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Example research essay topic: Intergovernmentalism As A Mode Of Union Governance - 2,316 words

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Intergovernmentalism as a Mode of Union Governance II. The Negotiation of the SEA as a Case Study A. Mode of Political process and Style of Governance Part 2: Beyond the Monolithic Government I. Case Study: Negotiating the SEA The National Level (Germany) c) Ministries, esp.

Agriculture, Finance, Economics B. Beyond the Monolithic Government 3. Factors Shaping National Policies Part 3: Intergovernmentalism and Democracy I. Intergovernmentalism and Consociation al Democracy II. Accounts, Accountability, Responsibility, Information A Theoretical A. Ambiguities about Accountability 1.

The Psychology of Accountability 3. Neglecting a Long-Run Perspective 6. Simplification of Causality Through Individual Responsibility B. The Importance of Accountability 2. "Practical" Reasons for the Persistence of the Ideal of 3. The "Kantian" Aspect of Responsibility C. The Basis for Accountability: Information IV.

Developments and Some Further Thoughts B. The Question of Levels: National / European Intergovernmentalism, albeit ringing familiar in theories of integration, has never been a clearly defined concept of political theory. Various writers imply very different things when they talk of intergovernmental ism. In particular, it is unclear whether it relates to 1) institutions ("institutional intergovernmental ism"), to 2) area fields ("functional intergovernmental ism"), or to 3) the Treaty structure (three pillars "formal intergovernmental ism"). Mostly, scholars and practitioners refer to "intergovernmental ism" in order to describe instances in which the voices of the Member States can clearly be heard on the Community level. Of course, the voices of the Member States can be heard in ways that have only little in common.

It almost is a truism to mention the fact that national influence on Community processes is directed through different channels: As suggested by the term itself, "intergovernmental ism", as referred to by many writers, often denotes the exercising of Member States control / influence on Community processes through governments. Here is a brief capsule version, hoping to capture the essence of that approach (1). National governments enjoy the possibility of exercising strong influence on Community processes. This position is most obvious in relation to 1) the Commission and 2) the Council. 1) Pressure on the Commission can be exerted formally (through government involvement in expert groups, in regulatory and management committees, and Council meetings which both the Commission and the Member States governments attend) and informally (ministers ringing Commissioners; working parties representatives meeting Commission officials). Also, the procedure of appointment to the Commission plays an important role. National nomination of Commissioners institutionalizes national input; national quota systems for senior grades perform a similar function. (However, Commission officials, of course, are not open to instructions from their home country and for the most part look for Community-wide interest. ) 2) Governmental control / influence in relation to the Council decision-making process depends on a variety of factors: the size of the State it represents; the importance of the State for particular negotiations; the desire of a government to play an active role (Germany, for instance, until the late 1960 s, kept a low profile); the capacity of the government to play an active role (domestic policy considerations such as coalition government, key interest group opposition, or electoral damage); relations with other governments; the procedure that applies (majority vote? ); the competence of national negotiators (which is often underestimated evidence suggests, however, that variations in such competencies are less between states but between individual negotiators); the arrangements for linking representatives in the Council with national capitals (which involves two issues: (a) Do representatives in working parties or COREPER enjoy room for maneuverability and flexibility e.

g. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or less so e. g. France, Greece, Ireland, UK? (b) Is a government able to co-ordinate its national position across different sectoral Councils?

The UK, for instance, enjoys relatively favorable conditions and effective co-ordinating mechanisms, such as centralized governmental system and majority party political system. Due to the following factors, such co-ordination is more difficult in Germany: coalition government; the relative autonomy of ministers and ministries within the federal government; the lack of an authoritative decision-making center, notably in cases of overlapping ministry competences or if the Chancellor does not act; the independence of the Bundesbank; the strong powers of the Later; and the strong sectoral specialization and loyalties to different federal ministries among the staff of the German Permanent Representation in Brussels). Others use the concept of "intergovernmental ism" in a more theoretical context, in particular as a counter-movement to neo-functionalism. (2) I will understand "intergovernmental ism" as one of three modes of governance within the EU system (intergovernmental ism, supra nationalism, infra nationalism). In order to give some flesh to the bare bones of intergovernmental ism, I shall analyze some of its major distinguishing features (style of intercourse, mode of political process, principal actors and players, issues of governance, level of institutionalization, visibility, transparency) by choosing a concrete example, the negotiation of the SEA (infra II. ). In Part II, I will then point to the analytical problem of a monolithic vision of government. Part III. , finally, shall deal with ways of thinking about the "democracy deficit" in the intergovernmental mode of European governance.

