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... cause in such a case it means that, in most cases, some sort of aggressive behavior, or more aggressive behavior than before, will be exhibited because the cabinet was correcting their previous leniency and liberalism by electing Tojo. His accession marked the final triumph of the military faction which advocated war with the United States and Great Britain (Hideki). Washington knew the nature of the Tojo cabinet, and yet they did nothing. In both cases, no one monitored anything or anyone more than before; no one improved the isolated, out-lying military installments that would be a great deal more susceptible to a surprise attack; no one seemed to pay any mind at all.
Because everyone was so preoccupied with what Roosevelt was doing as immediate retaliation, no one stopped to think that there might be some sort of Japanese retaliation against the United States' crippling embargo and devious activation. For these reasons, an attack should have been expected. There was also ample warning of the coming attack earlier in 1941. For example, on January 27, 1941, "Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy to Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii" (Willey).
Also on January 27, Joseph Grew, United States' ambassador to Japan, notified Washington that the "Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using all their military facilities" (Shapiro 40). Two warnings, on the same day, both from diplomatically reliable sources, the same predicted place, however not on what scale the attack would be, yet still no one did anything noticeable. There is also evidence that Roosevelt knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor, yet did nothing because of his want of war. On November 25, 1941, "Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary 'FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday'" (Willey).
Even the President of the United States, the man elected to protect the United States and its territories from powers like the Japanese Empire, suspected the coming attack. On November 29, 1941: The FBI embassy tap made an intercept of an unaided plain-text Japanese telephone conversation in which an embassy functionary asked, "Tell me, what zero hour is. Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy. " The voice from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said softly, "Well then, I will tell you.
Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor. " (Willey) In this message received by the FBI, the United States learned of an exact date and place. No one even informed General Short or Admiral Kimmel of this intercepted conversation so they might perhaps prepare for the attack, intercept the Japanese en route or perhaps even send a scouting plane on the morning of the seventh, if nothing else, to satisfy a curiosity (Willey). Even if it was a hoax, better to be safe than sorry. On December 4, 1941, "US General Thorpe at Java sent four messages warning of the [Pearl Harbor] attack. [Washington] DC ordered him to stop sending warnings" (Willey). Another General, someone who was concerned for the people, the only real one so far, sent warning, yet the United States government stopped him from doing so.
These should have been the most convincing signs because of their origin. The final example, is on December 6, the night before the attack, at 9: 30 p. m. , about nine hours before the first wave of Japanese aircraft were to pass over Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt read a portion of the newly decoded "diplomatic declaration of war and said 'This means war'. When he returned to his 34 dinner guests he said, 'The war starts tomorrow'" (Willey). Even if President Roosevelt wished for war, he could have at least warned the soldiers and civilians to take cover. There are many more examples of signs ignored by the people in power.
When evaluating these instances of received warning signs, it should have become increasingly obvious to Washington that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. There were also two clear signs, early on the morning of December 7, of the coming attack. At 3: 42 a. m. , three hours and eighteen minutes before the Japanese planes would make their first pass over the island, the minesweeper Condor sighted a periscope off Honolulu Harbor, it then notified the patrol destroyer Ward and it moved to investigate the sighting. The Ward goes to the wrong location, a sterling example of human error. The Ward radioed to the authorities that it had observed a submarine (obviously not American) at 3: 42 a.
m. in a restricted area, and yet nothing happened. Not one scouting plane was sent out; no vessels were sent out to investigate where the submarine came from; no one did anything at all. Then at 6: 30 a. m. , the Ward was notified of another submarine sighting, this time by a supply ship near the entrance of Pearl Harbor; a naval patrol plane was then dispatched to the scene to investigate and perhaps assist the Ward if any defensive measure were to be taken against the intruder.
At 6: 45, the Ward opened fire on the target and the "first shot sailed harmlessly over the Japanese submarine, but the second shot smashed into the conning tower. Four depth charges finished the job, the sub went to the bottom" (Shapiro 57). At 6: 53, Captain Outer bridge, commander of the Ward, sent a message to the commandant of the 14 th Naval District saying, "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon [a] submarine operating in the defensive sea area" (Schaaf). Another, different submarine was sighted, in a different location, and again, nothing happened; no scouting planes were sent out to investigate the nature of these submarines or to investigate their origin. Twice in three hours the Japanese forces had been sighted, one of their fleet was sunk and nothing happened. Twice they were discovered but the men in charge did nothing.
