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Days after the murder, when the prisoners began naming Raul Salinas de Gortari as the mastermind of the killing, Mario Ruiz Massieu-whoa told me that he was in constant touch with President Salinas and talked to him almost daily-must have told Salinas, Mr. President, we have a problem: Your brother killed my brother. The trafficking of drugs is clearly a "big business" in the current Mexican economy. In the mid- 1990 s, for example, it was reported that the drug trade was the only part of the Mexican economy that was experiencing a "boom" (Oppenheimer 164). The mid- 1990 s also spawned political corruption and assassinations. Drug related corruption and assassinations are not a problem for economic growth and stability, nor are they a problem for political stability in Mexico.
They increase the stability of the government by weeding out those that do not belong. In fact, through presidential brother Raul Salinas, Mexican drug lords were allowed to ship drugs to the United stated as long as levels were tolerable and the profits from the drug trade were invested back into the Mexican economy (Oppenheimer 306). By encouraging the drug lords to keep their profits in Mexico, the Mexican economy will become increasingly stable. The Mexican officials involved in this power play will also benefit. Their political power and eagerness to accept bribes are positively correlated with the intimacy of the relationship between the government and the drug lords.
The drug lords also benefit by investing their money into the Mexican economy; they have the financial power to voice their opinion. They have the power to buy stability, not only for their drug market, but also in the Mexican political sphere. To better understand and refute this argument we must first analyze the scope of the Mexican drug trade. Because drug trafficking is an illegal business, it is difficult to obtain precise figures regarding the size of the Mexican drug trade. It is apparent, however, that the bulk of the trade is geared toward meeting the demand for drug consumption in the United States.
The U. S. State Department has estimated that as much as 70 percent of South American cocaine bound for the U. S. market enters through Mexico (Andreas 160). The State Department has also estimated that Mexican traffickers dominate the U.
S. methamphetamine market, and that they provide between 20 and 30 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States, as well as 80 percent of the imported marijuana (Andreas 160). It has been further estimated that Mexican drug lords earn annual profits of between $ 10 and $ 30 billion as a result of the trade (Oppenheimer 164). A 1997 issue of Forbes placed the estimated income of the drug lords at $ 35 billion per year. This higher amount was obtained as a result of adjustments for the devaluation of the Mexico peso that occurred after December 1994 (Brimelow 46). Based on this estimate, the Forbes article further claimed that the profits of Mexico's drug traffickers is the equivalent of 18 percent of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP).
By contrast, "Peter, the Mexican state oil company, has revenues of only about 15 % of GDP... [and] total Mexican government spending is only about 27 % of GDP" (Brimelow 46). In addition, the Forbes article reported that there have been signs in recent years that the drug trafficking problem in Mexico has been growing worse instead of better. This indication can be seen, for example, in the fact that the U. S.
State Department's budget for fighting the Mexican drug trade was increased from $ 658, 000 in 1995 to $ 5 million in 1997 (Brimelow 46). On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence to support the claim that this massive drug trade has corrupted many Mexican officials and is interfering with international relations. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times, for example, stated that Mexico "has been buffeted in recent years by charges that drug traffickers have spread their influence into the top levels of government and business" (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A 1). Numerous stories have surfaced in recent years that show evidence of such things as accepted bribes, tip-offs of suspected traffickers, police theft of confiscated drugs, government leaders (including anti-drug officials) involved in corruption scandals and, at a more extreme level, political assassinations that are apparently linked to the drug trade. Some U.
S. officials have spoken out on the problem of Mexico's drug corruption. As an example, Robert S. Gelbard, a State Department official for narcotics issues, has claimed that U. S.
officials have "always" been aware of the existence of drug-related corruption in Mexican law enforcement (Golden "A Cocaine Trail" A 14). Thomas Constantine, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has made the similar claim that "there is not one single law-enforcement institution in Mexico with which the DEA has an entirely trusting relationship" ("Neighbours" 26). There have been leaders in the Mexican government that have also acknowledged the problem of drug corruption. For example, the Mexican Attorney General, Jorge Carpizo, made the claim in 1992 "that Mexican political institutions had become infiltrated by the interests of narco traffickers" (Rochlin 111).
