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Example research essay topic: World Trade Center Al Qaeda - 3,393 words

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... knew three weeks before 9 - 11 that two hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who were involved in the bombing of the USS Cole in November 2000, were in the United States. Although their names were listed in a watchlist of potential terrorists, which contained names of people for which the entry to the US is forbidden because of their terrorist connections, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were not stopped at their entry into the US neither were they arrested later. Although the CIA knew that with al-Mihdhar at least one of the two al-Qaeda terrorists could enter and leave US as he wanted to, they did not pass this information onto other authorities for nearly 1 years. They continued the surveillance of the two as long as possible, leaving the question why the other secret services were not informed. Government officials questioned about the why and how: The CIA failed to pass this information to the FBI and other secret services after they were informed of al-Midhar's connections to the terrorist group.

That is also the reason why the latter was not put on any government-watchlist until August, which allowed him to enter the country unhindered. The State Department also extended his expired visa in June 2001 for the same reason he was on no watchlist. Strangely the CIA had already decided not to do anything in this terrorist case. When news of al-Hazmi's stay in the US reached the CIA-HQ in March 2000, the report was tagged with the note: Necessary measures none.

A CIA Agency overseas noted with great interest that before all the fact, that a member of this (terrorist) group entered the United States but measures were apparently not necessary: so none were taken. After the FBI was then given late report (as to the official version), they similarly missed to pass this information down to the airlines, although this normally is a routine measure with important emergencies or other urgent investigations. The story of Cia Samir Jarrah, one of the hijackers aboard the United Airlines flight which crashed in Pennsylvania, also leaves many questions. Two days before 9 - 11 he was caught speeding on Interstate 95 in Maryland and fined. The police entered his name in their computers and did not find anything striking or suspicious. Afterwards he drove off.

FBI- and CIA-agents now say that they did not know anything about Jarrah before the attacks, resulting in them not putting Jarrah on any State Department-watchlist. This statement seems very weak seeing the remarks by official people from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE-sources show that Jarrah entered their country on January 30 th, 2001. Before that he was in Pakistan and Afghanistan for two months. Yet when entering the UAE he was stopped in the International Airport of Dubai and questioned several hours long after an explicit request of the United States.

This proves that the US already knew about him at this point of time and that someone was watching him closely, knowing his moves and whereabouts. It takes a long time of in-depth surveillance to know the exact arrival time in the UAE, which can really only result from a highly suspicious behavior in regard of a terrorist or criminal activity; no other case justifies such an extensive observation. Additionally, the UAE would not have any interest in Jarrah as he was only on transit through their country. Knowing this, it does seem strange that, after he was interesting enough eight months before resulting in an intense interrogation in the UAE, he was now allowed to enter the US and take flying lessons. Now the statement by the CIA, before 9 - 11 they did not even know of Jarrah's existence does appear, to put it mildly, as a little twisty version of the truth. European and Arab sources from the Emirates confirmed that the CIA had Jarrah watched a year before September 11 th.

He was also put on a CIA-Watchlist passed onto the authorities of the UAE. Additionally the American agents found out that Jarrah did in fact visit an al-Qaeda-training camp in Afghanistan for three weeks in January 2001. This only leaves one conclusion: the CIA deliberately left an al-Qaeda-terrorist travel freely and did not stop him, while they previously put him on an official terrorist-watchlist, and who was already observed because of his connections! This leaves the following questions: Why was Jarrah, who was watched by the CIA and whose name was on watchlist, in spite of his proven training in an al-Qaeda training camp, allowed to travel into and out of the US freely? And why was the CIA-watchlist not passed onto local police authorities? The CIA understands very well what crushing conclusions can be made from these reports and from the only possible answers to these questions and consequently denies to have had information about Jarrah before 9 - 11.

