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... 1935, which they had lost several weeks prior to that. After a few bitter defeats of Mao's Fourth Front Army by the Kuomintang in Szechuan, the First Front Army crossed the Wu River and entered Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow in April 1935. After Mao's troops arrived at Kweiyang, Chiang sent his Kuomintang troops there. Unexpectedly, Mao pulled his army out and headed to Yunnan. Mao was a strategist; and he divided his troops on the way to Yunnan, causing a diversion. Chiang was confident that he could finish off the Red Army on the banks of the Yangtze, but he underestimated Mao.
The Red Army captured seven enemy ferry boats, crossed the China River at the Chiaoche Ferry in nine days and nine nights and extricated itself from the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops hot on its heels or trying to intercept and encircle it. 42 Articles in the New York Times reported over the period of twelve days said, As predicted, the Communists in Northern Kweichow Province are proving a grave menace, and it is evident that recent Nanking assertions about their elimination are not justified. 43 Another April 3 rd article stated that Communists in Kweichow Province who broke through provincial troops captured today the city of Chihshui, swept south and occupied Tungtze and Tsunyi and approached within forty miles of Kweiyang, capital of the province. Although it was believed Kweiyang was in no immediate danger, the populace was highly excited when reports were received that Communists, numbering about 10 000, were again swinging southwest into Yunnan Province. 44 On April 5 th, 8 th and 10 th it was reported that the Red Army's advance has been checked. By April 15 th, the New York Times reported that the Red Army had occupied the towns of Tingfan, Chinghai, Pingchai and Anshun. Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party were viewed as a group of miscreants who terrified not only the Chinese but other countries as well. In May 1935 the Red Army faced its most challenging obstacle in the entirety of the Long March: the rapid and roaring Tatu River. If the Red Army did not cross successfully, the Long March would be over.
From May 26 th to 28 th, 1935 the Red Army ferried their troops across. On the third day the troops were slowed down and the Kuomintang began to bomb the Red Army from above. At Luting, with the Kuomintang waiting for them on the other side, the Red Army began to cross the iron chain suspension bridge. All of the planks had been removed, yet miraculously the Red Army was able to cross it.
After crossing the Tatu River the Red Army was now less than a hundred miles from their Fourth Front Army in northeastern Szechuan. On the way to the Kansu province, the Red Army had to go over seven ranges of high mountains. One of these was the Great Snow Mountain (Chiachinshan). Before the troops made their ascent, they ran into Tibetan warriors where some fighting occurred. The Red Army troops disarmed and took the Tibetans clothing in order to stay warm during their ascent of the Great Snow Mountain. Mao, who was sick with malaria again, had to rest after ascending sixteen thousand feet, while Lin Mao, the official historian of the Long March, had both of his legs amputated due to frostbite.
The troops were exhausted, but they needed to reach the other side in order to connect with the Fourth Front Army. The troops would march late in the evening so as to avoid enemy bombing. The rain, snow and fierce wind caused more men to die of exhaustion and cold. After days of severe weather the Red Army finally reached the sunny summit. After the Red Army arrived safely in Moukung and reunited with the Fourth Front Army, there were feelings of uncertainty. During all of the fighting with the Kuomintang there was some infighting between the First Front Army led by Mao Zedong and the Fourth Front Army led by Zhang Guotao.
Zhang believed that his army was the strongest, most viable army and deserved to be shown the appropriate amount of respect. On June 25, 1935 the Politburo held a conference in Lianghekou trying to plan the tasks of the Communists after the conference. After the Lianghekou conference was over there were five resolutions, three of which are as follows: 1) After the union of the First and Fourth Red Front Armies, our strategic policy is to apply our main forces to attack at the north, to destroy the enemy in large numbers in mobile warfare, to take over southern Gansu first and then to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Base. Thus, we will put the Chinese Soviet movement on a firmer and broader base foundation or foothold in order to strive for victory in the northwestern provinces and eventually in all China; 2) To realize this strategic policy, tactically, we must concentrate our main forces to destroy Hu Zongnans troops, to capture Songpan and control the region north of Songpan in order to achieve a successful march to southern Gansu; 3) One minor part of the Red Army should be dispatched to the Yao and Xia Rivers to control this region so that we can back on the vast area of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang provinces, which would be to the benefit of development toward the east. 45 After all the discussions, the conference concluded with no decisive resolution. Mao asked Zhang, How about leaving the matter for further consideration? 46 This did not calm down Zhang for long, though. It has been shown that at the time of the union between these two armies that there were ten to fifteen thousand troops in the First Front Army and sixty to seventy thousand in the Fourth Front Army.
