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Example research essay topic: Arab Israeli Conflict Israeli Prime Minister - 4,427 words

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The Arab states' relationship to the Palestine question has been saturated by myth and misunderstanding. Unquestionably, the issue has been an important aspect of modern Arab politics. But while Arab states seemed to be strongly engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict, giving full, passionate backing for the Palestinian cause since the 1930 s, they often acted in a cautious, constrained way based on national or self-interest. For decades, the PLO depended on the Arab world's diplomatic, financial, and military support to survive and to fight against Israel. Next to a stated determination to destroy Israel through violent means, the PLO Charter's most important point was the claim that it had a right to demand the Arab states' full support.

This expectation was often disappointed. And whatever leverage the Palestinians once had was considerably eroded in the 1980 s and 1990 s by the PLO's own mistakes -- including backing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait -- as well as shifting regional and international politics. Today, the Arab states' role in Israel-Palestinian issues, as important as it might be, is less directly linked to the peace process's details and less subject to Palestinian influence than it seems. Strong factors restrict the Arab states' willingness or ability to act. Their policy is based on regime interests as well as the new shape of regional politics, alliances, and power balances.

This paper examines the basis of Palestinian and Israel relations with Arab states, including Arab leaders' motives, strategies, and goals. Once the PLO made its own agreements with Israel, it could no longer deny other Arabs a right to do the same thing. Most Arab governments took the opportunity to withdraw even further from the conflict or to reduce help for the Palestinians. In this new context, the Palestinian Authority (PA) can neither expect moderate Arab states to forego normalizing relations with Israel nor radical regimes to fight for its own cause. Western observers and governments are sometimes slow to understand these changes though the PA is quite aware of the problem. Criticizing Israel is not equivalent to helping the PA, and limits on Arab states' help for the Palestinians goes hand-in-hand with a growing unwillingness to act against Israel in material terms.

Even if Arab state action is taken on the PA's behalf, the PA itself has no control over the timing or details, remaining a secondary player in Arab politics. The future of Arab-Israeli relations and peacemaking are key issues in contemporary Middle East politics. Arab regimes are trying to adjust to Israel having a more normal regional role. The Palestinian transition from revolutionary movement toward statehood is an important new element in inter-Arab politics. (1) But while Arab leaders publicly criticize Israel and endorse the Palestinian cause, their policies are remarkably passive in giving the PA direct material or even diplomatic assistance. To note four recent examples: -- Syria demands that Israeli concessions to itself, not progress on the Israel-Palestinian front, be the Arab states' criterion for normalizing relations with Israel. -- Egyptian President Hunt Mubarak, the PA's main backer, refused to attend the September 1996 Washington summit despite Arafat's pleas that he attend to reinforce the PA's position, Mubarak's absence did hurt the Palestinians but made him seem tougher, and hence more popular, at home. -- Jordanian-backed officials supervising Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem tried -- though they failed -- to give way to a PA-appointed group in 1996. -- Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) offered the PA any significant economic aid, and even they give less than formerly contributed to the PLO. Of course, the perceived negative attitude toward compromise on the part of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government also leads to a slowdown or freeze on progress toward peace with Arab states.

The October 1997 crisis over an Israeli assassination attempt of a Hamas leader in Amman or the refusal of most Arab states to participate in the November 1997 regional summit in Doha, Qatar, are examples of the link between Israeli actions and missed diplomatic opportunities. Clearly, a failure by Israel to have a flexible policy, make compromises, and advance on negotiations with the Palestinians will also block improvements in its relations with Arab states. At the same time, though, while the PA welcomes Arab states' tough words as a source of diplomatic leverage, this rhetoric has a mixed meaning. Aside from attacking Israel, that approach can also implicitly criticize the PA, whose very existence stems from the peace process. Moderate states complain in order to distance themselves from involvement or helping the PA; radical regimes are denouncing all peacemaking efforts. In the past, while putting their own interests first, Arab states were sometimes willing to go to war, use diplomatic capital, enforce an economic boycott, and give large-scale aid to the Palestinians.

The PA continues to claim -- as the PLO always did -- that it has some control over the Arab world's stance toward Israel, the West in general, and the United States in particular. Yet this is untrue, as Palestinian leaders, to their dismay, know very well. Of course, Arab nationalist and Islamic solidarity are still extremely important forces in Arab countries. Antagonism from these states denies Israel the fruits of peace and causes some in the West to believe that only pressure on Israel can avoid regional war or damage to their own relations with the Arab world.