A CIA-spokesman said: This is simply not true. There are also many uncertainties, which are enigmatic assuming the intelligence services acted according to its duty to protect the American citizen. For example, Richard A. Clarke, National Counterterrorism-Coordinator of the White House, sent a direct warning indication to the FAA, which however refused to heighten the security level. Insight on the News said that Clarke Counterterrorism Security Group has issued no less than five FAA-mailshots in which private airlines were warned of potential terrorist threats. The mailshots were all sent out in the months before 9 - 11, namely on June 22 nd, July 2 nd, 18 th and 31 st, as well as on August 16 th.

Contradicting to this, Jose Juves, the press manager of the Massachusetts Port Authority (managing the Boston Logan Airport) says in the Boston Globe: The government did not send out any Secret service findings regarding the hijacking of planes. The two planes which destroyed the WTC came from Logan. Someone is lying here. Also, starting on July 26 th, 2001, Minister of Justice John Ashcroft did not use normal scheduled flights but used government planes. The fact that the FBI warned Ashcroft long before 9 - 11 shows that there was serious threat. The same FBI now says it did not realize the extent of this threat.

However, if it was dangerous for John Ashcroft to use scheduled flights, then this was the case for the normal population too. The US-Government took preventive measures to ensure the safety of top-government people against an apparent threat, based on credible secret services-information. Nonetheless, it did not do anything similar for the normal American citizen, so ignored its duty. In relation to this, a former flight security inspector, Rodney Stich, warned the FAA about the chance of a plane hijacking, finding fault with the insecure cockpit-doors and, moreover, proposed that Pilots should be allowed to wear pistols.

The FAA denied to even think about these proposals. Even as the threat became more apparent, the FAA blocked al attempts to arm pilots and to have security members flying aboard. Excerpts from an in-depth study regarding this topic: But instead of putting the security measures into effect, arrogant and corrupt members of the management of the FAA destroyed even official investigation reports about the threats and their necessary counterparts. Also they warned flight security inspectors not to hand in reports which could hurt the reputation of the FAA, if there would be a hijacking which could have been prevented with the addressed measures. Furthermore they threatened inspectors who still attempted countermeasures or who still wrote reports, although nonetheless planes crashed due to these unresolved security problems. In the middle of march 2001 al-Hazmi's brother, Salim, traveled into the US.

Although he, as well as his brother Nawaf, was saved in the NSA database, he entered the US without any difficulties. Their data was still not in the police computers: Nawaf al-Hazmi, as said before long saved at the NSA, was caught in a speed trap on April 1 st 2001 on Interstate 40. He was stopped and had to show ID, license and registration. Over his radio the officer asked if there is anything against the driver. Al-Hazmi's name was entered in the computer. Nevertheless nothing against him could be found, as the CIA still did not inform local police authorities that he is a dangerous, searched-for terrorist.

So al-Hazmi simply got a ticket for speeding and can drive off. At the same time these computer errors occur, an ally of the Western powers pleads for help: Ahmed Massoud is in the European parliament in Strasbourg, France, on April 4 th 2001. He asks the world powers to help him fight the Taliban. He also clearly states that al-Qaeda's plans are not restricted to Afghanistan: If president Bush does not help us, he says in Strasbourg in front of an armada of reporters, these terrorists will cause great harm in the USA and Europe. Al-Mihdhar was meanwhile very well known to the CIA. They had a copy of his passport since 1 years.

The fact that the young Saudi had a valid visa for the US and traveled into the latter didnt really seem to bother the CIA-agents. At least they did not regard it as necessary to pass this information onto the FBI or other inland authorities. In Jeddah in Saudi-Arabia, al-Mihdhar applied for an extension of his visa. As his name is neither listed in the TIPOFF- nor in the CLASS-database (Consular Lookout and Support System), he got a new visa valid until October 3 rd 2001. When news that KSM has traveled into and out of the US like a normal tourist reaches the CIA-HQ in Langley, they could not really believe this. On the other hand the report was so detailed and concerning that they decided to at least verify it.