Zhang was displeased with the conference in June because he believed that it favored the Central Red Army and Mao Zedong. A battle plan called Operation of the Songpan Battle stated that the Red Army in its entirety needed to march north to capture the city of Songpan in order to pass to Gansu. 47 Zhang was extremely reluctant to follow these orders because he had not voted for these plans and did not wish to sacrifice his own men. Mao's troops rushed to Songpan but, as he did not want to fight the battle alone, he had to stop and renegotiate with Zhang. In mid July, Zhang and Mao met in Luhua where there was another conference. This conference was more about who could assert the most power rather than about finding a viable solution to their problem. The result of the Luhua conference was as follows: Zhang Guotao obtained the de facto control of the Army leadership The Front Headquarters was in charge of combat operations; its commander and political commissar were both from the Fourth Front Army.
As for Mao, his membership in the Three-Man-Group was automatically dropped, his assistantship to Zhou in military affairs was even more out of the question, and his former position as Political Commissar of the Front Headquarters was given to Chen Ghanghao. In other words, Mao lost all his titles and power in the Red Army. 48 Mao was extremely uncomfortable with his loss of position in the Red Army, but he was still very influential in the Party Center and was considered the spokesman for the First Front Army. Zhang was unhappy with this because he could not assert control over the First Front Army with Mao still as influential as he was. Zhang and his men also had designs on positions in the Party Center, so another conference was called to discuss these issues. On August 5 th and 6 th, 1935 a Politburo conference convened at Shawo. This meeting has been considered the most important event in the reunion of the First and Fourth Front Armies. 49 The conference at Shawo was the first conference since Tsunyi to seriously deal with political issues.
A part of the final Resolution of the Shawo Conference reads as follows: The fraternal solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies is a necessary condition for fulfilling our historical mission of creating the Sichuan- Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet and establishing the Chinese Soviet Republic. All those tendencies, intentional or unintentional, toward breaking the solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies can only be harmful to the Red Army and beneficial to the enemy. It should be made clear to each individual comrade that both the First and Fourth Front Armies are constituents of the Chinese Worker and Peasant Red Army, and both were under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. There are only class love and aid between us, not divergence and contradiction.
Only in this way can the union of the First and Fourth Front Armies be firm and lasting, can we combine into one unit to defeat our class enemy. 50 While all of this infighting was going on, Chiang Kai-shek was slowly encircling the Red Army to prevent it from re-entering eastern Sichuan. The Red Army was surrounded on every side, except to the west due to limiting terrain, and the Kuomintang patiently waited. Mao took the First and Third Army Groups of the First Front Army and the Fourth and Thirtieth Armies of the Fourth Front Army on the eastern route, while Zhang took the Ninth and Thirty-first Armies of the Fourth Army and the Fifth and Ninth Army Groups of the First Front Army on the western route. 51 This began the historic crossing of the Grasslands of Chinghai. The land known as the Grasslands of Chinghai is a part of the Songpan plateau. It is between six and nine thousand feet above sea-level, but it is not mountainous.
In the summer months green grass grows everywhere and makes excellent pasture for the Tibetans yaks and horses. But it rains for eight or nine months in the year, and the drainage is poor. 52 Because of the excessive amounts of rain, the land becomes marshy. August was the worst month in the Grasslands for rain and mosquitoes and because the Red Army's medical supplies were low and basically non-existent, many succumbed to black malaria. 53 The Red Army had great difficulty procuring food during this part of the Long March. Because the land was so marshy, the troops were unable to make fire, making it impossible to cook what provisions they did have. The troops ate grain and vegetables raw, causing some men to become violently ill. On emerging from the Grasslands the depleted Red Army encountered the Nineteenth Division of Hu Tsung-nan at Photo, but was able to scatter it without too much difficulty. 54 Chiang Kai-shek had only one more opportunity to defeat his enemies before they landed in the northern provinces of China.
The Kuomintang constructed trenches and bunkers and installed its guns at the Latzu Pass, between the waters of the Pailung and Min Rivers. The only way the Red Army could cross the Latzu Pass was to climb the single-plank bridge over the river, which the Kuomintang controlled. The Red Army sent three companies of climbers to scale the right bank, and they made it possible for the Communist force to capture the bridge and defeat the Kuomintang. At the end of October 1935, the troops that survived the Long March arrived in the town of Wuchichen in the northern Shensi Soviet area.