At the same time, Arafat's overestimating this factor makes him less conciliatory and slower to conclude agreements. Ironically, by making Israel and the PA less flexible, the Arab factor may damage Arafat's cause and make his goal of statehood harder to achieve. A. HISTORIC ARAB-PLO AND ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS The PLO always had a contradictory view of the Arab states.

They were an indispensable base of support without which the movement might have collapsed or been ignored. But these same forces often injured and tried to dominate the PLO, inflicting many of its casualties, setbacks, and internal divisions. "Virtually every Arab state has stabbed them in the back at one point or another, " wrote a veteran Palestinian nationalist. A PLO intelligence chief estimated the Arab states were responsible for slaying three-quarters of Palestinians killed in the struggle. (2) Arab states treated the PLO more as tool than partner, neither consulting it nor respecting its interests when setting policy toward Israel or the United States. They saw the conflict with Israel largely as a way to mobilize domestic support or gain advantage over rival Arab states.

Such considerations meant they benefitted by exploiting, not by peacefully resolving, the issue. Meanwhile, Pan-Arab nationalism steadily weakened -- in practice if not rhetoric -- as individual Arab states gained stronger identities and more diverse interests. Arab states stood by, or even pushed, as the PLO was chased from Amman to Beirut, and from Beirut to Tunis. In this context, voting on UN resolutions, donating money, or even secretly abetting terrorism were low-risk propositions.

But a PLO trying to drag them into another losing war with Israel or endangering their links to the West was a nuisance. A sympathetic historian wrote, "Few independence movements have been so heavily dependent on external assistance, " making the PLO's survival require maintaining "unity at any price. " (3) Thus, Arafat walked a tightrope, balancing a favor to one state with a gesture to its rival, keeping his independence by using it only sparingly. He always remembered that the Arab leader who shot at him one day might become the one he kissed another, and vice-versa. Arafat travelled in perpetual motion among Arab capitals, preserving his connections and making deals. Conflicts between Arab states gave him maneuvering room.

When Jordan attacked the PLO, Arafat took refuge with Syria; when Syria assaulted the PLO, he turned to Jordan and Egypt. Falling out with the moderates, Arafat accepted the patronage of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. By avoiding domination by a single patron or conflicts with Arab states that might make them revoke his license as the Palestinian leader, Arafat won a considerable degree of autonomy for the PLO, though most of its smaller member groups were clients of Arab regimes. He understood that having some Arab states as permanent enemies meant having others as masters, and vice-versa.

Arafat's route to survival showed his skill but also damaged the PLO's ability to adjust to conditions and opportunities. Granting or withholding patronage gave Arab regimes tremendous leverage over the PL. Over time, Arab states went from reluctance to wage war for the Palestinians's ake to refusing to help the PLO or even fighting it. Syria and Egypt refused to let the PLO to attack Israel across their borders in the 1960 s; Jordan expelled it in 1970; Syria attacked it in Lebanon in 1976; Iraqi gunmen shot down its officials in 1977; Egypt abandoned it by making peace in 1978 - 1979; Syria split it in 1983 and expelled the PLO from Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. Lebanese Christians and Shi'a Muslims massacred its people in 1982 and 1985. Iraq pushed it aside by invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. (4) Arab financial pledges often went unpaid.

A 1978 inter-Arab agreement promised $ 250 million a year to the PLO and $ 150 million to a Jordan-PLO committee. Only Saudi Arabia paid its share. Nor did Arab states give much to UNRWA's relief effort for Palestinian refugees. The United States paid over 40 percent of its budget.

Frustrated at their inability to destroy Israel, Arab states reduced their efforts. The high cost and negative outcomes of the 1967 and 1973 wars; inter-Arab disputes; the Iran-Iraq war; and political quarrels with the PLO advanced this trend. Once Egypt, exhausted from wasting limited resources for so long, broke the Arab consensus and made peace with Israel, Syria had more reason to avoid a conflict. Other threats -- Iran, Iraq, revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism distracted and reoriented the policies of Arab regimes.

