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Example research essay topic: Division Of Labor Struggle For Existence - 5,089 words

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... es, that it attaches us; thus Durkheim denied that it was a true social link, and repeated his argument that all such links derived from likeness have progressively weakened. If society itself is to survive, therefore, there must be some other "true social link" which replaces it, and this, of course, is organic solidarity, the product of the division of labor. But if the way in which men are linked together has thus evolved from mechanical to organic solidarity, there should be parallel changes in the structural features of the societies themselves. What kind of social structure, therefore, might we expect to find in a society whose cohesiveness is based primarily on resemblances? Briefly, we would expect what Durkheim called the horde -- an absolutely homogeneous mass of indistinguishable parts, devoid of all form.

arrangement, or organization. Durkheim admitted that no societies fitting this description had ever been observed; but among both the Iroquois 24 and Australian 25 tribes, he found societies made up of a number of groups of this kind. Durkheim thus gave the name clan to the horde which had become an element of a more extensive group, and used the term segmental societies with a clan base to refer to peoples thus constituted through an association of clans. Durkheim chose the term "clan" because these groups are both familial (i. e. , all members are regarded as "kin, " most are consanguineous, and they practice collective punishment, collective responsibility, and, once private property appears, mutual inheritance) and political (i. e. , not all members are consanguineous, some merely bear the same name; it attains dimensions much larger than any "family, " and the heads of clans are the sole political authorities).

Most important, however, the clan is internally homogeneous, and its solidarity is thus based on resemblances. 26 Even the clans themselves must bear certain resemblances if segmental organization is to be possible, although their differences must also be sufficient to prevent them from "losing themselves" in one another. This, then, is the social structure of mechanically solidary societies. But there is also a social structure to which organic solidarity corresponds. Typically, such societies are constituted not by homogeneous segments, but by a system of different organs, each of which has a special role, and which themselves are formed of differentiated parts. These parts are also arranged differently: rather than being merely juxtaposed or mingled, they are coordinated and subordinated to one another around a central organ, which exercises a regulative action on the entire organism. Finally, the place of each individual in such societies is determined not by his name or kin-group, but by the particular occupation or social function to which he is committed.

This is what Durkheim called the organized societal type which, because of its sharp differences from the segmental type, can advance only in so far as the latter is gradually effaced. But Durkheim was also aware of the considerable complexity of the transition from one to the other, and provided a particularly subtle account of the almost parasitical manner in which the new occupational "organs" at first utilize the old familial system (as when Levites became priests), the subsequent process whereby consanguineous ties give way to less resistant bonds based upon territorial allegiances, and, finally, the complete triumph of the fully "organized" societal type over the structural constraints of its earlier, "segmental, " counterpart. As with the primitive horde, Durkheim admitted that this organized type was nowhere presently observable in its purest form; but he added that "a day will come when our whole social and political organization will have a base exclusively, or almost exclusively, occupational. " 27 Thus far, Durkheim's argument would have appeared relatively familiar to his contemporaries, for it bore an unmistakable similarity to that found in Spencer's Principles of Sociology (1876 - 1885), particularly in its emphasis on the growth of individuality with the advance of civilization. This similarity was sufficiently upsetting to Durkheim to provoke a more detailed account of his differences with Spencer. For the latter, for example, the submersion of the individual in lower societies was the result of force, an artificial suppression required by the essentially despotic, "military" type of organization appropriate to an early stage of social evolution.

For Durkheim, by contrast, the effacement of the individual was the product of a societal type characterized by the complete absence of all centralized authority; military personality in lower societies was a consequence not of suppression, but of the fact that, in those societies, the "individual, " as such, did not exist. Reversing Spencer's argument, therefore, Durkheim saw the emergence of despotic authority not as a step toward the effacement of the individual, but as the first step toward individualism itself, the chief being the first personality to emerge from the previously homogeneous social mass. But there was more to this than a typical Durkheim ian annihilation of an intellectually inferior opponent; for Durkheim sought to establish two important propositions. The first of these was hinted at in our earlier discussion of Durkheim's view of the state -- that when we find a governmental system of great authority.

we must seek its cause not in the particular situation of the governing, but in the nature of the societies governed. The second was that altruism, far from being a recent advance over man's selfish, egoistic tendencies, is found in the earliest societies; for, as we have seen, Durkheim had a dualistic conception of human nature, and thus both egoism and altruism were natural expressions of the human conscience at all stages of social evolution. What, then, is the essential difference between lower societies and our own? Durkheim's answer was again worked out in opposition to Spencer, whose own answer again appeared quite similar.