II. The Negotiation of the Single European Act [SEA] as a Case Study (3) A. Mode of political process and style of intercourse The negotiating history of the SEA is one of the principal examples of interstate bargaining processes. In contrast to legislative processes, which are above all characterized through vote counting etc. , the process leading to the SEA resembled multilateral diplomatic treaty negotiations. There were no formal procedures serving as a framework for the negotiations. Rather, informal "shuttle diplomacy" (above all by Mitterrand and Dumas) and bilateral (FFRG) respectively trilateral (FFRGUK) prior negotiations led to the setting of the agenda and to the forming of an agreement.

The Fontainebleau Summit Meeting and the Intergovernmental Conference itself were by definition hardly restrained through process rules other than those in place for multilateral negotiations. Initiative. The initiative for negotiating the SEA came from the Member States themselves, not from Community institutions. Above all, initiative did not come from the Commission whose input, in the supranational mode of governance, is high. To be sure, Lord Cockfield's bold White Paper and Delors's political sensitivity and swift actions contributed a great deal to the indeed remarkable speed of decision-making at the IGC. (4) However, the Commission's actions did not alter at all the substance of the agreement. The SEA's broader outlines were proposed, negotiated, and, finally, approved by the Heads of State and Governments themselves, in many instances even before the Commission came into play.

Neither played the Commission an important role at an earlier stage, when decisive steps were taken to overcome the Europessimism of the early eighties. It was, in contrast, first the Genscher-Colombo initiative (of 1981) which called for greater European unity (the Commission did no more than backing it), and later the French presidency and Mitterrand's personal involvement which eventually to a turning point (a turning point, one might add, which would have been unthinkable, in the light of heavy French attacks, on the basis of the Stuttgart Declaration alone). In other words, the breakthrough in relaunching European integration occurred well before Delors became President of the Commission, and Moravcsik concludes that "Delors' actions as Finance Minister of France may have contributed more to the SEA than those as president of the Commission. " (5) In the area where the SEA brought the most progress, the internal market, the end result departs from the Commission's original paper more radically than anywhere else. (6) Negotiation / Elaboration. The EP's voice went almost unheard.

The Done Committee, in one of its first actions, rejected the EP's "Draft Treaty Establishing European Union" and rather began negotiations based on the French government's draft. (7) After Fontainebleau, Parliament representatives were deliberately excluded from important fora by government representatives. Both "incidents" clearly show how little Parliament's input was. Its protests against the "minimalist" draft treaty and against the exclusion were ignored. I cannot think of many more places where the European Parliament's influence is so small, and where it comes close to being regarded as almost obnoxious and as an intruder of sorts. It will come as no surprise that the Parliament reacted to the outcome of the negotiations with disappointment, anger, and sharp critique. (8) In contrast to any form of legislative bargaining, the negotiations leading to the SEA were characterized by a remarkable flexibility and the absence of firm, not to mention rigid or Community-defined, rules of procedure. Many decisions were made in prior bilateral negotiations, more or less outside the EC institutional framework.