Soon after that, the ex-president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado likewise "acknowledged the complicity existing between narco traffickers and important components of the Mexican government" (Rochlin 111). Ernesto Zedillo, who became president in late 1994, has indicated that he is trying to reform a political and legal system, which he sees as being " 80 % corrupt" ("Mexico's Great Salinas Soap" 39). In his book Bordering on Chaos, Andres Oppenheimer cites a 1995 study by the Mexican Interior Ministry in which it was estimated that "more than 60 percent of the members of all police forces in the country had received bribes or had criminal records themselves" (301). Oppenheimer also refers to an official report from the Mexican attorney general's office. According to this report, "even with Mexico's strong job protection laws, more than four hundred members of its Federal Judicial Police - or more than 10 percent of the force's personnel - had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the three years ending in mid- 1995 because of suspected ties to the drug cartels" (302). Although the problem has grown worse in recent years, Mexico has long been involved in the trafficking of drugs designated for U.
S. consumers. According to Rochlin, "Mexico's role in hemispheric narcotrafficking began in the 1930 s and revolved around opium production" (Rochlin 105). This role grew to dramatic proportions in the 1970 s, in part because of the development of a "drug counter-culture" in the United States, and in part because of the 1972 termination of the "French connection" of heroin supplies to the U.
S. market (Rochlin 105 - 106). Mexico's role in narcotics trafficking became even more substantial in the 1980 s, after the United States succeeded in cutting off the Colombian supply routes through Florida. As a result of this situation, the U.
S. -Mexico border came to replace Florida "as the main passage for drugs to the U. S. market" (Oppenheimer 164). For the past few decades, Mexico's role in supplying U.
S. drug users has been seen as a serious problem in the relations between the two nations. The Mexican government has often shown signs of cooperating with the United States in dealing with this issue. However, there is evidence that many of these signs of cooperation are intended merely to appease U. S.
officials. In this regard, it has been alleged that Mexican officials often track down and prosecute certain known drug traffickers while at the same time protecting other known traffickers. An example of an alleged effort to merely appease the U. S.
government can be seen in the early 1970 s, when President Diaz Order instituted a new program called "Operation Cooperation. " The purpose of this program was to show the United States that the Mexican government was cooperating in the effort to curb the drug trafficking problem. However, Rochlin says that this government program was not actually effective in terms of doing anything to solve the problem. As such, Rochlin claims that this event indicates that "the Mexican government learned early that it at least had to appear to be serious in the war against illicit drugs" (106). By the 1980 s, drug trafficking had become deeply entrenched in the Mexican economy. This was especially true after the 1982 debt crisis, which resulted in "the promotion of illicit drugs as a key subsidizer of a bankrupt Mexican economy" (Rochlin 107). The economic crisis of the time gave strong encouragement to government and police officials to fall into the lure of drug corruption.
Clearly, the situation provided an opportunity whereby huge amounts of money could be made with a minimum of effort. According to Rochlin, it was during this time that "Mexican security structures became penetrated by narco traffickers, severely weakening their credibility and legitimacy" (106). Rochlin further describes a theory about the relationship between the growing problem of drug corruption and the debt crisis that existed in Mexico during the early 1980 s. Rochlin argues that components of the government and traffickers essentially cooperated to satisfy mutual interests" (108). As an example, Rochlin points out that "it has been alleged that the de la Madrid government failed to bother drug barons, in exchange for the deposit of immense sums of narco dollars in Mexican banks during the severe financial crisis that plagued most of the 1980 s" (108). In the mid- 1980 s, there was growing physical evidence relating to the corruption of Mexican officials by drug traffickers.