Spencer had observed, like Durkheim, that in industrial societies a cooperative form of solidarity is produced automatically as a consequence of the division of labor. But if Spencer thus recognized the true cause of social solidarity in advanced societies, Durkheim argued, he had not understood the way in which it produced its effect; and, misunderstanding this, Spencer had misunderstood the nature of the effect (i. e. , social solidarity) itself. Consider only two features of Spencer's conception of social solidarity: because industrial solidarity is produced automatically, it does not require the regulation or intervention of the state in order to produce or maintain it; and because the sphere of societal action is thus drastically reduced, the only surviving link between men is the relationship of contracts, freely entered and freely abrogated, according to the self-interest of the parties involved.

Durkheim's initial response was that, if this is truly the character of societies whose solidarity is produced by the division of labor, we might with justice doubt their stability; for "self-interest" creates only the most ephemeral, superficial sort of social bond, and in fact disguises a more fundamental, albeit latent and deferred, conflict. The large and increasing volume of restitutive law, moreover, hardly suggested to Durkheim that the regulative intervention of the state in contractual relations was decreasing; on the contrary, it suggested that unregulated contracts alone were insufficient to secure equal justice for their contending parties -- particularly the worker in contractual relations between labor and management. While Spencer was right to point to the increase in the number of social relationships governed by contract, he ignored the parallel increase in the number of non -contractual relations; but most important, he ignored the fact that, even within the contract, "everything is not contractual" -- i. e. , a contract assumes the predetermination of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, a function performed not only by state-regulated contract law, but also through the less formal but nonetheless imperative structures of custom. In short, Spencer did not understand the nature of social solidarity nor did he understand the function of the division of labor.

Whatever its economic advantages, the function of the division of labor was pre-eminently moral. In fact, contrasting the solidarity created by occupational specialization with the "inferior" bonds forged by its mechanical counterpart, Durkheim insisted that the moral character of society is more pronounced in the "organized" type. Precisely because the modern individual is not sufficient unto himself, for example, it is from society that he receives all that is necessary to life; thus is created his strong sentiment of personal dependence which inspires those mundane sacrifices we call "moral acts" and, in occasional, extreme cases, those acts of complete self-renunciation which Durkheim would take up in Suicide (1897). On its side, society learns to regard its members not as indistinguishable units that could be lost without serious disruption to its internal economy, but as irreplaceable organic parts which it cannot neglect, and towards which it has important obligations. It was the perfection of this moral function toward which all social evolution tended.

Durkheim was always concerned to distinguish the causes of a social fact from its functions, and the division of labor was no exception. Indeed, he insisted, the causes of the division of labor could not possibly consist in some anticipation of its moral effects; for, as we have seen, those effects became evident only after a lengthy process of social evolution, and could hardly be foreseen. In a different sense, however, Durkheim's inquiry into causes rehearsed his earlier analysis of functions; for, just as the earlier discussion began with Durkheim's rejection of Adam Smith's argument that the function of the division of labor was the advancement of civilization, so the later discussion began with a negative assessment of that "classic" explanation, attributed to political economy in general, whereby the cause of the division of labor would be "man's unceasing desire to increase his happiness. " 28 Against this explanation, which would reduce the division of labor to purely individual and psychological causes, Durkheim launched a three-pronged attack. First, he challenged the axiom on which the explanation rests -- namely, the assumption that man's desire to increase his happiness is indeed unceasing. Here Durkheim's early experience in Wundt's psychological laboratory served him well, for he was able to cite the famous law of the German experimental psychologist E.