After the troops settled down, Mao led a party over to Hsiashihwan, the seat of government of the Soviet area and headquarters of the Shensi-Kansu Provincial Party Committee. Membership totalled less than forty thousand upon entering Shensi in October 1935. 55 The Long March was best summed up by stating: When Mao Tse-tung and his threadbare band arrived in the loess lands of Shensi, they represented a force, which, even on an optimistic estimate, was only a marginal element in Chinese political life viewed on a national basis. Sustained principally by discipline, hope and political formulae, Mao's group had, however, fortuitously garnered several hidden assets which were later to prove of major significance. 56 The commitment and sheer determination that enabled the remaining troops to survive the Long March helped the Chinese Communists establish themselves as the future leaders of China. Had the Long March never occurred, it is quite possible that China would be today under Japanese rule. Mao Zedong's strategic genius helped establish the Chinese Communist Party as indestructible. Because of his guerrilla warfare tactics during the encirclement campaigns and his innate ability to know what the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek were going to do, he brought a sense of mystery and power to his Party.
When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek realized that he needed the assistance of the Soviet Union in order to survive. In order to gain the assistance of the Soviet Union, Chiang needed to amend the tense, combative situation with the Chinese Communist Party. Mao had wanted to unify China for years and he looked upon this opportunity as a way to break the ice in their relations with the KMT as a whole. 57 On February 10, 1937 the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek with five conditions that needed to be met in order for the alliance to occur. Chiang and the Kuomintang needed to: Stop the civil war and unite all forces to fight the Japanese; Grant freedom to the people and release all political prisoners; Hold a national conference of all parties and circles; Prepare for an anti-Japanese war; Improve the peoples welfare. 58 If these conditions were met the Chinese Communist Party would fulfill four promises. It would: Abolish the CCP rebellious policies against the KMT government; Change the Soviet into a special region of the Republic and Red Army as a part of the Nationalist Army; Realize a democratic government of the people in a general election; Abandon the land distribution policy. 59 After making amendments to these requests the two parties came to an agreement for unification on September 15, 1937. This collaboration proved to be a great success for the CCP as a political party and for Mao as an individual person. 60 The Sino-Japanese War took place from 1937 until 1945.
During these years, the Chinese Communist Party strengthened its ability to persevere. The Red Army was extremely disciplined and organized, allowing it to strengthen its influence during this time. Had the two parties not been aligned with one another, it is doubtful that the invasion of Japan could have been ended. Mao Zedong and his troops were underestimated not only by the Nationalists but also by the Japanese. The Japanese never expected that the Communist guerrillas could become their most potent enemy and that all the territory they took over from the hostile Nationalists in North China would become the kingdom of the even more hostile Communists. 61 Although the Communists and Mao Zedong did not come into power until 1949, it is clear that the Long March galvanized commitment to the Communist cause and was thus the precursor to the eventual victory of the Communist Party in China. Mao's ability to negotiate and make decisions enabled him to take over China in 1949.
Mao knew that in order for the Chinese Communist Party to survive he needed to stress three magic wands: Party organization, military struggle, and the united front. 62 Mao's determination during the Long March solidified his eventual position as Chairman of the New Republic of China and laid the foundations for the victory achieved by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Bibliography: ENDNOTES 1 Dick Wilson, The Long March. (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 10. 2 Ibid. , 11. 3 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Sun Yat Sen, 430. 4 Ibid. 5 Wilson, 19. 6 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Chiang Kai-shek, 478. 7 Wilson, 29. 8 Chiang Kai-shek, 479. 9 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s.
v. Mao Tse-Tung, 817. 10 Frederic Tuten The Adventures of Mao on the Long March (USA: Marion Boyars, 1997), 37 11 Ibid. , 41. 12 Ibid. , 43. 13 Ibid. , 51. 14 Jean Fritz, Chinas Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1988), 24. 15 Ibid. , 28. 16 Ibid. , 32. 17 Ibid. 18 Tuten. , 53. 19 Ibid. , 56. 20 Fritz, 59. 21 Ibid, 62. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. , 63. 24 Wilson, 70. 25 Ibid. , 67. 26 Tuten, 71. 27 Wilson, 91. 28 New York Times, November 19, 1934: Sec. I, 7. 29 New York Times, November 20, 1934: Sec. I, 11. 30 Wilson, 79. 31 Fritz, 88. 32 Wilson, 93. 33 Fritz, 92 34 Wilson, 109. 35 Ibid. , 111. 36 Ibid, 112 37 Ibid, 115. 38 New York Times, January 7, 1935: Sec. I, 11. 39 New York Times, January 26, 1935: Sec. I, 10. 40 Fritz, 101. 41 New York Times, February 8, 1935: Sec.