After all KSM was meant to have brought trained al-Qaeda-members into the US, where they immediately contacted fighters already there and preparing an attack, according to the report. KSM himself is said to have boasted that he, a searched-for terrorist, has entered and left the US several times without any problems. CIA-note: If that really is KSM, we have, one, a serious threat, and, two, a good chance of getting him. The report is passed onto the FBI, were it is unnoticed. Tenet, at the end of June, sent out an express inquiry to the twenty partner-intelligence services with a list of known al-Qaeda terrorists and asked them to, if possible, arrest them.

A similar list with, among others, the names of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, was not made for the police authorities in the USA. Apparently the CIA did not want to open the possibility for outsiders to realize the momentous errors made in the CIA. Tenet also frequently calls Tom Pickard, the new boss of the FBI after Freeh retired in June, and asked him if he has anything on the more than frequent warnings of al-Qaeda attacks. Pickard can only answer no; although there were papers in his authority which are going to shock the whole country and which will bring discredit upon the FBI for its ignorance. Pickard, too, realized the immediate threat by terrorism and asked for more money for the CTC (Counterterrorism Center) at the start of August. Ashcroft thought this whole terrorism-thing was simple panic-mongering and did not answer the memo until September 10 th with a simple No.

The FBI-agents in Minneapolis, having arrested Zac for a simple Visa-violation, agree to hold him for 7 days instead of the usual 24 hours because of an expired visa. Agent Rapp already took into account to simply deport him to France, as he was traveling with a French passport. However, they first wanted to try to use FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) for special cases. Of 12, 000 applications only one was declined. However, for the next three days nothing happened. Rapp, in the meantime, questioned himself with some obvious questions: Why should plane hijackers learn to fly planes themselves?

And why did the other terrorist write his testament? The only possible answers werent very pleasant. Rapp found it absurd that he cannot take a closer look at Zac's computer and notebook although the apparent and urgent threat. In Washington everyone played safe now in regard to the case from far Minneapolis they contacted several FBI-lawyers who all say there is not enough of a connection between Zac and the al-Qaeda. The problem for the FBI-lawyers is that the new boss, Pickard, just came from the Ministry of Justice and was known for his lawfulness: The law cannot be bent for any reason. Under Freeh the law was not taken that seriously and such a search warrant was granted quickly.

For Rapp this was against common sense: There is a man who apparently plans to hijack a plane and Rapp is not allowed to take a look at his computer and notebook. Regarding the many warnings without any concrete details, Tenet advised the whole CIA to look through their documents and look for all open questions on August 21 st, 2001. Through this the information about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur was brought up again. This job coincidentally was given to a FBI-agent working in the CTC. After reading the information he connected two important pieces of information: the fact that al-Mihdhar had a visa even at the time of the meeting in Malaysia, and that with Nawaf al-Hazmi another terrorist who attended the meeting had a valid US-visa. With the help of a INS-official also working for the CTC, they found out that both of them have entered the US several times since, and both were in the US at that time.

They were stunned that this information has been known to the CIA since eighteen months. Finally the CTC decided to do what they should have done months earlier: Notify the FBI, the INS and customs that both of these terrorists needed to be put on the wanted lists. The CIA sent out a CIR (Central Intelligence Report) out to all other intelligence services and authorities on August 23 rd, 2001. This asked to put al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi and two other attendees of the Malaysia-meeting on wanted lists.

The CIA recommended rejecting them from entering the States. They didnt mention that the two mentioned above were long in the States already. The CIA still tried to cover its momentous mistakes up. Special Agent Rapp was meanwhile fed up with the endless waiting. He called a colleague in the RFU (Radical Fundamentalism Unit) in Washington and asked him about the state of things. The answer was only that Rapp only made everyone crazy with his Moussaoui.

Rapp replies: Im making every crazy in the HQ because I want to prevent that Moussaoui gets control over a plane and flies into the World Trade Center with it! In the FBI-agency in New York the agents wanted to try everything possible to track down al-Mihdhar, now that they know of his danger. They asked for reinforcements. These were declined with a ridiculous reason: The search for al-Mihdhar was started due to intelligence (CIA) information. That was not allowed, according to the NSLU (National Security Law Unit).

