Example research essay topic: Td Td Northern Ireland - 2,367 words

NOTE: Free essay sample provided on this page should be used for references or sample purposes only. The sample essay is available to anyone, so any direct quoting without mentioning the source will be considered plagiarism by schools, colleges and universities that use plagiarism detection software. To get a completely brand-new, plagiarism-free essay, please use our essay writing service.
One click instant price quote

... r> REST 22 6 17 < td> 1 3 1 Source: The Irish Times/MRBI, 21 May 1998 A majority of the UUP voters endorsed the Agreement; this poll, though, does not indicate how many voters the UUP had lost to the DUP. However, a poll conducted in The Sunday Times two days after the referendum indicated that 27 % of the total unionist electorate now backed Paisley, an enormous support for an extremist party. Ostensibly, the issues that the DUP put forward were really important for unionists and Protestants alike, and as time has shown, loyalists were right to be sceptical. Government Before Guns Since the referendum in 1998, loyalists had considered the decommissioning of IRAs arms as well as disarmament as the most important issues of the peace process.

Despite continuing promises, however, the IRA had failed to deliver what unionists regarded the criterion for accepting Sinn Fin in the Northern Ireland Executive. In June 1999, Tony Blair was heavily criticised by unionists for his soft line. In his weekly column, Bruce Anderson accused Tony Blair for sabotaging the Agreement. Anderson argued that the unionists somewhat misunderstood Blair when they believed that Mr Blair gave them a guarantee that Sinn Fin would not be allowed into government unless the IRA had started to decommission in semantic terms, they are wrong; Mr Blair's actual words will not bear that construction [but it] was the impression [he] gave However, they had the moral right to accuse Blair since he never reneged on the meaning that unionists had perceived. And furthermore, Mr Blair did make five specific pledges about Sinn Fin and government. [They] would have to declare that the war was over no more beatings or killings [and] the IRA must begin to dismantle its paramilitary structures, and by May 2000 there would have be substantial progress in decommissioning. None of these pledges had been honoured.

Loyalists had good reason no longer [to] believe [Tony Blair was] a man of his word. Either way one looks at it, Sinn Fin profited from Blair's soft line. If unionists accepted to enter an executive including Sinn Fin parallel with a demand about decommissioning, unionists had two options: Exclusion of Sinn Fin if they did not comply, or simply suspend the executive altogether. Unionists believed in none of these as it would be difficult to muster a sufficient majority required to exclude Sinn Fin.

And to let a minority party ruin a democratic executive because it does not comply with its norms seemed preposterous. Indeed, loyalists had good reason to feel run over by nationalists. Then, in July, the peace process took a positive turn. US Senator George Mitchell was asked to review the peace process and it resulted in two statements from the UUP and Sinn Fin, respectively, showing their commitment to the implementation of the peace process. Among other things, the UUP stated that: It is our belief that the establishment of the new political institutions and the disarmament of all paramilitary organisation will herald a new beginning for section of our people a new, peaceful, and democratic society, free from the use or threat of force the establishment of inclusive political institutions and the commencement of the process of decommissioning are the first steps in this process the UUP recognises and accepts that it is legitimate for nationalists to pursue their political objective of a united Ireland by consent through exclusively peaceful and democratic methods.

Sinn Fin joined in: The IRA cessation has now been in place for a total of almost four years IRA guns are silent and the Sinn Fin leadership is confident that the IRA remains committed to the objective of a permanent peace There has been a particular focus on arms Sinn Fin accepts that decommissioning is an essential part of the peace process Decommissioning can only come about on a voluntary basis In the executive the two Sinn Fin Ministers will make and honour the pledge of office which includes a commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means We reiterate our total commitment to doing everything in our power to remove the gun forever from the politics of our country. The outcome of the Mitchell review was the establishment of the Northern Ireland Executive, and subsequently it put an end to direct rule Westminster in December 1999. The policy-making body of the UUP, the Ulster Unionist Council, narrowly accepted the review by 480 votes to 349 and Sinn Fin entered the Executive committed to decommissioning. In other words, it meant that the loyalists had to realise that their sound-bite no guns, no government no longer had any meaning; now it was government before guns. From the vantage point of the Apprentice Boys annual Lundy Day parade in Derry, Edwards sums up Protestant frustrations: To outsiders, [the parade] is a strange, atavistic and tribal affair. Yet its symbolism is fascinating, for it is not sectarian, it is political.