H. Weber (later quantified by Gustav Fechner) to the effect that the smallest increment in a stimulus required to produce a, difference in the sensation experienced is not an absolute amount, but is rather relative to the magnitude of the stimulus in question. As a corollary to this law, Durkheim insisted that the intensity of any agreeable stimulus can increase usefully (i. e. , contribute to increased pleasure) only between two extremes. An increase in monetary wealth, for example, must be of a certain size if pleasure is to be its result; inversely, a person thoroughly accustomed to large increases in wealth estimates the value of such increases accordingly, and is equally denied pleasure proportionate to the stimulus received. The increase in income experienced by the man of average wealth is thus the one most apt to produce a degree of pleasure proportionate to its cause.

If the cause of the division of labor were the desire for happiness, therefore, social evolution would surely have come to a stop long ago; for the maximum happiness of which men are capable would have been achieved through a relatively moderate development of social differentiation and its resulting stimuli. 29 This insistence that the human capacity for happiness is very limited, a kind of Aristotelian ethics augmented by Wundt's Grunzuge der physiologischen Psychologie (1874), remained one of Durkheim's most constant and characteristic ideas. Second, Durkheim regarded it as very doubtful that the advance of civilization increases human happiness in any case. Here Durkheim initially sounds like Rousseau: while he admitted that we enjoy pleasures unknown to earlier societies, he observed also that we experience forms of suffering that they were spared, and added that it is not at all certain that the balance is in our favor. But it soon becomes clear that, again. Durkheim's more fundamental source was Aristotle. Even if social progress did produce more pleasure than pain, Durkheim thus insisted, this would not necessarily bring more happiness; for "pleasure" describes the local, limited, momentary state of a particular function, while "happiness" describes the health of the physical and moral species in its entirety, the extent to which that species has realized its true nature.

Thus, the normal savage is just as happy as the normal civilized man, an argument supported not only by Waitz's Anthropologie der Naturvolker (1859), but also by the rapid rise in the suicide rate commensurate with the advance in civilization, a phenomenon in which Durkheim already had a powerful interest. Durkheim's third argument dealt with a revised version of the "happiness hypothesis" which might have met the objections of his first two -- that pleasure (which is at least an element in happiness) loses its intensity with repetition, and can be recaptured only through new stimuli, meaning more productive work (and hence, through the division of labor). Progress would thus be, quite literally, an effect of boredom. But to this Durkheim had several objections. First, such a "law" would apply to all societies, and thus it could provide no account of why the division of labor advances in some societies and not in others. Second, Durkheim denied the assumption on which the argument is based: namely, that repetition alone reduces the intensity of pleasure.

So long as our pleasures have a certain variety, he argued, they can be repeated endlessly; only if the pleasure is continuous and uninterrupted does its intensity wane. But even if continuity thus does what repetition cannot, Durkheim continued, it could not inspire us with a need for new stimuli; for if continuity eliminates our consciousness of the agreeable state, we could hardly perceive that the pleasure attached to it has also vanished. Even novelty itself is but a secondary, accessory quality of pleasure, without which our ordinary pleasures, if sufficiently varied, can survive very well. In short, boredom is an insufficient cause to so painful and laborious an effect as the development of the division of labor. Having thus dismissed individualistic, psychologist ic causes, Durkheim argued that we must seek the explanation of the division of labor in some variation within the social context, and added that his earlier discussion of its function already pointed in the direction of an answer.

Durkheim had shown how the organized structure (and thus the division of labor) had developed as the segmental structure had disappeared; thus, either the disappearance of the segmental structure is the cause of the division of labor, or vice versa. Since, as we have seen, the segmental structure is an insurmountable obstacle to the division of labor, the latter hypothesis is clearly false; the division of labor can thus appear only in proportion as the segmental structure has already begun to disappear. How does this occur? Briefly, Durkheim suggested that, instead of social life being concentrated in a number of small, identical individual segments, these parts begin to extend beyond their limits, exchange movements, and act and react upon one another. Durkheim called this dynamic or moral density, and suggested that it increases in direct ratio to the progress of the division of labor. But what produces this "moral density"?