Mitterrand alone met with Kohl and Thatcher six times each during the French Council presidency in 1984. Multilateral meetings took place within a framework provided by the EC, the European Council. However, the European Council (9) is without doubt the institution in which the national voice can be heard loudest. As to the types of discussion in the European Council, the London Declaration spells out that there are both, " (i) informal exchanges of view of a wide-ranging nature held in the greatest privacy and not designed to lead to formal decisions or public statements. (ii) discussions which are designed to produce decisions, settle guidelines for future action or lead to the issue of public statements expressing the agreed view of the European Council." A third function is to "settle issues outstanding from discussions at a lower level." Many statesmen regard informal exchanges of view as the most important function of the European Council. (10) Foreign ministers are mostly excluded, and the number of interpreters and note-takers is reduced to a minimum. (11) This, of course, adds to an intimate atmosphere, keeping discussions as frank and informal as possible. Another important factor is personal acquaintance, shaping both European Council meetings as well as diplomatic negotiations in the framework of summitry. Take into account what Putnam and Bayne write about summitry: "Personal acquaintance with their fellow leaders is the effect of summitry most often stressed by submitters and their closest aides.

Unlike bureaucrats (and academics), who are typically 'paper-readers', politicians are typically 'people-readers', for whom face-to-face exchanges are important. " (12) Although it is difficult, in the absence of any written records, to firmly establish whether or not this informal exchange has contributed to building consensus within the European Council, there is no doubt that such type of intercourse epitomizes informal procedure and a low level of process rules both important elements of diplomatic negotiations and intergovernmental ism in general. In this context, it is telling and helpful to notice that, unlike European Council meetings designed to lead to formal statements and decisions, there is by agreement only very little preparation for informal exchange of view, with Heads of Government informing each other or the Presidency "a few days beforehand of the subjects they will wish to discuss." (13) This, again, is an indicator of the conspicuous lack of procedural rules, and thus of the informality and almost ad hoc-nature of the process. However, bilateral ism plays an important role in the preparation. Although official bilateral meetings are not all that common (14), bilateral ism most visibly occurs any time the Presidency chooses to engage in 'shuttle diplomacy', trying to create a package deal.

Even apart from this visible bilateral ism, it is understood that bilateral ism, in the form of partnerships, is an important core not only of the preparation of European Council meetings, but indeed of its decision-making too. One of the most obvious examples is the creation of the EMS, the initiative seized by a close Franco-German collaboration. (15) In this regard, bilateral ism is to be seen as the nucleus of intergovernmental ism, almost ruling out other modes of governance. What is more is that bilateral ism is not only closely interwoven with intergovernmental ism during the preparation stage, but also during the decision-making stage. Bilateralism leads to issue linkages, log-rolling, support buying, and side payments all elements of traditional diplomatic negotiations and intergovernmental ism. Edward Heath, for example, recalls that "the primary purpose of the [European] Council was to permit chief executives to propose compromises, issue linkages and side payments that ministers, bureaucratic factions or domestic groups might otherwise block." (16) The preparation of European Council meetings designed to generate public statements and official decisions is, of course, more structured and detailed. The presidency-in-office narrows down the possible points for agenda (17) as to what might be the ingredients for a successful package deal.

COREPER plays a key role in putting together a list of possible agenda items, which is then discussed during an early exchange amongst foreign ministers. Here, an early indication of national viewpoints takes place. Finally, the agenda is circulated among a committee called Anti Group. Foreign ministers hold their meeting in confidential session; the final setting of priorities is conducted orally.

This, again, proves the very low transparency of the whole process. Why, then, should we not call the European Council an intergovernmental institution as such? It is evolving more and more as a genuine Union organ, and as such becomes part of the network and influences of other Community organs / procedures etc. For example, the Commission may be pressing an initiative which the Presidency and at least some of the states are sympathetic to (this was the background to the discussion and adoption of the Social Charter at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989).

In that case, we cannot properly call the mode of governance an intergovernmental one rather, it tends to move towards supra nationalism. Style of Intercourse. The negotiating process resembles a lowest-common-denominator bargaining process. Due to a lack of input from EC institutions there is no 'European hegemon' (18) capable of providing universal threats or incentives the negotiation process reflects the relative power of the negotiating states and their interests. Smaller States are bought off with side-payments; larger States may exercise a de facto veto over certain...


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