I, 5. 42 New York Times, April 4, 1935: Sec. I, 12. 43 Ibid. 44 Benjamin Yang. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 143. 45 Ibid. , 145. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. , 148. 48 Ibid. , 149. 49 Ibid. , 151. 50 Ibid. , 152. 51 Wilson, 201 - 02. 52 Ibid. , 204. 53 Ibid. , 206. 54 Tuten, 84 55 Ibid. , 48. 56 Ibid. , 54 - 56. 57 Yang, 239. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. , 242. 61 Ibid. , 251. 62 Ibid. , 257. BIBLIOGRAPHY Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Sun Yat Sen.
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Chiang Kai-shek. Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Mao Tse-Tung.
Fritz, Jean. Chinas Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger. New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1988. New York Times, November 4, 1934. New York Times, November 19, 1934. New York Times, November 20, 1934.
New York Times, January 7, 1935 New York Times, January 26, 1935. New York Times, February 8, 1935. New York Times, April 4, 1935. Tuten, Frederic. The Adventures of Mao on the Long March. USA: Marion Boyars, 1997.
Wilson, Dick. The Long March. New York: Viking Press, 1971. Yang, Benjamin.
From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. ENDNOTES 1 Dick Wilson, The Long March. (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 10. 2 Ibid. , 11. 3 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Sun Yat Sen, 430. 4 Ibid. 5 Wilson, 19. 6 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v.
Chiang Kai-shek, 478. 7 Wilson, 29. 8 Chiang Kai-shek, 479. 9 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Mao Tse-Tung, 817. 10 Frederic Tuten The Adventures of Mao on the Long March (USA: Marion Boyars, 1997), 37 11 Ibid. , 41. 12 Ibid. , 43. 13 Ibid. , 51. 14 Jean Fritz, Chinas Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1988), 24. 15 Ibid. , 28. 16 Ibid. , 32. 17 Ibid. 18 Tuten. , 53. 19 Ibid. , 56. 20 Fritz, 59. 21 Ibid, 62. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. , 63. 24 Wilson, 70. 25 Ibid. , 67. 26 Tuten, 71. 27 Wilson, 91. 28 New York Times, November 19, 1934: Sec. I, 7. 29 New York Times, November 20, 1934: Sec. I, 11. 30 Wilson, 79. 31 Fritz, 88. 32 Wilson, 93. 33 Fritz, 92 34 Wilson, 109. 35 Ibid. , 111. 36 Ibid, 112 37 Ibid, 115. 38 New York Times, January 7, 1935: Sec. I, 11. 39 New York Times, January 26, 1935: Sec.
I, 10. 40 Fritz, 101. 41 New York Times, February 8, 1935: Sec. I, 5. 42 New York Times, April 4, 1935: Sec. I, 12. 43 Ibid. 44 Benjamin Yang. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 143. 45 Ibid. , 145. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. , 148. 48 Ibid. , 149. 49 Ibid. , 151. 50 Ibid. , 152. 51 Wilson, 201 - 02. 52 Ibid. , 204. 53 Ibid. , 206. 54 Tuten, 84 55 Ibid. , 48. 56 Ibid. , 54 - 56. 57 Yang, 239. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. , 242. 61 Ibid. , 251. 62 Ibid. , 257. BIBLIOGRAPHY Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v.
Sun Yat Sen. Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s. v. Chiang Kai-shek. Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed. , s.
v. Mao Tse-Tung. Fritz, Jean. Chinas Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger.
New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1988. New York Times, November 4, 1934. New York Times, November 19, 1934. New York Times, November 20, 1934. New York Times, January 7, 1935 New York Times, January 26, 1935. New York Times, February 8, 1935.
New York Times, April 4, 1935. Tuten, Frederic. The Adventures of Mao on the Long March. USA: Marion Boyars, 1997. Wilson, Dick. The Long March.
New York: Viking Press, 1971. Yang, Benjamin. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
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