These states were largely passive during the 1982 Lebanon war and the post- 1987 Palestinian Intifada. Then came the Saudi-Kuwaiti aid ban to punish Arafat's support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Several principles can be adduced from this experience: -- There is strong public sentiment in all Arab states supporting the Palestinian cause. To some extent it can be manipulated by Arab rulers; to some extent it directs them. -- Most Arab states shifted their stance from demanding that a Palestinian state replace Israel to backing the PA's goal of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem. -- Arab states make policy decisions about Israel based on their own interests and only secondarily on Palestinian concerns. -- The PLO worked hard to maintain independence from all Arab states. This goal brought it into collision with Arab rulers wishing to alter its policy, install puppets as leaders, or use it as an instrument of their own ambitions. -- The Palestinian cause has always had more effect in constraining Arab states from moving toward peace with Israel than it has in forcing them to go to war with Israel. -- It is far easier for Arab states to speak in support of the Palestinians than to help them materially by large-scale economic aid or sacrificing other political and strategic interests. All Arab states rejected Israel's creation in 1948 and maintained a position of total hostility toward it throughout the next 30 years.

Egypt changed this situation by making peace with Israel in 1978 - 1979. But despite some secret contacts (especially with Jordan) no other Arab country followed this example for an another 15 years. Egypt was isolated, boycotted, and ejected from the Arab League. Lebanon's 1983 agreement with Israel was killed by pressure from Arab states and domestic forces. Only at the start of the 1990 s did this situation change, due to global and regional developments as well as the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict itself.

Global factors: The Cold War's end and USSR's collapse made the United States the world's sole superpower, weakened radical Arab regimes, gave moderate ones an incentive to improve relations with Washington, and reduced U. S. constraints on using its own power. Israel generally benefitted from this trend since Arab states needed to limit conflict and make peace with Israel if they were going to improve relations with America. Arab-Israeli Conflict factors: In a long-term cumulative process, the Arab states' inability to defeat a seemingly stronger Israel and the high cost of war and conflict made them tire of the battle and seek a way to withdraw from it. (5) Other regional factors: Arab states became increasingly distinctive, gaining a stronger sense of individual interests. Pan-Arab nationalism proved both illusory and dangerous.

Growing radical Islamic movements, Iran, and Iraq all posed new dangers to Arab rulers, including the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. They needed regional stability to preserve their independence, retain power, and pursue economic development. For these and other reasons, over a dozen Arab states began talks with Israel in 1991. Once the PLO made a unilateral decision to make an agreement with Israel in 1993, Arab leaders could now say the PLO's decision freed them to decide themselves how to make peace with Israel, consider their obligation to the Palestinian struggle as ended, or condemn Arafat as a sell-out. Obviously, some Arab states want to prolong the conflict.

Disengagement is also a way to avoid making formal peace. Since radical regimes oppose and try to sabotage the peace process while moderate ones want to avoid tensions or real costs, either way, the PA has no Arab card to play. Lack of progress in the Israel-Palestinian peace process deprives Israel of normalization with several states, while a breakdown would raise security threats. Still, these problems are unlikely to lead to war or revive the old regional situation.

C. THE PEACE PROCESS CYCLE: FULL STOPS AND FORWARD STEPS Historically, the Arab intellectual and policy approach to dealing with Israel was set by the radical camp. This is no longer true. According to the June 1996 Arab summit's final resolution, peace "is a strategic decision. " (6) In contrast to all preceding modern Arab political history, a serious, conscious decision has been taken to recognize and make peace with Israel, even though several Arab states still reject this outcome.

For most Arab leaders, the question is the price, not the principle. "We call upon the new Israeli government, " Mubarak told the 1996 Arab summit, "to cooperate with us so as to complete the peace process without slackness or hesitation. " This statement is a demand for Israeli concessions but also a call for cooperation, which is clearly preferred over confrontation. Jordan's King Hussein noted that the Arabs always knew peacemaking would be hard, but the current process was "the only available option... [and] possible means to bring the conflict to a just and lasting solution that can endure. " (7) Having pioneered this new situation by its own 1993 agreement with Israel, the PLO cannot easily reverse it. From 1993 onward, the peace process and the Arab states' behavior followed a consistent pattern, though this became more apparent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's election in May 1996. Some crisis would arise -- over Arab fears about the Netanyahu government's intentions, May-August 1996; the tunnel opening in Jerusalem, September-October 1996; the Hebron withdrawal, November 1996 -February 1997, the building of the Har Homa neighborhood in east Jerusalem starting in March 1997, etc. -- during which Arab state criticisms of Israel increased and normalization slowed. The rhetorical tone could be quite ferocious.