At a time when the Protestant community was riven over the Agreement when David Trimble had managed to persuade the Ulster Unionist Council to agree to enter government without IRA decommissioning having occurred, and when the Protestant community were still reeling after the appointment of McGuinness (whom they knew to have been the IRA Chief of Staff) as Minister for Education it was extraordinary to watch the burning of an enormous effigy of Lundy a representative of the British government who, three centuries earlier, had been accused of being on the point of selling out the people of Derry. What Edwards believes is that once again as though history moves in circles the British government was selling out the Protestants of Northern Ireland. True, if it were meant to be in accordance with the Agreement, the impossible became reality. Edwards also argues that from the unionist perspective it seemed as though the British, Irish and US governments always reacted to republican intransigence by pressurizing David Trimble into further compromises, i.

e. by giving concessions to nationalists. However, on the day the UUC voted on the Mitchell review, Bruce Anderson as usual ready to castigate the political landscape criticised unionists for being stubborn and argued that they would not get a better deal. He recognised the flaws in the peace process, though, but at the same time he believed unionists should acknowledge the advantages they could get from an executive. He does not, however, present any concrete examples. Furthermore, Anderson believed that unionists are entitled to reassure themselves that there will be a binding timetable for decommissioning, and that Saturdays concessions will be the last concessions.

Government before guns but the guns must follow in short order. Presently, a year and a half later, there has not been any significant progress on IRAs decommissioning. Trimble's Ultimatum Revisited Guns go or I go, David Trimble threatened recently. It resembled events in early 2000, when Peter Mandelson, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, had to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly in order to prevent Trimble from resigning.

The background at that time was the ever-recurrent issue of arms decommissioning. Despite the promises Sinn Fin had made after the Mitchell review, IRA still failed to make any progress. A few months after the suspension, the IRA released a statement saying that it was ready to begin a process that would completely and verifiably put its arms beyond use, and this lead to the reinstatement of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Shortly after, two independent weapon inspectors, Martin Ahtisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa, reported that they had been to IRA weapon bunks and secured that the weapons could not be used without their knowledge.

Apparently, this was the greatest progress the peace process had made for years, but of course it was not enough. The fact that IRA is determined to keep its arms in store confirms loyalist suspicion of IRAs goal of uniting Ireland with force. Although Ireland revoked its constitutional claim over Northern Ireland in 1999, there still is a deep-rooted mistrust of what is believed to be the nationalists real agenda. Michael ONeill explains: The spectacle of paroled terrorists free as heroes at Sinn Fins party convention almost derailed the Agreement. A seasoned commentator observed that many unionists got a glimpse of the future or what they feared might be the future and did not like what they saw.

Above all, there is concern that once inside the policy process republicanism will use that bridgehead as Trojan Horse for its real agenda. Going a little further back in time, Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fin, stated on a conference in 1986 that our main objective, our destination, is the reconquest of Ireland by the Irish people. This means the expulsion of imperialism in all its forms, political, economic, military and culture. [The final objective was] an Ireland, free, united, socialist and Gaelic. Protestants in Northern Ireland are known to have an elephants memory, and it is understandable that they interpret Sinn Fins and IRAs exhaustive efforts to slow down the peace process as a preservation of the old revolutionary line. The DUP harps on this deep-seated fear and rejects any further concessions to the republicans. Loyalists, who see nothing but Sinn Fins puppet show of the peace process, are attracted to Paisley and his argument to entirely scrap the agreement; to go right back to the drawing board, negotiating only with parties which are not associated with armed paramilitaries.

In a scholarly perfection of the sound-bite, Paisley declared that our alternative is trust opposed to treachery, democracy as in the rest of the UK opposed to fascist dictatorship, truth not lies, pledges kept not broken, no veto for any party except the people of Ulster. The Future? As the marching season closes in with increased violence Portadown has already experienced a forecast of what to come as well as a general election in June, 2001 could prove to be an extremely dramatic year for the peace process. As already mentioned, Trimble vowed to resign if there is no significant progress of arms decommissioning before July. It is peculiar, but strategic indeed, that the date lies so close to the twelfth parades. There will be an enormous focus not least from the outside world on the nationalist violence.