If just one plane was ordered to go north, the direction from which the submarines had come, it would have seen the massive six carrier Japanese Fleet approaching, and radioed home for preparation or interception. However, even if warning of the incoming fleet was actually conveyed it is doubtful that it would have helped. The communication line was unreliable, which is evidence of human error in the creation of the communications system: How this line [of communication] would have functioned in an emergency is difficult to sabot it seems probable that it would have taken a good half-hour for a message to reach the Navy. Whatever such a patrol might have discovered in the way of a hostile air attack would have provided at most a few minutes' warning.
On the morning of December 7 it was not functioning. There were no army aircraft in the sky. (Wohlstetter 6) Human error on the part of the American military allowed the Japanese to attack that morning; their cover of surprise had been blown, twice, which was the only thing that they had going for them. There was another hint of the impending attack that morning. It was picked up on one of the radar that existed on the island.
There was an Aircraft Warning System (AWS) in place in which Fort Shafteer and six other mobile radar, which where on trucks, patrolled the area, but the problem was that they were for only high altitude (between 30 and 130 miles up, no aircraft below that could be detected) and they could not detect any aircraft within 30 miles of the radar. Even with the system, there were glitches in the communications that was a direct result of human error in the set up of the system. Other than slow and unreliable conventional telephones, there was no communication between the operators of the small, mobile radar and the information center, and there were not even any ground observers: [The] radar sets [were] not being operated on a regular 24 -hour basis on December 7 no liaison officers [were] present or even assigned, therefore there was no possibility of correct and rapid identification and interpretation of aircraft. Even with these officers present at the drills, there had been "considerable confusion, " because of the great number of aircraft operating around the islands at all times. no one knew who possessed the final command responsibility for defense of the Hawaiian Islands in the event of an enemy attack. (Wohlstetter 9 - 10) At 7: 02 a. m. , an unidentified blip was picked up on a radar at the Opana Radar Station (one of the mobile radar), which was located twenty-five miles north of Pearl Harbor on Kahuku Point, northernmost tip of Oahu.
The two privates, Pvt. Joseph Locked and George Elliott, had decided to stay latter than the normal 7 a. m. shut down time because one of them wanted a little more practice operating the new equipment. They picked up what appeared to be a flight of unidentified aircraft bearing in 132 miles north of Oahu. Then, at 7: 10, one of the privates phone the information to Fort Shafteer, where Private Joseph MacDonald recorded what Elliott had to say and went to read it to Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, who had begun his training four days earlier.
After five minutes of deliberation, he reached the conclusion that the unidentified aircraft were a group of B- 17 s that were scheduled to arrive at eight o'clock. He then instructed the two privates at the Opana station to shut down and said "Well, don't worry about it, " but instead the two privates decided to continue to monitor the planes. It was 7: 15 and the blips were 88 miles out. Then at 7: 39 they lost the aircraft on radar 20 miles off the coast of Oahu due to the 'dead zone' caused by the surrounding hills. Even though there was no confirmation of the hunch that it was the B- 17 s, it was dismissed, ignored and paid no attention to.
The times that the radar were monitored is another example of direct human error: On December 7, the AWS radar centers were manned from 4 to 7 A. M. These hours had been instituted by General Short on November 28, in response to a war-warning message from Washington. Before that date these hours had been 6 to 11: 30 A.
M. , plus a few hours in the afternoon, but Short figured the period from 4 to 7 A. M. to be "the most dangerous hours" for an enemy attack by aircraft taking off from Japanese carriers. (Wohlstetter 10) If General Short had have been responsibly thinking, he would have had the radar stations be operational all day or nearly all day, especially after receiving a 'war warning' only a few days before. When summarily reviewing all of the warning signs, earlier that year as well as during the years that preceded attack, it becomes simple for most historians to deduce that there were ample reliable signs of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and that some one should have prepared the base for it.
There were the hints from the Japanese expansionist behavior, from the Japanese-United States relations before the attack, from Grew and other trusted men, and from the radar and patrolling ships that were located on or near Oahu Island on the morning of December 7. The attack on Pearl Harbor formally brought the United States into World War Two and would eventually compel them to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and become victorious over Italy, Japan and Nazi Germany in the war. However, the attack still left a scar on the hearts and minds off all who lived through it. Many swore that it would never happen again on United States's oil, yet here it is again. But here it is again, but this time within the continental United States. Were there as many warning signs of the World Trade Center attack?
This time, after the United States has been 'hit' twice, will the people in power recognize the warning signs if they should appear again? Did the United States 'learn its lesson?' No one can completely answer these questions yet and one might hope that no one ever has to ever again.
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Research essay sample on Attack On Pearl Harbor People In Power