During the September 1996 rioting, for example, an Arab League meeting issued a statement that "hails the Intifada of the Palestinian people... in intrepidly confronting Israeli repressive practices [and] considers what is happening to be part of an Israeli Zionist plot to destroy the Aqsa mosque, set up the Temple of Solomon, obliterate Islamic Arab landmarks and create more facts which harm the legal status of Jerusalem. " (8) But Arab countries took few or no concrete steps against Israel. Each period of friction would be followed by an agreement in which Israel made some concessions, though short of Arab demands. Moderate Arab states would then take another step toward normalization. For example, just after the Hebron redeployment, the following events took place in the first quarter of 1997: -- Mubarak hosted a long, friendly visit from Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, and proclaimed a "new atmosphere" in the region. Officials discussed improving ties between the two armies, including exchanging delegations and setting up a hotline. -- The Egyptian president then invited Netanyahu to Cairo, meeting with him and an Israeli business delegation, saying there would be no barriers to developing commercial links. -- Egypt informed Israel that economic cooperation would be resumed and expanded.

Dr. Ibrahim Kamel, an Egyptian businessman with close links to Mubarak, visited Israel and bought a large amount of stock in Israel's Know Corporation, "We do not have hesitations about doing business with Israel, " he said. -- Jordan invited Israel to attend a Mediterranean trade conference in Amman. Elscint became the first Israeli company to win a Jordanian government tender, a $ 1. 5 million deal to supply the government hospital in Amman with CAT-scan equipment. On 6 March the two countries signed an agreement to establish a jointly operated airport in Aqaba. -- Oman announced a thaw of economic relations with Israel. Abu Dhabi renewed contacts with Israel regarding cooperation in the exchange of tourism delegations. Projects with Dubai that had been suspended were revived.

Qatar restarted contacts about sending a representative to Israel (an Israeli diplomat had already set up an office in Qatar). Relations with Morocco also improved. Dr. Dore Gold, then Netanyahu's foreign policy advisor, went to several Gulf states for secret meetings in late January. -- Israel, Jordan and the PA launched an international joint advertising campaign to attract tourists, with the slogan, "Peace.

It's a beautiful sight to see, " in spring 1997. The PA wants to mobilize and must rely on Arab state help, especially since this is one of its few points of leverage and only real international asset. It wants Arab states to: -- Maximize economic and other aid to the PA to promote development, reduce unemployment, and reduce dependence on Israel. -- Condition normalization of relations with Israel on the PA's interests and strategy, demanding prior Israeli concessions. -- Promote PA demands in all international institutions and with the West, with rewards and punishments as well as words. -- Stop supporting anti-Arafat Palestinian elements. The one area where Palestinians have their wish concerns Arab state support for an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem. The PA falls far short, however, in being unable to regulate moderate Arab states' good relations to the United States or degree of normalization with Israel. Significantly, the line that Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia tried to impose on other Arabs rested not on a Palestinian but on a Syrian veto.

In this view, normalization should occur only when Israel had also made full peace with Damascus, regardless of what happened in the Palestinian sphere. These PA goals each require a detailed review: It is startling to realize that of $ 2 billion pledged to the PA internationally, 50 percent came from Europe, 25 percent from the United States, 10 percent from Japan, and only 5 percent ($ 125 million) from the Arab world (Saudi Arabia and the UAE). This aid provides only enough money to pay the PA's budget and for some make-work and minor development projects. It does not make up for losses due to Israel's closure of the PA-ruled area or the declining number of Palestinian workers employed in Israel. Foreign financing of the PA must stem from political motives because profit-making opportunities (especially if the goal is to avoid excessive Palestinian dependence on Israel) are going to be limited. Arab states make investment choices based on commercial considerations.

The PA's area lacks resources and infrastructure; its products often compete with Arab economies. Projects in the West, Asia, or even deals with Israel are more attractive than putting money into the West Bank and Gaza. The PA intensifies this reluctance with bureaucratic barriers and corruption. (9) Fears of instability and uncertain future also discourage investment. Whether critical or verbally supportive of the PA, Arab states are not going to give much material help. The UAE has been most generous, offering in November 1996 a $ 164 million grant to build 3, 800 housing units and support facilities in Gaza City. (10) The wealthy Gulf Arab states prefer to spend money at home or make profitable investments in the West. Real development -- vital to promote stability and maintain the PA's base of support -- requires an infusion of capital which can ultimately come only from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Gulf Arabs donate some money directly to Palestinian institutions, but far less than they did before the 1990 Kuwait crisis. duck The 1996 Arab summit's final communique is both ironic and indicative on this issue. The Arab leaders urged Europe, Japan, and other countries, "to continue providing political and economic support to the Palestinian people and their National Authority. " But there was absolutely no Arab pledge -- not even a non-binding recommendation -- for their own aid program to the Palestinians. (11) The PA would like Arab states to force Israel to meet its demands in negotiations. But this is not easy and may not be possible.