Durkheim pointed to two causes. First, the real, material distance between members of a society must be reduced both spatially (e. g. , the growth of cities) and technologically (e. g. , advances in communications and transportation), for such "material density" multiplies the number of intra-societal relations. Second, this effect is reinforced by the sheer "social volume" of a society (the total number of its members). Thus, Durkheim argued that the division of labor varies in direct ratio to the dynamic or moral density of society, which is itself an effect of both material density and social volume. 30 But how does this double cause (material density and social volume) produce its ultimate effect (the division of labor)?

Here again, Durkheim had to confront the competing explanation of Herbert Spencer. In First Principles (1862), Spencer had argued that all homogeneous masses are inherently unstable and thus tend toward differentiation, and that they differentiate more rapidly and completely as their extension is greater. But in Spencer's theory, such extension produces differentiation, not by itself, but only in so far as it exposes parts of the social mass to diverse physical environments, thus encouraging diverse aptitudes and institutional specialization. Durkheim in fact agreed that a diversity of external circumstances has this differentiating effect; but he denied that this diversity was sufficient to cause (rather than merely accelerate) an effect so dramatic as the division of labor. For his own explanation, Durkheim turned to Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), arguing that an increased material density and social volume cause the division of labor, not because they increase exposure to diverse external circumstances, but because they render the struggle for existence more acute. According to Darwin, so long as resources are plentiful and population size is limited, similar organisms can live side by side in relative peace; but where population increases and resources become scarce, conflict and competition ensue, and this conflict is just as active as the organisms are similar and pursue similar needs.

Where organisms are different and pursue different needs, on the other hand, what is useful to one organism will be of no value to another, and conflict will diminish. Human populations, Durkheim argued, adhere to the same law. In so far as a social structure is "segmental" in character, each segment has its own organs, kept apart from like organs by the divisions between segments. With the growth in the "material density" and "social volume" of the society, these divisions disappear, the similar organs are put into contact with one another, and competition between them ensues. Those groups which triumph then have a larger task, which can be discharged only through a greater internal division of labor; those organs which are vanquished can henceforth maintain themselves only by specializing on a fraction of the social function they previously performed; but in either case, the division of labor is advanced. Thus, the conflict and competition resulting from an increase in social volume and density produces advances in the division of labor just as the latter mitigates against the negative consequences of the former.

In the modern city, for example, large and highly condensed populations can coexist peacefully as a consequence of occupational differentiation: "The soldier seeks military glory, the priest moral authority, the statesman power, the businessman riches, the scholar scientific renown. Each of them can attain his end without preventing the others from obtaining theirs. " 31 Nothing in this process, Durkheim added, implies an increase in happiness, or that the pursuit of happiness might be its goal: on the contrary, "everything takes place mechanically" as the result of an inexorable law of social progress. Finally, Durkheim argued, it is a corollary of this law that the division of labor can be established only among the members of an already constituted society. For the effect of these same forces (e. g. , opposition, conflict, competition, etc. ) upon a number of independent individuals could only be further diversification without the development of compensatory social bonds 32, while Durkheim had already shown that the division of labor creates moral linkages even as it differentiates. Durkheim thus argued that the individuals among whom the struggle for existence is waged must already belong to the same, mechanically solidary society.

In opposition to Spencer's view that a society is the product of cooperation, therefore, Durkheim supported Comte's argument that cooperation already presupposes the spontaneous existence of society. 33 This, in turn, became the basis for Durkheim's reply to Brunetiere at the height of the Dreyfus Affair. Far from being destructive of the social order, individualism is itself the product of society, and expresses a particular stage in its ongoing, structural evolution. Durkheim had thus argued forcefully that the division of labor is caused by changes in the volume and density of societies. But this was not yet a complete explanation, for Durkheim recognized that such specialization was not the only possible solution to the struggle for existence which then ensued. Others included emigration, colonization, resignation to a precarious existence, and even suicide. The division of labor was thus a contingent rather than a necessary consequence of changes in the social environment, and for it rather than its alternatives to result, it was essential that the influence of at least two secondary factors -- the conscience collective and heredity -- be significantly reduced.

