologically-based appetites and instinctive reactions propel us between these two poles. Appetite moves us to pursue pleasure; instincts such as fear impel us to avoid pain. It is important to note, Burnyeat contends, that the powerful feelings of appetite and fear are not divorced from the realm of thought. Insofar as the ability to recognize pleasure and pain is a function of perception, appetite and instinct do represent cognitive processes.
Specifically, they are evaluative responses. Burnyeat puts the matter like this: It is not that evaluative responses have no thought component (no intentionality): on the contrary, something is desired as noble or just, something inspires shame, because it is thought of as disgraceful. The responses are grounded in an evaluation of their object, parallel to the way appetite is oriented...
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Research essay sample on Pleasure And Pain Strong Feelings