Arab states can deny Israel most regional and some international benefits from the peace process. But they cannot -- given realistic options -- so endanger Israel or raise the costs as to force it to change policy. The Arab states have three levels of engagement and pressure. But failure on any one of them further erodes Arab credibility: The first is verbal, criticizing and condemning Israeli policy while trying to persuade the United States and Europe to coerce Israel into making concessions. While their tone is harsh, the goal is more moderate than ever before: to force Israel into a compromise peace. The second level is a freeze on normalization with Israel, rejected by the 1996 summit but adopted at the March 1997 summit.

Contacts were to be cooled, multilateral talks discouraged, and economic projects curtailed. This did not affect countries having a peace treaty with Israel (Egypt and Jordan) and did not reverse steps toward normalization taken by Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Qatar and Oman. But new deals or upgraded arrangements are discouraged, including plans by the UAE or Bahrain to open lines of communication with Israel. Still, a freeze has not been totally imposed on all Arab states. For example, Israel and Jordan continued to sign accords on transport, building a joint Aqaba-Eilat airport, allocating water, and highway improvements. (12) King Hussein said that peace would bring the "qualitative progress that we have always sought. " (13) Despite giving the PA morale support, a freeze does not do much for Arafat's interests. Israel's doubts of Arab readiness for peace reduces public and leadership incentive for supporting concessions.

Ultimately, a freeze cannot force Israeli policy to change. Shown to be ineffective, Arab leverage is diminished. The main alternative remains a third stage: a return to the era of no-war, no-peace basically typifying the conflict between 1974 and 1994. The 1996 Arab summit's resolution warned Israel that breaking its commitments could bring "a resumption of tension in the region and compel all the Arab states to reconsider steps taken in the context of the peace process, vis-a-vis Israel. " (14) Most Arab states, however, worry that such a step would endanger them, not only from military defeat but also economic losses, gains for radical forces, damaging relations with the United States, and lacking a superpower patron to help them. The collapsed economic boycott against Israel cannot be reinstated without hurting the investment climate in the Arab world as well. Mubarak told the 1996 summit, "None of us wishes to return to war and destruction nor seek to revert to the state of no-war, no-peace. " (15) This view reflects historic lessons Mubarak mentioned in his speech to the 1985 Arab summit: "God has granted us a mind with which to think.

We fought for many years, but where did we get? I am therefore not ready to take more risks... Wars have generally not solved any problem. " (16) 3. ENDING ARAB AID TO ANTI-ARAFAT PALESTINIAN GROUPS Another important PA goal is to stop Syria, Libya, and Sudan from helping its Palestinian rivals, which can be divided into several categories: Hamas receives aid from Islamic radical groups in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, with growing sponsorship from Syria and some help from Iran. This constitutes an international competitor to the PA's Arab League backing. Islamic Jihad has several independent actions with links to Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Iran.

These include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Abu Naval's group, Fatah defectors from the 1983 split, and Fatah factions that turned against Arafat when he made peace with Israel. These groups are closely tied to Syria. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are headquartered in Damascus and subject to Syrian influence. Syria also has links to some PLO leaders still abroad, notably Forum Qadumi, the second-most popular Fatah chief.

Finally, several groups in the West Bank and Gaza accept the 1993 peace agreement but criticize Arafat's tactics. These include the People's (Communist) party, the Democratic party (split from the DFLP), and various local forces around such figures as Harder Abd al-Shall. These groups have no important foreign Arab connections and Arafat has successfully brought several of their leaders onto his cabinet. As long as Arafat pursues the peace process, those in categories A through C will be his bitter enemies. By undermining Arafat's authority, the Arab states make it hard for him to convert them into a legal, peaceful opposition like those in Group D. Arafat's willingness to block such assaults varies depending on whether he thinks they will strengthen his position.

In terms of PA/Arab state relations, however, this issue poses considerable problems for him. -- These attacks are promoted by states and Palestinian forces opposing him and his policy. If such operations make them more influential or popular among Palestinians, Arafat's power is reduced. In Lebanon, his rivals have used this strategy to steal the allegiance of many Palestinians there. -- ...


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