It is a media stunt by Trimble, awarded the Nobel Prize in 1998. If he resigns, and if it leads to the downfall of the peace process, as some political commentators believe, it ensures that nationalists will suffer a major setback in the outside worlds perception of them. Trimble is well aware that the outside world will regard them as the main obstruction on the road to peace. However. the loyalists in Northern Ireland are divided more than ever. Representatives of the two largest unionist parties, UUP and DUP, have been going vilely at each others necks, accusing each other ferociously.

The DUP has accused the UUP that Trimble's threat to resign is a pathetic and cynical election stunt. The UUP has accused the DUP of their hypocrisy of sitting in an assembly with Sinn Fin, a party it [the DUP] has vowed that it would not share power with. Thus, the general election in June has turned into a referendum on the peace process. For Catholics, there are no complications, but for Protestants it matters greatly where they put their vote: UUP or DUP, pro-agreement or not, Paisley or Trimble? So far, Trimble's tactic has been a success, in the immediate sense that [supporters of] the Ulster Unionist Party has united behind him, but the question is how long his supporters will accept concessions after concessions.

That is what they have been served the past seven years since the commencement of the present peace process seven years of adding fuel to Paisleys fire. For Protestants, the peace process has never been in such a critical condition. Indeed, 2001 will see the peace train venture far beyond known territory. Bibliography Anderson, Bruce.

Can the Faithful Tribe Trust Mr. Blair's Tightrope-walking Skills? in The Spectator, July 3, 1999; found via ProQuest Anderson, Bruce. It may be Repugnant, but the Unionists are not going to get a better deal in The Spectator, November 27, 1999; found via ProQuest Anderson, Bruce. The Sinners are on the Pigs Back and look Who put Them There in The Spectator, June 26, 1999; found via ProQuest Anonymous. A Guide to Northern Ireland on the homepage of The Belfast Telegraph (web and /peace pro.

html) Anonymous. Timeline: Good Friday to Devolution; found via Bbc's homepage web ireland / news 53900 / 539391. stm Burns, Mike. The Agreement: Will it Work in Europe, May 1998, issue 376, pp. 28 - 29; found via ProQuest Cowan, Rosie. Clinton Flies in to Boost Irish Peace in The Guardian, May 21, 2001; found via The Guardians homepage Cowan, Rosie. No Unity among Unionists in Battle for Province in The Guardian, May 22, 2001; found via The Guardians homepage Cowan, Rosie.

Trimble's Opener: Guns go or I go in The Guardian, May 9, 2001; found via The Guardians homepage Edwards, Ruth Dudley. The Colour Orange in The Guardian, June 21, 1999; found via The Guardians Homepage Edwards, Ruth Dudley. The Faithful Tribe (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999, 2000) Howe, Stephen. Marching Boys in The New Statesman, June 28, 1999, pp. 47 - 48 Independent/Belfast Telegraph Poll, Fewer Confident of a Long Term Peace in The Belfast Telegraph 26 May 2001 Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline.

The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (New York: Longman, 1997) Lloyd, John. A Terrible Viciousness is Born in New Statesman, May 21, 2001 Lloyd, John. Between Peace and War, only Words in New Statesman, October 16, 2000 pp. 31 - 32; found via ProQuest ONeill, Michael. Peace Dropping Slow: Answering the Iris Question? in The Round Table, October 1998, issue 348, pp. 349 - 51; found via ProQuest Sevaldsen, Jrgen and Ole Vadmand.

Contemporary British Society (Copenhagen: 1987, 2000) Tonge, Jonathan. Northern Ireland Conflict and Change (London: Prentice Hall Europe, 1998) Tools, Kevin. The Fluter is Orange in The Observer, July 11, 1999 Tran, Mark. Northern Ireland Rivals take Peace Gamble in The Guardian, November 16, 1999; found via The Guardians homepage

Research essay sample on Td Td Northern Ireland