Durkheim's argument concerning the "progressive indetermination" of the conscience collective has already been described; but now Durkheim attempted to explain it, focusing equally on the growth of rationality and the decline of tradition. In early societies, Durkheim began, everyone is related to specific objects of their environment (e. g. , animals, trees, plants, etc. ) in roughly the same way, and the states of conscience representing this environment take on a parallel similarity; the fusion of these individual consciences thus results in a conscience collective which is sharp, decisive, and well-defined. As these societies become more voluminous and their populations more diversely situated, however, common objects can no longer create common experiences and representations; in so far as it is to remain "common, " therefore, the conscience collective must necessarily become less concrete and well-defined, and more general and abstract.

The "animal" becomes the "species, " the "tree" becomes "trees in general and in abstracto, " the "Greek" and the "Roman" become the concept of "man"; and a similar process of progressive abstraction up to the level of universalizable concepts persists in law, religion. and morality. This explains the difficulty we have in understanding primitive societies. Our own minds, dominated by the logic and rationality this evolutionary process has produced, see in earlier societies only bizarre, fortuitous combinations of heterogeneous elements; but in fact, these are simply societies dominated by concrete sensations and representations rather than abstract concepts. 34 But in so far as the conscience collective thus becomes less concrete and decisive, it necessarily has less of an impact on individual thought and behavior. Precise states of conscience act in a manner analogous to instinctive reflexes; more general principles affect behavior only through the intervening reflections of intelligence. Thus, "deliberated movements have not the spontaneity of involuntary movements.

Because it becomes more rational, the [ conscience collective ] becomes less imperative, and for this very reason, it wields less restraint over the free development of individuals. " 35 But the cause of this growth of rationality, again, is the increase in the volume of the society's population and the environmental diversity thus implied. Still more important than the "progressive indetermination" of the conscience collective, however, is the decline of tradition; for the strength of the conscience is due to the fact not only that its states are shared, but also that they are the legacy of previous generations. This authority of tradition is well supported in societies of the segmental type, which, as we have seen, have a familial as well as a political base; but as the segmental organization is undermined, individuals no longer feel bound to their kin-group or even their place of origin; migration ensues, and the authority of tradition weakens commensurately. But here, again, the decline of tradition is the consequence of those factors -- social volume and density -- which gradually dissipate the segmental form of social organization. In other words, just as it is purely mechanical causes which lead to the individual's submersion in the conscience collective, it is similarly mechanical causes (not the "utility" of emancipation) which subvert that conscience and lead to individual freedom. But don't the occupational specialities of more organized societies simply reproduce the conscience of the primitive segment, and exercise the same regulative function.

For at least three reasons, Durkheim's answer was an emphatic no: first, the occupational conscience affects only the occupational life, beyond which the individual enjoys much greater freedom; second, the occupational conscience is shared by fewer individual minds, has commensurately less authority, and thus offers less resistance to individual transgressions than its collective counterpart; and third, the same causes (i. e. , increased volume and density) which progressively undermine the conscience collective have a similar, if less dramatic, effect within the occupational group. Thus, "not only does occupational regulation, because of its very nature, hinder less than any other the play of individual variation, but it also tends to do so less and less. " 36 The other "secondary factor" whose influence had to be reduced in order for the division of labor to emerge was the role of heredity. Durkheim was particularly concerned with this because, according to John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy (1848), the first condition of the division of labor was that "diversity of natures" whose principal function was to classify individuals according to their capacities. If this were the case, Durkheim argued, heredity would, constitute an even more insurmountable obstacle to individual variability than the conscience collective; for, where the latter chained us only to the moral authority of our familial group, the former would bind us to our race, and thus to an utterly impersonal, congenital past, totally oblivious to our individual interests and aspirations. Thus, the greater the role of heredity in a society's distribution of tasks (as, for example, in the caste system, or in rigidly stratified societies), the more invariable that distribution, and the more difficult it is for the division of labor to make headway.