For example, in March 1985, the bodies of two men were found, and it was apparent that they had both been tortured to death. It was soon discovered that the bodies were those of a U. S. DEA agent, Enrique Camerena Salazar, and his pilot. Two Mexican drug traffickers were arrested in connection with the case. Furthermore, the chief investigator into the case, Armando Pain, admitted that he had accepted a $ 275, 000 bribe from one of the drug traffickers in return for "a safe exit at the Guadalajara airport" (Rochlin 109).
According to Oppenheimer, this case provides clear evidence that Mexican law enforcement officials had tried to protect drug traffickers. As such, the case shows that "Mexican police and army commanders had been on the criminals's ide" (300). During the late 1980 s, there were other outbreaks of violence which were clearly related to the activities of drug traffickers. There was hope that the situation would change after Carlos Salinas de Gortari became president in 1988. Like all Mexican presidents since 1929, Salinas was a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (De Witt 6). During his time in office (through 1994), Salinas made the appearance that he was cooperating in the effort to fight drug trafficking.
Nevertheless, allegations and admissions of official drug corruption continued during that time. Furthermore, Rochlin notes that "the flow of Mexican narcotics into the States remained on an upswing" during the period of Salinas's presidency (110). In 1990, an investigative news program on American television revealed evidence that Sergio Garcia Ramirez, the attorney general under President de la Madrid, "was involved in both drug trafficking and in the 1985 murder of DEA agent Camerena" (Rochlin 110). Thus, despite Salinas's claims of cooperation in the war against drugs, "corruption of official Mexican institutions by narco traffickers became more apparent in the 1990 s" (Rochlin 111). Drug corruption is prevalent in Mexico because of the nation's ongoing economic problems. Because of these problems, many officials have been tempted to accept bribes from drug traffickers.
In addition, Rochlin points out that many of the nation's peasant farmers turned to the production of drug crops in the 1970 s because they "appreciated the profits that drug crops could yield, especially in the context of an emerging economic crisis" (106). It is interesting to note that the times of greatest corruption and violence in the drug trade (such as the mid- 1980 s and the mid- 1990 s) have also been times of economic crisis. Drug trafficking plays a role in the economy of Mexico by providing "jobs" to citizens who would otherwise be unemployed. Regarding this, Andreas says that the drug trade is a "significant employer" in the nation (160). Furthermore, drug traffickers have played a role in the development of certain parts of Mexico, where they have "financed schools, hospitals, and other social welfare projects" (Rochlin 107). Regarding the pervasive role of drug trafficking in the Mexican society, Eduardo Valle once claimed that the nation's leading drug lords had become "driving forces, pillars even, of our economic growth" (Andreas 160).
If you dont go along with the narco's they kill you (Veronica Esperonza) This double sided sword was a way for the drug lords to weed out the individuals who didnt fit into their game plan. Regarding the increased evidence of official corruption, Andreas has said that "the extent of drug-related corruption in Mexico is revealed by the series of high-profile murders and scandals in recent years" (161). In May 1993, a high-profile murder occurred with the assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo. At first, it was assumed that drug traffickers had killed the cardinal by mistake.
However, the subsequent investigation into the case suggested that he may have been intentionally murdered because he "was the only major authority figure in Guadalajara not owned by the narcotics traffickers" (Rochlin 111). This theory presumes that Posadas was killed either to provide a "warning" to the government, or because he was about to reveal information about the links between the government and drug traffickers (Rochlin 111 - 112). Other cases of drug-related violence in the early 1990 s involved clashes of certain police groups against each other. For example, in March 1994, a group of Federal police officers were about to arrest a drug cartel leader in Baja California when they were suddenly ambushed by members of the local police force. Apparently, the members of the local police department had been bribed to protect the trafficker. Ironically, the head of the Federal police unit was killed during the incident, while the drug trafficker was able to use the confusion to make his escape (Oppenheimer 301).