The law states a clear border between police and intelligence findings. These borders had to be strictly honored. The New Yorker-FBI-agent was totally startled. It is bad enough that the CIA only informed the other authorities about the entry of dangerous terrorist months late. Now the FBI was not allowed to search for a wanted terrorist who had his fingers in the attack on the Cole, who could walk around freely in the United States and is probably planning another attack. He wrote an email to his superiors in Washington: Some day someone will die never mind law-borders -, and the public will not understand why we were not more effective and used all our resources to find solutions to certain problems.

Lets hope, that the NSLU will back their decisions then too, especially because our biggest threat, UBL, gains the most protection out of this! In the morning of September 11 th, the terrorists checked in at Portland Airport, Maine. For twenty days, the whole country was searched for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Nonetheless, their tickets and passports were issued with their real names.

They passed security etc. without any problems. On the morning of the eleventh of September, 2001, two planes hit the World Trade Center in New York City, which, when collapsing, killed more than 2, 750 people. One plane hit the Pentagon, killing 186 people.

Another plane crashed in Pennsylvania after a passenger revolt against the hijackers, killing 44 people. Shortly after the attack Rapp got the permission to search Zac's belongings. After his computer and notebook were evaluated they could proceed fast. Although they were under high pressure, they could not resist and attached a warning sent out before the attacks to every email they send to the HQ, because more and more their anger and certainty was growing, that they could maybe have prevented the attack here in Minneapolis. Aboard Air Force One, Ari Fleischer gave a first briefing of the press. Replying to the question Were there any warnings known to the president? , he falsely answered No.

In a conference of the NSC (National Security Council), to which Tenet is connected through phone, he had strong evidence for once. On the passenger list of AA 77 which flew into the Pentagon he could identify three people long known the CIA: Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi as well as Khalid al-Mihdhar. Tenet didnt mention since when the CIA knew of the trio, neither did he talk about the Cia's knowledge that at least two of the three entered the US twenty months ago. Without knowing anything on the background or details, the members of the NSC knew that someone badly messed something up. FBI-director Robert Mueller, only in place since one week, didnt even try to make the impression the FBI knew something: The FBI does not have a clue how the hijackers could get control over the planes. We did not receive any according information from the CIA.

However, I cannot surely say that there were no possibilities to investigate indications which would maybe have lead to the hijackers early on. Tenet mentions to Bush that the al-Qaeda did have its headquarters in Afghanistan, but was active worldwide, on all continents. We have a 60 -country-problem, he told Bush, to show the dimensions of the operation of extinguishing the al-Qaeda. Bush, who rarely traveled outside of his country before his presidency, is not impressed and replied: Lets shoot them off one after the other.

There is an evident pattern visible here: The al-Qaeda-suspected were under extensive surveillance, they actively prepared a terrorist attack and yet they could enter, leave and travel within the United States without any restrictions - even though watchlist's with their names existed. Nobody stopped them, never mind the fact that they were traveling with passports and tickets with their real names. That should have alerted lots of computers at the passport controls and at the check-in counters, when ones passports magnetic strip is scanned. In conclusion, one can definitely say that the September 11 th-attacks could have been avoided if the Secret Services would not have been hindered in their work by higher authorities in their agencies and if they would have cooperated / shared their findings. Many inexplicable events have taken place, clearly showing that the intelligence services made many mistakes of which many are so easy to avoid. The fact that the CIA and FBI see each other as competitors instead of partners is purely shocking and unacceptable.

Additionally, some of the terrorists were on several wanted- and watchlist's. This should have caused lots of trouble for them traveling under their real name. In spite of this it did not. Why? Why? That is the big question.

Why? And How? These are the most important questions, still be unanswered, and will probably stay like that for a long time. The final bitter realization is: The deaths of 2, 752 people could have been prevented.

In American Cold War movies, the KGB (the USSR-intelligence) is bad, a dark mesh of something, while the US-intelligence is the good side, the light and transparent secret service on your side. Maybe it isn't


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Research essay sample on World Trade Center Al Qaeda

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