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... sent to Professor James L. Cate in January of 1953, Truman claims: I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on Tokioplain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other naval men present agreed.
And finally, on April 28, 1959, in front of students at Columbia University, Truman stated that the dropping of the bombs stopped the war, saved millions of lives. Why are there such discrepancies in Truman's figures? Truman exaggerates the figures in order to provide self-defense, which is highly practiced in government. As opposition to the atomic bomb augments, Truman increases the figure in order to defend and justify his decision. Thus, although the original calculation of casualties submitted by the Joint War Plans Committee was 193, 000 killed, wounded or missing, Truman later embellishes this figure in order to justify his decision. The effective American blockade was sufficient to bring about Japanese collapse in less than half a year after the atomic bombings.
Widespread belief among top American officials was that the surrender of Japan was inevitable-even without the atomic bomb. Before the summer of 1945, it had become increasingly apparent that the Japanese were on the verge of destruction. As the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chief of Staff put it: Due to the shortage of ocean shipping, Japans main rail lines are already overburdened, while motor transportation is totally inadequate Under these circumstances the Japanese will to continue war may be expected to weaken progressively. Entirely apart from the physical results obtained by air-sea blockade combined with strategic bombing, the psychological effects upon the Japanese people as a whole will be most detrimental and will progressively undermine their confidence in victory or even confidence in the hope of avoiding complete and inevitable defeat. American bombing strategies were highly successful and had already brought Japan to a state of despair. The bulk of Japans military was stationed around Southeast Asia, and the blockade was effectively preventing supplies and reinforcements from leaving the home islands.
If dropping the bomb was a military necessity, did Japans worsening condition actually pose such an immediate threat to American safety to allow such drastic weapons be used? The fact that Japan had already been effectively isolated causes increased suspicion as to why the bomb was dubbed a necessity. Japans disastrous state is described by General George C. Kennedy: The situation is developing rapidly and there are trends which indicate that the Jap is not going to last much longer.
His sea power is so badly depleted that it is no match for any one of the several task forces we could put into action. His air power is in a bad way. He has a lot of airplanes-probably more than he had a year ago- but he has lost his element, flight, squadron and group leaders and his hastily trained replacements havent the skill or ability or combat knowledge to compete with us... Without the support of his sea power and air power his land forces cannot do anything except hold out in isolated, beleaguered spots all over the map until bombs, bullets, disease and starvation kill them off. It is safe to assume that the Japanese were slowly on the decline.
But how long would the Japanese hold out before finally surrendering had the bomb not been used? After all, the use of the bomb was mainly to bring about a speedy end to the Pacific War. It was a year after the bombing when the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey published its conclusion that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing and without an American invasion. If Japan was on the verge of surrendering within the next half year, it would suggest that there was no necessity to drop the atomic bomb, certainly not to the degree that many claim.
The Japanese were in such terrible condition however, that the same conclusion could easily have been made a year earlier. Therefore, because of Japans terrible state, atomic bombs were never needed to bring about an inevitable Japanese surrender. American officials were well aware of Japanese intentions of surrendering, yet they refused to use diplomatic efforts. By late 1944, as the Japanese watched Germany's power diminish, peace feelers began to make offers with the Allied Powers.
As early as September 26, 1944: I learn from a very reliable source that in important civilian circles in Japan the peace problem is being discussed with increasing anxiety. A speedy German collapse is expected and it is not believed that Japan can then continue the war. It is therefore considered necessary to get peace as soon as possible before the country and towns are destroyed If any willingness appeared to exist in London the Japanese would be ready for preliminary discussions through Swedish channels there is no doubt that this attempt be considered a serious one. On July 13, Foreign Minister Togo instructed his ambassador in Moscow to inform the Russians, whom the Japanese had a neutrality pact, that: His majesty the emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated...
It is the Emperors private intention to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a Special Envoy with a letter from him containing the statements given above. In addition, the Emperor had advised his top officials: We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to the last soldiers. We wish that you, leaders of Japan, will now strive to study the ways and means to conclude the war. In so doing, try not to be bound by the decisions you have made in the past.
If Japan had offered peace terms, and were willing to negotiate, why was it necessary to drop the atomic bomb in order to bring about peace? Had Truman opted for peaceful negotiations, he may have received the same ends (saving American lives) without ever killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. For reasons unknown, Truman decided to defer from peace talks-a much more effective and moral way of ending the conflict. Since the Japanese were readily willing to negotiate peace, the dropping of the bombs was certainly not a military necessity. In conclusion, due to exaggerated casualty figures, an inevitable Japanese collapse, and an avoidance of peace negotiations, dropping the atomic bomb was not a military necessity.
The argument that the atomic bomb saved countless American lives is weak, as a diplomatic route would accomplish the same means without every having to sacrifice a single life. Moreover, it has been proven that the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse, and American interference simply hastened an inevitable surrender a few months later. When juxtaposed with other options, the use of the atomic bomb seems to be the most destructive as well as unreasonable. Truman's true motives for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki may never be fully understood, but the myth that he has partially created will continue. He has in essence, created an American myth, one that is supported by a sense of subconscious guilt. As opposition to Truman's actions strengthen, people will no longer ask, How many American lives were saved because of the atomic bomb?
Instead, they will ponder, How many Japanese lives were needlessly killed? For the time being, the average American cannot respond to the latter, only the former. Thus, Truman's atomic myth persists. Bibliography ABC News, Nightline.
What If We Hadnt Dropped the Bomb? Transcript of Show No. 1096, August 5, 1985. Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. , 1995.
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Dining, David. Why Did President Truman Drop the Atomic Bomb? 4 Oct. 2003. < web row. htm> John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.
New York: Pantheon, 1986 221. Farris, John. Hiroshima. San Diego: Lucent Books, 1990.
Hoyt, Edwin P. Japan's War: the Great Pacific Conflict, 1853 to 1952. McGraw-Hill, 1986. Iwo Jima and Okinawa. 7 Jan. 2004 < web > Listen, Betty J. A Place called Hiroshima. New York: Kodonsh International Ltd. , 1985.
Paul, Gregory P. The Ethics of War: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: After 50 Years. Sept. 1995. 6 Oct. 2003 < web peacediplomacyorforeignaid / ethics war . shtml> Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950. Washington D.
C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964 Scarlott, Jennifer. The Legend of Hiroshima. 10 Oct. 2003 < web > Stimson, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. Harpers 1947: 97.
Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima. Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995. Zinn, Howard.
Reflections on Hiroshima. The Progressive Media Project. 31 July 2001. 13 Oct. 2003 < web >
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Research essay sample on America Decision To Drop The Atomic Bomb