It was Durkheim's goal, however, to show that, for at least two reasons, the role played by heredity in the distribution of tasks has declined in the course of social evolution. First, Durkheim observed, aptitudes appear to be less transmissible by heredity precisely to the degree that they are more specialized; in so far as a society has a more complex division of labor, therefore, the relative role played by heredity in determining individual capacities will have been reduced. In short, social evolution produces new modes of activity requiring capacities that heredity simply cannot transmit. Second, Durkheim insisted, even those capacities that heredity can transmit (e. g. , instincts) decline both in number and strength with social evolution. 37 Whether conceived relatively or absolutely, therefore. the contribution of heredity to the determination of individual tasks has been progressively reduced, and has thus presented few obstacles to the continuing growth of the division of labor.

This led Durkheim to some general conclusions about the distinction between the division of physiological labor and its social counterpart. Precisely because it is imposed by birth, Durkheim argued, the function of the biological cell is immutably fixed; but in society, hereditary dispositions are not predestinate, and the individual's specialized function is largely self-determined. Durkheim thus denied the view of Comte and Spencer that "substitution" (i. e. , one part of an aggregate exchanging function with another) was a characteristic of lower rather than higher evolutionary forms 38; on the contrary, in social evolution, function becomes independent of structure in direct proportion to the increasing complexity of society. This in turn explains the origin and development of "civilization"; for as social volume and density increase, men can maintain themselves only through harder work and the intensification of their faculties, which inevitably produces a higher state of culture.

But Durkheim's theory of social evolution was not quite so mechanistic as the account above implies; for, while he urged that civilization was thus the effect of necessary causes, and denied that it was the result of the desire for happiness, he nonetheless argued that it was also "an end, an object of desire, in short, an ideal. " 39 This paradoxical quality of civilization was based, once again, on Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological. At each stage in the history of a given society, he suggested, there is a "certain intensity" of the collective life which is "normal"; and if everything in the society happens "normally, " this state is realized automatically. But, in fact, everything does not happen normally; societies, like individual organisms. are subject to disease, and this prevents them from realizing their natural, ideal condition.

Under these circumstances, Durkheim argued, it is not only legitimate but also essential that the sociologist intervene, ascertain the degree of collective activity appropriate to existing conditions, and attempt to realize this ideal state of health (or "golden mean") by the proper means. 40 And precisely because the "conditions" here referred to would constantly change, the social ideal would always be definite without ever becoming definitive: "Thus, not only does a mechanistic theory of progress not deprive us of an ideal, but it permits us to believe that we shall never lack for one. " 41 Finally, these observations led Durkheim to a sociological reformulation of the mind-body problem posed in Descartes' Meditations (1641). The progress of the individual conscience, as we have seen, is in inverse ratio to that of instinct, not because that conscience "breaks up" instinct, but because it "invades" the territory that instinct has ceased to occupy. Instinct, of course, has regressed because of the increasing importance of sociability; thus, the rational superiority of human beings over lower animals is a consequence of their superior sociability. Durkheim thus agreed with the observation of the "spiritualist" philosophers 42 that modern "psycho-physiology" would never be able to explain more than a small fraction of psychic phenomena through reference to organic causes; for psychic life, in its highest manifestations, is simply much too free and complex to be understood as a mere extension of physical life.

But this is not to say that psychic life cannot be explained by natural causes; for society, no less than organic processes, is a part of nature. There is thus a vast region of the individual conscience which is both unintelligible to "psycho-physiology" and yet perfectly amenable to scientific investigation. Durkheim thus called for a "socio-psychology" which would investigate those psychic facts which have social causes. Far from deriving social facts from the essential features of human nature, such a positive science, pace Spencer, would derive human nature from society. Abnormal Forms of the Division of Labor The normal function of the division of labor, as we have seen, is to produce a form of social solidarity; but, like all social (as well as biological) facts, the division of labor may present "pathological" forms which produce different and even contrary results.

Durkheim was especially


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