Two other high-profile assassinations occurred during 1994. The first of these was the assassination of Luis Donald Colosio, a PRI candidate for the presidency who was shot to death in March while campaigning in Tijuana. Although he was a member of the dominant political party, Colosio was also interested in bringing reform to the party. Regarding this, Colosio had publicly claimed shortly before his death that he wanted to reduce the monolithic power of the presidential office and that he wanted "to end any vestige of authoritarianism" in Mexican politics (Oppenheimer 62).
The second assassination victim, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, was a deputy leader of the PRI who was also in favor of reforming the nation's political system. His death occurred in Mexico City in September of 1994 (Golden "Salinas's Brother" A 1). As in the case of the Camerena and Posadas murders, the exact causes and motives of these two killings have not been determined. Nevertheless, various theories have been developed in an effort to answer these questions. In the words of De Witt, "though theories about these killings are numerous and varied, few of them exclude PRI rivals and / or drug dealers from their calculus" (8). Some theorists feel that Ruiz Massieu and Colosio were murdered by drug traffickers as a warning to the government.
Other theorists claim that the assassinations were related to "turf wars" between rival Mexican drug cartels (Oppenheimer 306 - 307). Regardless these high profile murders are rocking the stability of the Mexican economy. The theories regarding these two assassinations became more complex following a series of events that occurred in early 1995. In February of that year, Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of the former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was arrested and charged with having ordered the murder of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu. According to the New York Times article that reported the arrest, Raul Salinas had three possible motives for ordering the assassination: "some sort of personal vendetta, a fight for political power, or possibly a political struggle that involved drug traffickers" (Golden "Salinas's Brother" A 8). The suspicions surrounding Raul Salinas grew deeper when his brother fled to Ireland soon after the arrest.
Furthermore, in November 1995, investigators in Switzerland discovered that Raul Salinas had stashed away millions of dollars in secret accounts ("Mexico's Great Salinas Soap" 39). Despite the implication that this money was raised through illegal drug profits, the Mexican government did not open a drug investigation against Raul Salinas. Rather, the special prosecutor in the case, Pablo Chapa Bezanilla, sought to develop the initial charge of political assassination (Preston A 3). In October 1996, Chapa announced the discovery of important evidence in the case - a corpse which was found buried near Raul Salinas's home.
However, the authorities soon realized that the corpse had actually been planted on the property in an effort to frame Salinas. When a warrant was issued for the arrest of Chapa, the prosecutor fled the country, thereby jeopardizing the government's case against Raul Salinas (Preston A 3). Later, in April 1997, Swiss authorities completed their investigation of Raul Salinas's bank accounts and determined that the tens of millions of dollars deposited there had been obtained in return for his role in protecting the movement of drug supplies through Mexico. This was a significant announcement because it was the first time that a government law-enforcement agency had openly claimed that Raul Salinas "received payments from drug traffickers" (Preston A 3). Further connections to the murder of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu were traced to the victim's own brother, Mario Ruiz Massieu.
Mario Ruiz, a former narcotics prosecutor, was the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the investigation into his brother's death. In November 1994, Mario resigned from the investigation with the claim that government officials were standing in the way of his efforts. Then, in early 1995, Mario Ruiz was arrested when he tried to flee into the United States with $ 46, 000 in cash (Rochlin 112). In March, the Mexican government charged Mario Ruiz with attempting to cover up the role of Raul Salinas in the death of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu (Golden "A Cocaine Trail" A 14). Meanwhile, authorities in the United States began an investigation into how Mario Ruiz was able to deposit more than $ 9 million in bank accounts in Houston and Mexico City. The investigation was based on "the possibility that Mr.
Ruiz Massieu's fortune may have come from protecting drug traffickers and that such a link might somehow explain his willingness to protect the former President's brother rather than seek justice for his own" (Golden "A Cocaine Trail" A 14). A civil trial on the matter was opened in Houston in March of 1997. At the trial, Mario Ruiz claimed that the money did not come from bribes for protecting drug shipments, b...
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